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Dissertation

PRAGMATIC ELEMENTS IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF BORDEN P. BOWNE

by

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INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of Borden P. Bowne shows the use of two distinct types of method, both empirically grounded: the rationalistic and the pragmatic. This fact is evident to any student of Bowne's writings as a whole, and accounts for the various interpretations that have been given to his philosophy. To some students of Bowne the rationalistic type of method has seemed the more fundamental and characteristic in the development of his thought; to others, the pragmatic. Nevertheless, in no investigation have the pragmatic elements in his philosophy been carefully isolated and defined; nor has their relation to the rationalistic emphases been critically exhibited and evaluated. That such a study of the pragmatic elements is necessary, however, before the relative importance of the rationalistic and pragmatic types of method in the thought of Bowne can be critically evaluated is clear. It is to this problem that the present study is devoted.

As explicitly formulated, the problem may be stated thus: Precisely what are the pragmatic elements in the epistemology of Bowne; how are they related to the theoretical function of the reason; from what sources are they drawn; what was Bowne's relation to the pragmatic movement in general; and finally, to what extent is the term pragmatism applicable to his methodology ?

Of those who have written in the field of this problem, all have recognized, to some extent at least, the presence of the pragmatic influence along with the rationalistic. In every investigation, however, the tendency has been to emphasize either the one or the other. Those

who have regarded Bowne primarily as rationalist in methodology have interpreted the pragmatic elements as falling under rationalistic method. Those, on the other hand, who have regarded Bowne as characteristically pragmatic have stressed the pragmatic side of his thought without attempting to relate it to the rationalistic. In no published writings has any investigator suggested that these two sides of Bowne's thought are, as they stand, incapable of being harmonized, although Professor Edgar S. Brightman has, in personal conversation, expressed the view that such a conflict probably existed in Bowne's writings and that he never fully succeeded in resolving it. This view, I believe, will be borne out by the results of the present investigation. Indeed, it is already indicated by the fact that some writers have sought to harmonize the two sides of the thought of Bowne under the conception of reason, while others have pointed to practical experience as the unifying conception.

The first of the investigators whose work we shall notice is Professor Albert C. Knudson, who has published the most complete study of Bowne's work that has yet appeared.[1] Recognizing the practical emphasis in Bowne, Professor Knudson harmonizes it with the rationalistic under the conception of the primacy of the practical reason. He points out that for Bowne an element of practical faith underlies all of the cognitive activities of reason, and that the theoretical reason "must ascend to the practical reason with its realms of ends and values before thought can complete itself in a unitary world-view. The disinterested intellect is not sufficient unto itself."[2] In this sense, therefore, the prac-

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1. Knudson, Albert C., The Philosophy of Personalism (N.Y.: Abingdon Press, 1927).
(Note: This work appears as an independent presentation of the personalistic philosophy, but it is clear that it is intended primarily as a presentation of that philosophy as found in the writings of Bowne.)
2. Op. cit., p. 99.

tical reason has the primacy. But further, Professor Knudson accepts without question Bowne's identification of the subjective needs and interests of the mind with the Kantian conception of the practical reason. These subjective needs and interests are "constitutional within us. And as such they stand in their own right."[1] Again, the mind must accept its own presuppositions. "It must assume that whatever its own inner nature with its various needs and interests requires for its own satisfaction, is true, if there is no decisive evidence to the contrary."[2] Although the language here is distinctly pragmatic in tone, Professor Knudson finds no difficulty in interpreting it under the conception of reason as both theoretical and practical.

The element of Bowne's teaching that keeps it from being pragmatic, according to Professor Knudson, is the view of truth. "Personalism does not find in utility the criterion of truth or a substitute for it. It does not subordinate the theoretical to the practical in such a way that the practical becomes the organizing center and the independent norm of the mental life."[3] Rather personalism recognizes "the independent validity of each of the four fundamental interests of the human mind";[4] it subordinates neither the intellectual to the practical, nor the practical to the theoretical. It is in this way, Professor Knudson believes, that the thought of Bowne holds a mediating position between pragmatism and the old narrow rationalism.

Professor Edgar S. Brightman, in his published writings relating to this problem (his opinion, loc.cit., that a conflict exists in the thought of Bowne is somewhat more recent than the writings here referred to), has expressed essentially the same view. "Philosophy for Bowne must

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1. Op.cit., p. 162.
2. Ibid., p. 162.
3. Ibid., p. 163.
4. Ibid., p. 164.

be religious because life is religious, and philosophy is only an attempt to make life intelligible."[1] Personalistic method, which Professor Brightman implies is the method employed by Bowne, is essentially synoptic. He writes:

> Personalistic method insists that the facts of logic, mathematics, and sense experience are not the only nor the most important facts. The moral and religious experiences of men are also facts. Personalism postulates God as their explanation. This postulate is accepted not because it is a good thing to accept every hypothesis that occurs to us, but because, when critically defined, rationally related to the whole of life, and tested by all the data at our disposal, it explains more facts and gives a deeper meaning to life than any other philosophy.[2]

Professor Brightman is thus interpreting Bowne, in these writings, as fundamentally rationalistic in method. Recognizing the pragmatic, voluntaristic influence, he yet regards it as but a harmonious part of the rationalistic method as a whole. The unity is to be found in the view that the real is at once rational and purposive. Bowne adopted the doctrine of Hegel that "the real is rational."[3] Further, for him, "thought seeks internal connection,'a rational whole,' which is attained only through purpose, the highest metaphysical category."[4]

In his published writings Professor Brightman also accepts without question Bowne's identification of our subjective interests and needs with the Kantian conception of the practical reason. As a consequence his interpretation of Bowne's statement of method - 'whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof' - is rationalistic. It means fundamentally simply that "philosophy should

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1. Brightman, Edgar S., "Sources of Bowne's Power," Meth. Rev., 105(1922), p. 371.
2. Brightman, Edgar S., "The Personalistic Method in Philosophy," Meth. Rev., 103(1920), p. 369.
3. Brightman, Edgar S., "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne," Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, 1926, ed. by E. S. Brightman, (N.Y.: Longmans, Green & Co., 1927) p. 163.
4. Ibid., p. 164.

start with the hypothesis that the universe is full of value."[1] The rationalistic character of Professor Brightman's interpretation of method as defined by Bowne is further shown by the fact that he finds in it essentially 'the duty to believe' rather than 'the will to believe.'

> This does not mean the duty to believe everything that other personalities believe or that has been handed down by tradition. As philosophical principle it would mean that for explaining all of the data of experience we are in duty bound to form and accept the best working hypothesis that we can devise or imagine.[2]

This voluntaristic tendency in Bowne, Professor Brightman adds, made him "one of the forerunners of the recent development of axiology. He did not formulate his ideas fully, but he spoke of the fact that he must be guided not alone by the cognitive ideal, but also by the moral, the aesthetic, and the religious ideals."[3]

Professor William Ernest Hocking, in a brief study, has likewise stressed the rationalistic methodology of Bowne. His interpretation is given in the following passage:

> He (Bowne) has often been ranked with James among the pragmatists because of his doctrine that the great sources of evidence for metaphysical truth are in life and not in logic - James himself thought that the difference between them was merely one of terminology. The real difference, however, was profound. For the 'life' which provides the evidence of metaphysical truth was, for Bowne, not simply a state of resolve, or of feeling, but a state of empirical cognition. It is possible to know the truth, and not merely to choose it as one's adopted hypothesis. Life is will, plus thought and experience; and Bowne's critical achievement is that he worked out a view, which he was willing to call empirical because based on experience, but 'transcendentally empirical,' because the experience he was concerned with far exceeded the realm of the senses. In this transcendental empiricism Bowne anticipates the intuitionism of Bergson, without falling into the anti-intellectualism of the intuitionist position. To Bowne ideas which in ab-

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1. Loc.cit., Meth. Rev., 103(1920), p. 368.
2. Ibid., p. 376.
3. Loc.cit., Proceedings - Sixth Internat. Cong. Phil., p. 164.

> stract thought appear conflicting are reconciled in experience, whereas to Bergson concepts are intrinsically abstract and conflicting. (See, for instance, Personalism, p. 259.) Thus he reaches faith not as against, but through the labors of critical thought.[1]

Bishop Francis J. McConnell is another student of Bowne who has regarded his thought as essentially harmonized under the Kantian conception of reason. He quotes from a letter of Bowne's, in which reference is made to Schiller's Humanism, to suggest Bowne's own point of view: "Schiller's fancy that he has anything new is certainly naive. At best, it is only a specification of Kant's Primacy of the Practical Reason."[2] And so it is with Bowne's own pragmatism, Bishop McConnell believes. Bishop McConnell has gone farther in isolating the pragmatic elements in Bowne's thought than any other writer. And he further suggests: "Be it remembered that long before James and Dewey, Bowne taught pragmatism."[3] But that this estimate of priority over James is not accurate will appear during the course of the present investigation.

We turn now to the pragmatic elements in Bowne's thought to which Bishop McConnell gives consideration. With respect to Bowne's conception of the nature of the human mind and of the method most fruitfully employed by the mind, he writes:

> His contention was that the mind finds itself to be a living organism required to make its adjustments to the world in which it must live. If it began by doubting everything, it would limit itself to practical and theoretical barrenness. The fruitful method is, provisionally at least, to take things as we find them, to assume that things are giving a true account of themselves, until reason for doubt appears.[4]

With respect to belief as subjectively determined and as world-product,

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1. Hocking, William Ernest, "The Metaphysics of Borden P. Bowne," Meth. Rev., 105 (1922), pp. 372-373.
2. McConnell, Francis John, Borden Parker Bowne (N.Y.: Abingdon Press, 1929), p. 149.
3. McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne," Meth. Rev., 105(1922), p. 343.
4. Op. cit., Borden Parker Bowne, pp. 82-83.

Bishop McConnell states: "he did indeed allow full scope to non-logical forces as producing belief" (although he adds, "but, even so, he judged his own argument by strict logical standards.").[1] Again, "in his own system Bowne moved frankly on assumption, and on the recognition of and use of extra-logical factors. --- There are interests of the total self which, he taught, determine the weight we shall give to reasons of one sort or another."[2] With respect to the tests of truth, Bishop McConnell, after pointing to Bowne's view of truth as objective, says: "Bowne was really adding to the tests of truth,"[3] by applying where relevant tests of instrumentality and 'survival of the fittest' among beliefs. "In the end he defined truth as something much more vital than a set of abstract propositions. The fullest life of the self was truth."[4] If, therefore, we may speak of "a higher pragmatism," suggests Bishop McConnell, "Bowne was a pragmatist."[5] But his was a pragmatism that "took into account the demands of the whole nature of man. We postulate - not prove - God as the demand of our whole nature, and then note the results in life, as we work on the basis of the postulate."[6]

On the other hand, Bishop McConnell emphasizes equally the rationalistic side of Bowne's thought. He says:

> Confidence in reason must underlie all mental processes. Bowne laid down the strictest rules for the scrutiny of the intellectual activity, but all on the assumption that such activity is to be trusted. He insisted upon limits within which reasoning is to move, but these limits are to be set in the name of reason itself.[7]
> (And further, recognizing as he did) the play of all manner of subjective forces in thinking --- He did ask, how-

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1. Op. cit., Borden Parker Bowne, p. 55.
2. Ibid., p. 153.
3. Ibid., p. 156.
4. Ibid., p. 157.
5. Ibid., p. 151.
6. Loc. cit., Meth. Rev., 105(1922), p. 343.
7. Op. cit., Borden Parker Bowne, p. 83.

> ever, that all such subjective elements be brought out into the full light and examined by reason proceeding according to reason's laws, reason maintaining its rights as the judge of everything laying claim to rationality.[1]

Here, then, we have the two sides of Bowne's thought as Bishop McConnell presents them, and apparently he finds no difficulty in harmonizing them under the Kantian conception of reason. There is just one point in his treatment at which a sense of difficulty is intimated, namely, in speaking of the use of assumptions and extra-logical factors, he says: "Bowne knew and said that all this is a dangerous procedure." But this sense of difficulty seems quickly to lose its force in the immediately added query: "but what other procedure is possible ?"[2]

Of those investigators who have been chiefly interested in stressing the pragmatic side of Bowne's thought, without attempting closely to relate that side with the rationalistic, Professor George Croft Cell has done the chief, although not the earliest, work. Though not published, the results of that work have been available, since 1926, to students in his Seminar in American Thought.[3] Professor Cell's views on Bowne, with reference to the problem of this dissertation, are here summarized from class-notes with his permission:

> (1) James was right in saying to Bowne that "our emphatic footsteps fall on the <u>same spot</u>."[4] Both James and Bowne, making proper allowances for differences in emphasis which are always important, were 'pragmatic personalists' in the final stages of their thinking.
> (2) Bowne emancipated himself completely from the intellectualism of the Hegelian tradition and from the rationalistic prejudice that coherence is the only test of truth. For Bowne there was no simple logical standard of truth. The living mind, not the logical mind, is the touchstone of truth.
> (3) For Bowne, experience is a larger concept than reason. Experience includes reason, not reason experience. His formula was 'experience and its indications.' Bowne's trust in experience increased in his later work, although indeed it is

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1. Op. Cit., <u>Borden Parker Bowne</u>, p. 84.
2. Ibid., p. 155.
3. Seminar in American Thought, given at Boston University School of Theology since 1926. Professor Cell's article "Die Philosophie in Nordamerika," in Ueberweg's <u>Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie</u>, (Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1928) 5. Teil, also has relevance here.
4. Letter of William James to Borden P. Bowne, dated August 17, 1908. Published in McConnell's <u>Borden Parker Bowne</u>, pp. 276-278.

pervasive throughout the whole of it. He accepted Lotze's "Reality is infinitely richer than thought," [1] and went beyond Lotze in its development.
(4) Bowne stressed the importance of the non-intellectual factors in the mental life. Intellect, indeed, has its rightful place, and Bowne sought to safeguard it lest it be denied "its full rights," [2] yet for Bowne, intellect is not even primus inter pares. But because he was interested in guarding the rights of the intellect, he may be called a 'qualified pragmatist.'
(5) General conclusion: Pragmatism is clearly present in Bowne's early works, but it is there present along with rationalism. In the course of the development of his thought, pragmatism becomes stronger, and rationalism correspondingly weaker, until at the end of his work, pragmatism was dominant, although the rationalistic elements had not been entirely eliminated.

For Professor Cell, experience is the concept under which the pragmatic and rationalistic elements of Bowne's thought are harmonized, although the problem of harmony is clearly not a real one for him with his judgment that the intellect in Bowne's view is not even primus inter pares. That the pragmatic elements are just as strong in Bowne's earlier work, that is before 1885, as in his later work, contrary to Professor Cell's conclusion, will be clear, I believe, in the results of this investigation.

The earliest emphasis upon the pragmatic side of Bowne's philosophy to appear in print, so far as I have been able to discover, was made in a memorial paper on Bowne written, just after his death in April, 1910, by Professor George A. Coe. Professor Coe, like Bishop McConnell after him, attributed priority to Bowne's pragmatism over that of William James. [3] In speaking of Bowne's stress on the vital basis of belief, Professor Coe writes: "We hold to the postulates of religion, he maintained, primarily because they are important for life. The function of logic is not to create them but to adjust them to one another and to the other contents of thought." [4] "Of the merely instrumental nature of the

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1. Lotze, Hermann, Metaphysic, English transl. ed. by B. Bosanquet (Oxford Press, 1877), Vol. I, p. 178.
2. Bowne, B. P., "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation," Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-10), p. 892.
3. Coe, George A., "Borden Parker Bowne," Meth. Rev., 92(1910),pp.521-522.
4. Ibid., p. 522.

understanding he was quite convinced."[1] And yet, Professor Coe adds, for Bowne "the process whereby we move from religious need to religious faith is rational in the deepest sense of the term reason."[2]

But though recognizing the rationalistic side of Bowne, Professor Coe does not regard that as the essential side. He writes:

> In spite of his strong liking for dialectic; in spite of the tendency of many to estimate him in terms of a system, I belive that we are nearer the truth, and nearer his own conception of himself, if we remember him most for the eagerness and the pointedness with which he reverted to primary data.[3] He who never tired of dialectical contest nevertheless made "The field of life and action" his supreme court of appeal as against "the arid wastes of formal logic."[4] Metaphysics was to him not the main thing, but, rather, a sort of police force with which to defend the life and the liberties which he prized.[5]

With respect to Bowne's relation to pragmatism as a movement, Professor Coe expresses the following judgment: "If he never fully appreciated what one may call the historical inevitableness of pragmatism, yet he himself helped prepared the way for it."[6] And in his ethics, with his conscious purpose to unite 'the intuitive and the experience school of ethics,' "His affinity with utilitarianism is unmistakably close."[7]

One more writer on Bowne remains to be considered in this survey of investigations already made in the field of this dissertation - Professor Ralph Tyler Flewelling. Like Professor Coe and Bishop McConnell, he has attributed priority to Bowne's pragmatism over that of James. He writes:

> It is no detraction from James to call attention to the fact that the distinction of Bowne's philosophy from that of the idealists with whom he is most frequently classed, lay just in his insistence upon the pragmatic test for truth in both

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1. Loc. cit., Meth. Rev., 92(1910), p. 520.
2. Ibid., p. 522.
3. Coe, George A., "The Empirical Factor in Bowne's Thinking," Studies in Philosophy and Theology, ed. by E. C. Wilm, (N.Y.: Abingdon Press, 1922, p. 18.
4. Ibid., p. 19.
5. Ibid., p. 19.
6. Ibid., p. 19.
7. Ibid., p. 20.

> philosophy and religion. In the publication of these views Bowne possessed the priority. Will it be offensive to call attention still further to the fact that Bowne did a larger work, in that he not only laid down a method for judging truth but also accompanied it with an appropriate metaphysics ? When, then, claim is made for pragmatism as the distinctly American philosophy, it is but fair to include Bowne as a pragmatist. [1]

But though counting Bowne as a pragmatist, Professor Flewelling refers to his conception of truth as essentially rationalistic: "Bowne retains his pragmatism --- without surrendering truth that shall be valid for all." [2]

This completes the survey of investigations already undertaken in the field of this dissertation. The materials and methods of investigation of the present study, together with the general plan of development, are next to be indicated. With respect to the materials, the primary are the works of Bowne. These are listed in the bibliography, which follows the text of the dissertation, with markings to indicate those that are of particular philosophic interest. Other materials employed have been the works of all writers in the field, in so far as they have now been distinguished, who may have had a direct influence upon Bowne in the development of the pragmatic side of his thought. These, likewise, are listed in the bibliography. They include chiefly the works of Spencer, Lotze, James and Kant.

The methods of investigation employed in this study may be summarized thus:

> (1) Historical and developmental, both as regards external influences upon the thought of Bowne, and as regards the course of his own thought development.
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> (2) Critical: the evaluating of the methods used by Bowne and of the synthesis which he made between the pragmatic

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1. Flewelling, Ralph Tyler, "Bowne and Present-Day Thought," Meth. Rev., 105(1922) pp. 378-379.
2. Flewelling, Ralph Tyler, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, (N.Y.: Methodist Book Concern, 1915) p. 131.

and the rationalistic elements in his methodology.

(3) Analytic: the distinguishing and defining of the pragmatic elements wherever they have appeared in Bowne's work.

(4) Synoptic: the viewing of these pragmatic elements in relation to Bowne's methodology as a whole.

The general plan of the dissertaion involves, first, a preliminary definition of terms, together with a brief survey of the early development of pragmatism as a movement; second, a survey and critical analysis of Bowne's theory of thought and knowledge developmentally viewed; third, the isolation and definition of the pragmatic elements in that general epistemology, together with an estimate of their place in Bowne's thought as a whole and with an examination of their relation to the theoretical function of reason as conceived by Bowne; fourth, a consideration of Bowne's relation to pragmatism as a movement; and fifth, a study of the sources of the pragmatic elements which Bowne came to employ. Each of these considerations will be of help in answering the question: to what extent is the term pragmatism applicable to the thought of Bowne ?

CHAPTER ONE

RATIONALISM AND PRAGMATISM

Section One: Rationalism, Its Meaning and Its Relevance to the Thought of Bowne.

The term rationalism has been used variously; its different meanings need to be distinguished. It may refer, in the first place, to the strictly a priori method in philosophy by which the metaphysical superstructure is deductively derived from a few basic concepts, definitions, and axioms. The methods of Spinoza and Leibniz illustrate this meaning of the term par excellence. In the second place, the term may refer to the Kantian doctrine of the creative activity of the mind, that is, the doctrine that the mind is constitutive in the knowing process, that knowledge is a product of the mind's active reworking of the material sensuously presented to it. Or, in the third place, the term may refer simply to an essential faith in the trustworthiness of the mind and in the intelligibility of the real world.[1]

The relevance of these various meanings of the term rationalism as applied to Bowne's thought will become clear through the course of this investigation, but may well be anticipated here. Bowne was clearly not a rationalist in the first meaning of the term as here given. One of the most frequent of Bowne's teachings was precisely that the real world cannot be deduced a priori; it must be thought in terms of concrete experience. Bowne scorned every deductive scheme of metaphysics. One of his first criticisms of Spencer's First Principles was that it was "written on the a priori plan."[2] Again, referring to the investigation of the

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1. These definitions have been formulated in the light of those given for the term in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (New ed., N.Y.: Macmillan Co., 1928), and in Lalande's Vocabulaire de la Philosophie (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1926).
2. Bowne, B. P., "Herbert Spencer's Laws of the Unknowable," New Englander, 31 (1872), p. 86.

laws of mental activity, Bowne says: "This question is not to be answered by any a priori speculation, no matter how pretentious, but by an inductive consideration of the mind itself."[1] Perhaps the most effective putting of Bowne's method as he conceived it, in so far as it relates to this point of view, is the following:

> We begin with experience, external and internal. Analysis and reflection reveal that we cannot stop with them but must proceed to certain assumptions concerning their cause and ground. By the necessities of thought we pass from the facts of experience to the metaphysical notions of cause, absolute, etc. Hence the absolute can never be the beginning of knowledge, but is rather the end of investigation.[2]

The second and third meanings of the term rationalism as here given do, however, have definite relevance as applied to Bowne's thought. Bowne fully accepted the essential Kantian doctrine of the creative activity of the mind in the knowing process. In one of his early papers, he says: "No fact in psychology is more clearly established than that the mind is active in all knowledge."[3] And this doctrine remained an essential part of the groundwork of his philosophy throughout the course of its development. Closely associated with this meaning of rationalism, is the third, namely, faith in the trustworthiness of the mind and the intelligibility of the world. These are indeed for Bowne conditions of knowledge and are repeatedly stressed by him. "The trustworthiness of reason is the presupposition of all speculation."[4] And further:

> Our interpreting activity presupposes the intelligibility and hence the rationality of all existence. It presupposes that the objective reality is cast in the molds of thought, so that the irrational is the impossible.[5]

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1. Bowne, B.P., "Ulrici's Logic," New Englander, 33(1874), p. 463.
2. Bowne, B.P., "Gott und die Natur," New England., 33 (1874), p. 626.
3. Loc. cit., New England., 33(1874), p. 462.
4. Bowne, B.P., Philosophy of Theism, (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1887), p. 112.
5. Bowne, B.P., "What is Rationalism," Independent, 40 (1888), p. 99.

Bowne is careful, however, to qualify his conception of the rationality of existence. That rationality "is not something actually discerned in experience, but an ideal believed in."[1] In his judgment post-Kantian rationalism was extravagant and excessive. It assumed human reason and human insight as the norms of rationality. Actually, "the rationalistic ideal is as yet something far off and unattained. In connection with it we have little more than the conviction that it admits of indefinite approximation by us, and that to perfect insight it would be real."[2] After recognizing and pointing to the excesses of post-Kantian rationalism, however, Bowne makes his own position clear by saying:

> We still believe in the universality of rational law, but we are far from being so sure that we have fully comprehended it. We still believe in the interpretability of facts, but we are seldom able to say that we have reached a final interpretation. The only thing that is fixed is that nothing can be allowed which contradicts the laws of thought; but these leave a great many possibilities open, and which of these have been realized cannot be learned by a priori reflection, but only by experience. It still remains our faith that the absolute reason at the center of things sees all things in rational connection; but our reason is neither absolute nor at the center.[3]

For Bowne, therefore, the rationality of the world is a controlling ideal, a working faith, not an experienced fact or a demonstrated truth; and our investigations of that world are always of the nature of hypotheses - they are seldom final. With this, then, the senses in which the term rationalism is relevant to the thought of Bowne are clear.

Section Two: Pragmatism, Its Early Development and Its Characteristic Emphases.

The meaning of pragmatism and its relation to the thought of Bowne can best be shown through a brief survey of its antecedents and of its

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1. Bowne, B.P., loc. cit., Independent, 40 (1888), p. 100.
2. Ibid., p. 100.
3. Ibid., p. 100.

early development as a movement. The scope of the survey is expressly limited by its purposes: (1) to isolate any possible influences upon the thought of Bowne, and (2) to exhibit those elements of pragmatism that are essential and characteristic.

The antecedents of the pragmatic doctrine are unmistakably present in the thought of Kant. We shall distinguish those elements of Kantian teaching which are of significance to pragmatism under the following topics: (1) primacy of the practical reason; (2) emphasis upon interests in the life of the mind; (3) the regulative function of the speculative reason; (4) utility and rational possibility as criteria of belief; and (5) the 'will to believe'.

Kant conceived reason as a unity functioning in a two-fold manner: theoretically and practically. In the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, he says: "Der theoretische Gebrauch der Vernunft beschäftigte sich mit Gegenständen des blossen Erkenntnisvermögens," whereas in the practical use of reason, "beschäftigt sich die Vernunft mit Bestimmungsgründen des Willens, welcher ein Vermögen ist, den Vorstellungen entsprechende Gegenstände entweder hervorzubringen oder doch sich selbst zur Bewirkung derselben --- zu bestimmen."[1] And, in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,

> teils erfordere ich zur Kritik einer reinen praktischen Vernunft, dass, wenn sie vollendet sein soll, ihre Einheit mit der spekulativen in einem gemeinschaftlichen Prinzip zugleich müsse dargestellt werden können, weil es doch am Ende nur eine und dieselbe Vernunft sein kann, die bloss in der Anwendung unterschieden sein muss.[2] (Practical reason, then, is reason that) Kausalität in Ansehung ihrer Objekte hat. Nun kann man sich unmöglich eine Vernunft denken, die mit ihren eigenen Bewusstsein in Ansehung ihrer Urteile anderwärtsher eine Lenkung empfinge, denn alsdann würde das Subjekt nicht seiner

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1. Kant, Immanuel, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Karl Vorländer (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1920-1922), Vol. II, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, p. 18 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 15)
2. Ibid., Vol. III, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 8, (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 391).

> Vernunft, sondern einem Antriebe die Bestimmung der Urteilskraft zuschreiben. [1]

Kant's doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason is stated in a brief section of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft under the title, "Von dem Primat der reinen praktischen Vernunft in ihrer Verbindung mit der spekulativen."

> Wenn praktische Vernunft nichts weiter annehmen und als gegeben denken darf, als was spekulative Vernunft für sich ihr aus ihrer Einsicht darreichen konnte, so führt diese das Primat. Gesetzt aber, sie hätte für sich ursprüngliche Prinzipien a priori, mit denen gewisse theoretische Positionen unzertrennlich verbunden wären, die sich gleichwohl aller möglichen Einsicht der spekulativen Vernunft entzögen (ob sie zwar derselben auch nicht widersprechen müssten), so ist die Frage, welches Interesse das oberste sei (nicht, welches weichen müsste, denn eines widerstreitet dem anderen nicht notwendig). [2]

And this supposition of original a priori principles belonging to pure practical reason is the doctrine which Kant is defending. For him, then, the question of the primacy of the practical reason refers solely to the independent rights of those a priori principles of practical reason which cannot be established by the speculative reason, but which do not contradict it. Kant is very careful to safeguard his meaning by specifying:

> In der Tat, sofern praktische Vernunft als pathologisch bedingt, d.i. das Interesse der Neigungen unter dem sinnlichen Prinzip der Glückseligkeit bloss verwaltend zum Grunde gelegt würde, so liesse sich diese Zumutung an die spekulative Vernunft gar nicht tun. Mahomets Paradies oder der Theosophen und Mystiker schmelzende Vereinigung mit der Gottheit, sowie jedem sein Sinn steht, würden der Vernunft ihre Ungeheuer aufdringen, und es wäre ebensogut, gar keine zu haben als sie auf solche Weise allen Träumereien preiszugeben. [3]

The meaning of Kant is rather this:

> Allein wenn reine Vernunft für sich praktisch sein kann

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1. Kant, loc.cit., Vol. III, G.M.S., pp. 76-77(Akademie-Ausgabe,p. 448).
2. Ibid., Vol. II, K.d.p. V., p. 154 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 120).
3. Ibid., pp. 154-155 (Akademie-Ausgabe, pp. 120-121).

> und es wirklich ist, wie das Bewusstsein des moralischen Gesetzes es ausweist, so ist es doch immer nur eimmddieselbe Vernunft, die, es sei in theoretischer oder praktischer Absicht, nach Prinzipien a priori urteilt, und da ist es klar, dass, wenn ihr Vermögen in der ersteren gleich nicht zulangt, gewisse Sätze behauptend festzusetzen, indessen dass sie ihr auch eben nicht widersprechen, sie eben diese Sätze, sobald sie unabtrennlich zum praktischen Interesse der reinen Vernunft gehören, zwar als ein ihr fremdes Angebot, das nicht auf ihren Boden erwachsen, aber doch hinreichend beglaubigt ist, annehmen und sie mit allem, was sie als spekulative Vernunft in ihrer Macht hat, zu vergleichen und zu verknüpfen suchen müsse; doch sich bescheidend, dass dieses nicht ihre Einsichten, aber doch Erweiterungen ihres Gebrauchs in irgend einer anderen, nämlich praktischen Absicht sind.[1]
> In der Verbindung also der reinen spekulativen mit der reinen praktischen Vernunft zu einer Erkenntnis führt die letztere das Primat, vorausgesetzt nämlich, dass diese Verbindung nicht etwa zufällig und beliebig, sondern a priori auf der Vernunft selbst gegründet, mithin notwendig sei. Denn es würde ohne diese Unterordung ein Widerstreit der Vernunft mit ihr selbst entstehen; weil, wenn sie einander bloss beigeordnet (koordiniert) wären, die erstere für sich ihre Grenze enge verschliessen und nichts von der letzteren in ihr Gebiet aufnehmen, diese aber ihre Grenzen dennoch über alles ausdehnen und, wo es ihr Bedürfnis erheischt, jene innerhalb der ihrigen mitzubefassen suchen würde.[2]

For Kant, the moral law is an a priori principle of pure practical reason, and as such is valid independently of any fact of experience, that is, of any sensuous presentation, any impulse, feeling, or instinct. As such an a priori principle, any propositions inseparably connected with it, as Kant believes the postulates of freedom, God and immortality to be, though not capable of being established by theoretical reason, may be regarded as sufficiently authenticated, provided they do not contradict theoretical reason. In the field, therefore, of a priori principles of practical reason, in which theoretical reason is able to establish nothing, the practical reason must be regarded as having the primacy. As Kant puts it in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, "Es wird sich aber in

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1. Kant, loc.cit., Vol. II, K.d.p.V., p. 155 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 121).
2. Ibid., pp. 155-156 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 121).

der Folge zeigen, dass doch, in Ansehung des praktischen Gebrauchs, die Vernunft ein Recht habe, etwas anzunehmen, was sie auf keine Weise im Felde der blossen Spekulation ohne hinreichende Beweisgründe voraussetzen befugt wäre."[1] Although the pragmatic bearing of this doctrine is immediately apparent, it cannot be too strongly insisted that for Kant it was interpreted in strictly rational terms. In no sense whatever did Kant mean to open the way to such beliefs as we might wish to hold, or as might prove useful to us, or as might satisfy some need other than the need of the pure practical reason. Even the much quoted "Ich musste also das Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen,"[2] refers, for Kant, only to those beliefs which are attached to the moral law, that is, to a priori principles of pure practical reason. Nevertheless, that this doctrine suggested an opening which could later be capitalized by pragmatism is clear.

Kant's emphasis upon interests in the mental life would seem manifestly to be an important element in the historical background of pragmatism.[3] For example, such a statement as the following would suggest a pragmatic tone: "Lasset demnach euren Gegner nur Vernunft sagen, und bekämpfet ihn bloss mit Waffen der Vernunft. Uebrigens seid wegen der guten Sache (des praktischen Interesse) ausser Sorgen, denn die kommt in bloss spekulativen Streite niemals mit ins Spiel."[4] To examine more carefully, however, Kant's use of the word 'interests', we shall turn to his more explicit expositions:

> Einem jedem Vermögen der Gemüts kann man ein Interesse beilegen, d.i. ein Prinzip, welches die Bedingung enthält, unter welcher allein die Ausübung desselben befördert wird. Die Vernunft, als das Vermögen der Prinzipien, bestimmt das

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1. Kant, loc.cit., Vol. I, K.d.r.V., p. 646 (Original 2nd Ed., p. 804).
2. Ibid., p. 37 (Orig. 2nd. Ed., p. xxx).
3. I am indebted to Professor Edgar S. Brightman for suggesting a study of Kant's use of the word 'interests'.
4. Kant, loc.cit., Vol.I, K.d.r.V., p. 622 (Orig. 2nd.Ed., p. 772).

> Interesse aller Gemütskräfte, das ihrige aber sich selbst. Das Interesse ihres spekulativen Gebrauchs besteht in der Erkenntnis des Objekts bis zu den höchsten Prinzipien a priori, das des praktischen Gebrauchs in der Bestimmung des Willens in Ansehung des letzten und vollständigen Zwecks. [1]

And further:

> Interesse ist das, wodurch Vernunft praktisch, d.i. eine den Willen bestimmende Ursache, wird. Daher sagt man nur von einem vernünftigen Wesen, dass es woran ein Interesse nehme, vernunftlose Geschöpfe fühlen nur sinnliche Antriebe. Ein unmittelbares Interesse nimmt die Vernunft nur alsdann an der Handlung, wenn die Allgemeingültigkeit der Maxime derselben ein genugsamer Bestimmungsgrund des Willens ist. Ein solches Interesse ist allein rein. Wenn sie aber den Willen nur vermittelst eines anderen Objekts des Begehrens, oder unter Voraussetzung eines besonderen Gefühles des Subjekts bestimmen kann, so nimmt die Vernunft nur ein mittelbares Interesse an der Handlung, und da Vernunft für sich allein weder Objekte des Willens, noch ein besonderes ihm zu Grunde liegendes Gefühl ohne Erfahrung ausfindig machen kann, so würde das letztere Interesse nur empirisch und kein reines Vernunftinteresse sein. [2]

It is clear, therefore, that Kant distinguishes between those interests which belong directly to pure reason, both theoretical and practical, and those interests which rest on empirical grounds, and that Kant's concern is with the former, that is, with the direct interests of pure reason. Here again, though Kant is specific in his own use of the concept 'interests,' his treatment, by suggestion, opens the line of development which pragmatism has subsequently followed. For Kant the interests of pure reason alone have objective standing; for pragmatism the interests of reason have no greater validity than any other interests. The following is of significance in showing how carefully Kant attempted to safeguard his doctrine from precisely the development which pragmatism has carried out:

> --- so ist die Erklärung, wie und warum uns die Allgemeinheit der Maxime als Gesetzes, mithin die Sittlichkeit inter-

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1. Kant, loc.cit., Vol. II, K.d.p.V., p. 153 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 120).
2. Ibid., Vol. III, G.M.S., Footnote, p. 90 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 460).

> essiere, uns Menschen gänzlich unmöglich. So viel ist nur gewiss: dass es nicht darum für uns Gültigkeit hat, weil es interessiert (denn das ist Heteronomie und Abhängigkeit der praktischen Vernunft von Sinnlichket, nämlich einem zum Grunde liegenden Gefühl, wobei sie niemals sittlich gesetzgebend sein könnte), sondern dass es interessiert, weil es für uns als Menschen gilt, da es aus unserem Willen als Intelligenz, mithin aus unserem eigentlichen Selbst entsprungen ist. [1]

Kant's view of the speculative reason as regulative is one that has led naturally into the pragmatic view of the mind as instrumental, although indeed the doctrine of evolution and not the Kantian teaching itself has stimulated that development. Kant's view is expressed in the following passage:

> Die grösste und vielleicht einzige Nutzen aller Philosophie der reinen Vernunft ist also wohl nur negativ, da sie nämlich nicht, als Organon, zur Erweiterung, sondern, als Disziplin, zur Grensbestimmung dient, und anstatt Wahrheit zu entdecken, nur das stille Verdienst hat, Irrthümer zu verhüten. [2]

The "source of positive cognitions which belong to the domain of pure reason" is the reason in its "practical employments," [3] that is, truths concerning the real world cannot be attained by speculative reason, but they may come as postulates required by practical reason. The function of the speculative reason, therefore, is one of regulation, of limiting its own activities in the interests of those propositions required by the a priori principles of pure practical reason.

Again, Kant's treatment of the use of reason in connection with objects "recommended to us by the senses," though intending to show that this is not the sphere of activity of pure reason, is clearly suggestive of the instrumental view of the mind:

> Wenn die Bedingungen der Ausübung unserer freien Willkür aber empirisch sind, so kann die Vernunft dabei keinen

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1. Kant, loc.cit., Vol. III, G.M.S., p. 91 (Akademie-Ausgabe, pp. 460-461).
2. Kant, loc.cit., Vol. I, K.d.r.V., p. 659 (orig. 2nd. ed., p. 823).
3. See ibid., pp. 659-660 (orig. 2nd. ed., pp. 823-824), trans. by J.M.D.Meiklejohn.

> anderen, als regulativen Gebrauch haben und nur die Einheit empirischer Gesetze zu bewirken dienen, wie z. B. in der Lehre der Klugheit die Vereinigung aller Zwecke, die uns von unseren Neigungen aufgegeben sind, in den einigen, die Glückseligkeit, und die Zusammenstimmung der Mittel, um dazu zu gelangen, das ganze Geschäft der Vernunft ausmacht, die um deswillen keine anderen, als pragmatische Gesetze des freien Verhaltens, zu Erreichung der uns von den Sinnen empfohlenen Zwecke, und also keine reinen Gesetze völlig a priori bestimmt liefern kann. [1]

Another of the elements of Kant's teaching that have significance for pragmatism is the suggestion of utility and rational possibility as criteria of belief. The reference to utility as a warrant for belief appears only incidentally in Kant, but it is sufficiently striking to be mentioned among those elements of his thought that have a pragmatic tone. It appears in the following passage:

> --- so ist doch die Zweckmässige Einheit eine so grosse Bedingung der Anwendung der Vernunft auf Natur, dass ich, da mir überdem Erfahrung reichlich davon Beispiele darbietet, sie gar nicht vorbeigehen kann. Zu dieser Einheit aber kenne ich keine andere Bedingung, die sie mir sum Leitfaden der Naturforschung machte, als wenn ich voraussetze, dass eine höchste Intelligenz alles nach den weisesten Zwecken so geordnet habe. Folglich ist es eine Bedingung einer zwar zufälligen, aber doch nicht unerheblichen Absicht, nämlich um eine Leitung in der Nachforschung der Natur zu haben, einen weisen Welturheber vorauszusetzen. Der Ausgang meiner Versuche bestätigt auch so oft die Brauchbarkeit dieser Voraussetzung und nichts kann auf entscheidende Art dawider angeführt werden, dass ich viel zu wenig sage, wenn ich mein Fürwahrhalten bloss ein Meinen nennen wollte, sondern es kann selbst in diesem theoretischen Verhältnisse gesagt werden, dass ich festiglich einen Gott glaube. [2]

Here, clearly, Kant is suggesting utility (Brauchbarkeit) as the positive warrant for belief in the theistic hypothesis. Even recognizing this occurrence of the criterion as incidental, it is of extreme interest as an element in the background of pragmatism. The negative warrant, which Kant indicates in the same connection, is the fact that "nothing can be adduced against it." This, indeed, is an essential element in Kant's

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1. Kant, loc. cit., Vol.I., K.d.r.V., p. 663 (orig. 2nd. ed., p. 828).
2. Ibid., pp. 681-682 (orig. 2nd. ed., p. 854).

doctrine as a whole, as we have already observed in our consideration of the primacy of the practical reason. Any proposition required by the moral law, as an a priori principle of pure practical reason, may be regarded as authenticated so long as it is not found to be in contradiction with speculative reason. This criterion of rational possibility is specifically used with respect to the ideas of God and immortality:

> Folglich kann und muss ihre Möglichkeit in dieser praktischen Beziehung angenommen werden, ohne sie doch theoretisch zu erkennen und einzusehen. Für die letztere Forderung ist in praktischer Absicht genug, dass sie keine innere Unmöglichkeit (Widerspruch) enthalten. [1]

The last of the pragmatically toned elements in the thought of Kant to be distinguished is one that may be designated by the well known phrase of William James: the will to believe. The example which Kant has used to illustrate what he calls "den pragmatischen Glauben" is immediately suggestive of the 'will to believe' doctrine, although Kant clearly intended it to apply only in immediate circumstances of emergency and not to have relevance for metaphysical belief. Kant's example is this:

> Der Arzt muss bei einem Kranken, der in Gefahr ist, etwas thun, kennt aber die Krankheit nicht. Er sieht auf die Erscheinungen, und urtheilt, weil er nichts Besseres weiss, es sei die Schwindsucht. Sein Glaube ist selbst in seinem eigenen Urtheile bloss zufällig, ein anderer möchte es vielleicht besser treffen. Ich nenne dergleichen zufälligen Glauben, der aber dem wirklichen Gebrauche der Mittel zu gewissen Handlungen zum Grunde liegt, den pragmatischen Glauben. [2]

There is, further, another passage in which Kant allows a certain place, though carefully restricted, to choice in the matter of belief. Speaking of the perfect proportioning of happiness to worthiness as required in the summum bonum, he says:

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1. Kant, loc. cit., Vol. II, K.d.p.V., p. 5 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 4)
2. Ibid., Vol. I, K.d.r.V., p. 680 (Orig. 2nd. ed., p. 852).

--- nur die Art, wie wir uns eine solche Harmonie der Naturgesetze mit denen der Freiheit denken sollen, hat etwas an sich, in Ansehung dessen uns eine Wahl zukommt, weil theoretische Vernunft hierüber nichts mit apodiktischer Gewissheit entscheidet, und in Ansehung dieser kann es ein Moralisches Interesse geben, das den Ausschlag gibt. [1]
--- aber die Art, auf welche Weise wir es (i.e. the promotion of the summum bonum) uns als möglich denken wollen in unserer Wahl steht, in welcher aber ein freies Interesse der reinen praktischen Vernunft für die Annehmung eines weisen Welturhebers entscheidet ---. [2]

In one additional passage Kant specifically uses the concept of 'willing' in the achievement of belief. He writes:

--- zugestanden, dass das reinen moralische Gesetz jedermann als Gebot (nicht als Klugheitsregel) unnachlasslich verbinde, darf der Rechtschaffene wohl sagen: ich will, dass ein Gott, dass mein Dasein in dieser Welt auch ausser der Naturverknüpfung noch ein Dasein in einer reinen Verstandeswelt, endlich auch, dass meine Dauer endlos sei, ich beharre darauf und lasse mir diessen Glauben nicht nehmen; denn dieses ist das einzige, wo mein Interesse, weil ich von demselben nichts nachlassen darf, mein Urteil unvermeidlich bestimmt, ohne auf Vernünfteleien zu achten, so wenig ich auch darauf zu antworten oder ihnen scheinbarere entgegenzustellen imstande sein möchte. [3]

These, then, constitute those elements of Kant's thought which are either in themselves pragmatically toned, or which, by change of emphasis, have been transformed into the developed doctrines of pragmatism. The number of such elements in Kant is indeed strikingly large.

With this consideration of the antecedents of pragmatism as they are found in the philosophy of Kant, we turn now to a brief survey of the beginnings of pragmatism as a movement in America. Charles Sanders Peirce is regarded as the father of American pragmatism. But that Peirce felt a direct indebtedness to Kant is clear from the statement: "The writer was led to the maxim (i.e. the doctrine of meaning) by reflecting upon Kant's Critic of the Pure Reason." [4] And that Peirce did not intend that his teaching be taken in a purely pragmatic sense is further clear from

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1. Kant, loc.cit., Vol. II, K.d.p.V., p. 184(Akademie-Ausgabe, pp. 144-145).
2. Ibid.,Vol.II, K.d.p.V., p. 185 (Akademie-Ausgabe, pp. 145-146).
3. Ibid., Vol. II, K.d.p.V., pp. 182-183 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 143).
4. Baldwin, James M., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (New Ed., N.Y.:Macmillan Co., 1928) Vol.II, section of article on"Pragmatism" by C.S.Peirce, p. 322.

his own comment on the development of the doctrine:

> The writer subsequently saw that the principle might easily be misapplied, so as to sweep away the whole doctrine of incommensurables ---. In 1896 William James published his Will to Believe, and later his 'Phil. Conceptions and Pract. Results,' which pushed this method to such extremes as must tend to give us pause. [1]

The pragmatism of Peirce, in so far as it is pragmatism, is largely that of his doctrine of meaning. His article on "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," published in The Popular Science Monthly for Januray, 1878, is usually regarded as marking the beginning of the pragmatic epoch in American thought. He writes: "There is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice." [2] And again, "I only desire to point out how impossible it is that we should have an idea in our minds which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things. Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects." [3] Hence the rule, as Peirce lays it down:

> Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. [4]

If ideas have no practical effects, they have no real meaning; and if two ideas have the same effects, then their meaning is the same.

> The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing a different tune. [5]

For Peirce, then, meaning is to be conceived practically, actively, dynamically. But it is important to note that Peirce did not identify meaning and truth. Though effects give us the meaning of an idea, they

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1. Baldwin, loc.cit., p. 322.
2. Peirce, C.S., "Illustrations of the Logic of Science: Second Paper - How to Make Our Ideas Clear." The Popular Science Monthly, Jan.1878,p.293.
3. Ibid., p. 293.
4. Ibid., p. 293.
5. Ibid., p. 291.

do not constitute its truth. It was the carrying over of this doctrine of effects from meaning to truth by William James that constituted the most characteristic formulation of pragmatism; it was first expounded by him as a philosophic doctrine in an address at the University of California in 1898 under the title "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results."

Before this formulation of the pragmatic doctrine of truth, however, James had written other essays of significance in the development of the new movement. Of these we shall here consider what may be regarded as the two most important. The first of these appeared as an article in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy for January, 1878, under the title "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence." Professor R.B.Perry speaks of this article as of "unique historical importance as perhaps the key to all of James' later thought."[1] Certain it is that many of the later pragmatic emphases of James' thought are present in the germ in this early essay.

The first of these early emphases of James is that of the importance of interests in controlling the development, indeed, the entire cognitive activity, of the mind.

> 'Mind,' as we actually find it, contains all sorts of laws - those of logic, of fancy, of wit, of taste, decorum, beauty, morals, and so forth, as well as perception of fact. Common sense estimates mental excellence by a combination of all of these standards, and yet how few of them correspond to anything that actually is - they are laws of the Ideal, dictated by subjective interests pure and simple.[2]

Again:

> We are all fated to be a priori teleologists whether we will or not. Interests which we bring with us, and simply posit or

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1. James, William, Collected Essays and Reviews, Ed. by Ralph Barton Perry, (N.Y.: Longmans, Green & CO., 1920), pp. vii-viii.
2. Ibid., p. 46.

> take our stand upon, are the very flour out of which our mental dough is kneaded.[1]

And further, "Interests are the real a priori element in cognition." They determine which elements in the environment shall be singled out for cognition. "The interests precede the outer relations noticed"; before those outer relations can be altered, something must first "awaken an interest."[2]

A second element of pragmatic significance in this early essay of James is the suggestion of survival value and workability as criteria of belief. The chief of James' formulations follow: Referring to differences in judgment as to what constitutes rightness or excellence, he says:

> The formula which proves to have the most massive destiny will be the true one.---Our respective hypotheses and postulates help to shape the course of thought, but the only thing which we all agree in assuming is, that thought will be coerced away from them if they are wrong.---The idealists and the empiricists confront each other like Guelphs and Ghibellines, but each alike awaits for adoption, as it were, by the course of events.[3]

Again, with respect to our individual hypotheses, convictions, and beliefs:

> Far from being vouched for by the past, these are verified by the future. They are all of them, in some sense, laws of the ideal. They have to keep house together, and the weakest goes to the wall. The survivors constitute the right way of thinking.[4]

And again, after stating that there is no reason for assuming priority of cognitive over other interests, James asks:

> How shall I say that knowing fact with Messrs. Huxley and Clifford is a better use to put my mind to than feeling good with Messrs. Moody and Sankey, unless by slowly and painfully finding out that in the long run it works best?[5]

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1. James, Collected Essays and Reviews, op.cit., p. 61.
2. Ibid., p. 50, footnote.
3. Ibid., pp. 60-61.
4. Ibid., p. 65.
5. Ibid., p. 66.

Another characteristic pragmatic element appearing in this early essay is the notion that truth is made, although in the form here presented it does not differ essentially from the Kantian doctrine of the creativity of thought:

> The knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foothold anywhere, and passively reflecting an order that he comes upon and finds simply existing. The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers the truth which he helps to create. Mental interests, hypotheses, postulates, so far as they are bases for human action - action which to a great extent transforms the world - help to make thetruth which they declare.[1]

Likewise the germ of the 'will to believe' doctrine is present here. Referring to our various individual beliefs, competing as they are for survival, James says: "While the issue is still undecided we can call them our prepossessions. But, decided or not, 'go in' we each must for one set of interests or another."[2]

The second of the essays of James written before 1898 to which we shall refer is that which bears the title "The Will to Believe." It was written in 1896. Here appears the doctrine of the 'will to believe' in its developed form:

> Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, 'Do not decide, but leave the question open,' is itself a passional decision,- just like deciding yes or no,- and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.[3]

The basic questions of morality and religion, James believed, are all questions that must be decided primarily in this volitional way.

In his essay, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," written in 1898, James carries over, as we have already mentioned,

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1. Collected Essays and Reviews, op.cit., p. 67.
2. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
3. James, William, The Will to Believe, (N.Y.: Longmans, Green & Co., 1927; First Ed. 1897), p.11.

Peirce's doctrine of sensuous effects from meaning to truth itself, and he enlarges the notion of sensuous effects to that of "practical results." Referring to the principle as formulated by Peirce, he writes:

> I think myself that it should be expressed more broadly than Mr. Peirce expresses it. The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires. And I should prefer --- to express Peirce's principle by saying that the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive.[1]

As for logical consequences of the principle thus formulated:

> Suppose there are two different philosophic definitions or propositions, or maxims, or what not, which seem to contradict each other, and about which men dispute. If, by supposing the truth of the one, you can foresee no conceivable practical consequences to anybody at any time or place, which is different from what you would foresee if you supposed the truth of the other, why then the difference between the two propositions is no difference - it is only a specious and verbal difference, unworthy of further contention.[2]

This pragmatic conception of truth, as taught by James, is expounded most fully in his two volumes Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth, published in 1907 and 1909, respectively. His treatment, however, is not always unambiguous. Often he seems to identify truth with workability, the one constituting the exhaustive definition of the other. This view is suggested by such a passage as the following: Whenever an idea becomes relevant to a particular situation, he says:

> You can say of it then either that "it is useful because it is true" or that "it is true because it is useful." Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified.[3]

Elsewhere James seems to make workability simply an attribute, not the essence of truth. Indeed, in one passage, he seems to speak of this

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1. Collected Essays and Reviews, op.cit., p..412.
2. Ibid., pp. 412-413.
3. James, William, Pragmatism, (N.Y.: Longmans, Green & Co.,1907), p.204.

view as specifically the one he intends, and contrasts it with the broader usage in England:

> All that the pragmatic method implies, then, is that truths should have practical consequences. In England the word has been used more broadly still, to cover the notion that the truth of any statement consists in the consequences, and particularly in their being good consequences.[1]

James lays large stress on the dynamic character of truth; it is not simply statically found; rather it is created:

> The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent init. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification.[2]

In speaking ofthe instrumental quality of truth, James reports approvingly the doctrine as already taught by John Dewey, which we shall notice shortly, thus: "Ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience."[3] Elsewhere James states again: "The possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action."[4]

Yet with all of this emphasis upon the utility and instrumentality of truth, James did not mean to reject the criterion of logical harmony among ideas. He says:

> If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged.[5]

This recognition of the need of harmony between new propositions and truths previously arrived at made James feel that the pragamtic method as he conceived it was not wanting in intellectual rigor. He

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1. James, William, The Meaning of Truth, (N.Y.: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909), p. 52.
2. James, Pragmatism, op.cit., p.201.
3. Ibid., p.58
4. Ibid., p.202.
5. Ibid., p. 73.

writes:

> In the choice of these man-made formulas we can not be capricious with impunity any more than we can be capricious on the common-sense practical level. We must find a theory that will work; and that means something extremely difficult; for our theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences. It must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly. To 'work' means both these things; and the squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any hypothesis.[1]

This completes our exhibition of the essential features of James' pragmatism. Primarily, with him, pragmatism was a philosophical method.

We shall notice in this survey one other important work of pragmatism that falls within the period of possible influence upon Bowne and that is needed to complete our outline of the essential and characteristic elements of pragmatism as a developed doctrine, namely, Studies in Logical Theory, by John Dewey, published in 1903. For Dewey, the thought-situation is always a problem-situation, and thought arises for the purpose of resolving that situation. The thought process, like every other process, must be understood in evolutionary terms, namely, "as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation."[2] The character of thought is "strictly instrumental."[3] "Thinking is adaptation to an end through the adjustment of particular objective contents."[4] The fundamental position of Dewey is succinctly expressed in the following passage:

> All the distinctions of the thought-function, or of conception as over against sense-perception, of judgment in its various modes and forms, of inference in its vast diversity of operation - all these distinctions come within the thought-situation as growing out of a characteristic antecedent typical formation of experience; and have for their purpose the solution of the peculiar problem with respect to which the thought-function is generated or evolved: the restoration of a deliberately in-

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1. James, Pragmatism, op.cit., pp.216-217.
2. Dewey, John, Studies in Logical Theory, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1903), 2nd. Impress., 1909, p.15.
3. Ibid., p. 79.
4. Ibid., p. 81.

tegrated experience from the inherent conflict into which it has fallen.[1]

If thought is essentially an instrumental process, it follows that its validity, its truth, must be understood in instrumental terms, according to Dewey. "The test of validity of (an) idea is its functional or instrumental use in effecting the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a relatively integrated one."[2]

For Dewey, instrumental logic is a method, and, as such, constitutes the major portion of his philosophy. It has no concern for system-building. "It makes no pretense to be an account of a closed and finished universe."[3]

With this survey of the early development of pragmatism, we are now able to indicate, by way of summary, those emphases of pragmatism which are characteristic and definitive:

(1) Our practical, vital interests control the development of our mental life, and are determinative in all cognitive activity. This use of 'interests' by the pragmatists is not equivalent to the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, for as we have seen in our consideration of that doctrine, Kant was speaking solely of a priori principles of the pure practical reason; his emphasis was upon control <u>by</u> reason, not upon determination <u>of</u> reason by subjective interests.

(2) Knowledge is essentially hypothetical, not final; it is always relative to a problem-situation which it is purposing to solve. Mind-activity, therefore, is fundamentally instrumental.

(3) The criterion of the validity of an idea or belief is its utility or workability, that is, the suitability of the practical consequences that follow from it, the results which it brings about that

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1. Dewey, <u>Studies in Logical Theory</u>, p. 47.
2. Ibid., p. 75.
3. Ibid., p. 19.

mean the control of the problem-situation, the success of the adaptation to the environment-problem. These various expressions carry different emphases, but their common significance is that of workability or instrumentality.

(4) With the validity of the ideas so tested, truth itself tends to be defined as that which is verifiable, as that which works, as that which can be made to solve a problem-situation. Truth becomes, therefore, essentially instrumental.

(5) The 'will to believe' doctrine is not characteristic of pragmatists in general, but belongs chiefly to such religiously-interested leaders in the movement as William James and F.C.S.Schiller.

This, then, gives us a working conception of pragmatism. The relation of such thought-emphases to the methodology of Bowne is the problem of this investigation.

CHAPTER TWO

A CRITICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BOWNE'S THEORY OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE.

Introduction.

In our analysis of Bowne's theory of thought and knowledge, we shall proceed developmentally, beginning with his earliest epistemological references and writings. The published work of Bowne covers a span of nearly thirty-nine years, beginning in 1872, and continuing to the time of his death in 1910. To facilitate our study we shall divide these thirty-nine years, somewhat arbitrarily, into four different periods. The first period we shall designate as that from 1872 to 1878, representing the beginnings of Bowne's critical work. The second period, from 1879 to 1883, is marked by the publication of Studies in Theism. The third period, from 1884 to 1896, is that beginning with the publication of the two articles: "Science Must Go," and "The Logic of Religious Belief." The final period, 1897 to 1910, is dated from the publication of the Theory of Thought and Knowledge.

In each period we shall deal with Bowne's theory under the following topics: (1) Nature of the Mind, (2) The Nature and Scope of Knowledge, (3) Philosophical Method and Criteria, and (4) The Nature of truth.

Section One: First Period, 1872-1878.

(1) Nature of the Mind.

In his view of the nature of the mind, Bowne followed in the activistic tradition of Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant. And under the direct influence of Lotze and Ulrici, his conception was as empirical as it was logical. "In consciousness," he says, "we know ourselves as self-determining activities."[1] And again, "Self as perceiving, is the most funda-

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1. Meth. Quart. Rev., 56 (1874), p. 274.

mental datum of consciousness."[1] Bowne rejected outright the sensationalistic view of the mind, as taught, in his day, chiefly by Spencer. "Mind," he says, "is neither a state nor a series of states, but a being which experiences these states."[2] With Bowne, the empirical emphasis accompanied, it did not replace, the logical. We cannot comprehend even the possibility of experience until we grant the unified self which experience logically presupposes. "Knowledge is not knowledge until it is related to self. It is only the enduring and identical ego which gives unity to experience, and makes memory possible."[3] Again, "The subjective unity of self must be given before knowledge of any kind is possible."[4]

The mind, experienced thus as a unified, self-conscious, self-determining activity, is capable of thought and knowledge. But in all thought and knowledge, indeed in all experience of any sort whatever, the mind continues in its active function. It never passively receives impressions from the outside world. Bowne emphasizes that "sensation is impossible without an inner activity of the soul,"[5] and again, "The mind is active in all knowledge. Without attention by the inhabitant within, the nervous messengers knock in vain at the chambers of the soul."[6] The mind interprets what is sensuously presented to it; by attending, it excludes what it is not interested in; it compares, recognizes, judges, imagines, constructs - in all these the mind is active."[7]

Bowne accepts, in this period, Ulrici's conception of the knowing mind as "in essence a differentiating activity."[8] With the mind exper-

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1. Bowne, B.P., The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, (N.Y.: Phillips & Hunt, 1874), p. 159.
2. Ibid., p. 119.
3. Ibid., p. 180.
4. Ibid., p. 185.
5. Ibid., p. 153.
6. New Englander, 32 (1873), p. 19.
7. New Englander, 33 (1874), p. 462.
8. Ibid., p. 466.

iencing itself as such a differentiating activity, it follows that it must contain within itself the norms of differentiation: "The universal points of comparison, according to which the soul proceeds in that differentiation whereby it comes to knowledge."[1] These norms or points of comparison are the categories. They could not be borrowed or abstracted from sense-experience, because they are presupposed by that experience. Rather they "lie in the nature of the mind, and are the a priori conditions of knowledge."[2]

In his treatment of the nature of the mind in this period, Bowne attempts no critical distinction between the function of reason as theoretical and the function of reason as practical. In one article, however, "Moral Intuition vs. Utilitarianism,"[3] Bowne seems to mean, in his emphasis upon "the moral instinct,"[4] what Kant meant by the practical reason, although Bowne is not willing to accept the Kantian principle of moral action determined by duty without regard to consequences. Bowne's use of instinct here, however, is extremely loose. The term would seem to suggest something entirely subjective, something lacking in rational objectivity, yet Bowne makes it clear that he thinks of the moral instinct as binding upon all alike. He says: "We look upon our moral instincts as a part of the primary furniture of the soul, and like all the intuitions, as authoritative in their sphere."[5] Indeed "The bulk of humah action is instinctive, and though it would cease if it were found to be resultless, yet the primary cause is the promptings of the instinct."[6] But the moral instinct is objectively valid. "Our claim is, that when two motives appear in the soul, we instinctively know which is higher."[7] Again:

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1. New Engl., 33 (1874), p. 469.
2. Ibid., p. 470.
3. New Engl., 32 (1873), pp. 217-242.
4. Ibid., p. 218.
5. Ibid., p. 226.
6. Ibid., p. 234.
7. Ibid., p. 229.

> Not a common and consistent code, but a common and consistent conscience, is one of the most patent facts of human history. Remember that by a moral judgment we mean a decision upon the relative worth and dignity of motives; and we claim that in such judgments all men agree. [1]

Bowne is thus using the term 'moral instinct' as synonymous with 'conscience.' He says:

> This faculty, power, instinct, or whatever it may be, which when two motives disclose themselves, intuitively pronounces upon their relative worth and authority, we call conscience. [2]

In moral conduct, Bowne sets the moral instinct, or conscience, alongside of reason:

> Conscience judges actors; reason judges actions. Conscience selects the motive; reason selects the act which will best express that motive. Conscience gives the principle of action; reason applies it. [3]

Thus, though it would seem clear that in giving objective validity to the moral instinct Bowne is intending essentially the Kantian doctrine of the practical reason, his use of the term 'instinct' is not clear, suggesting as it does an extra-rational factor in human experience.

(2) The Nature and Scope of Knowledge.

The cognitive relation Bowne conceives dualistically from the beginning of his work. "All knowledge inplies a thing to be known, and a faculty for knowing it." [4] "In every act of knowledge two things are always given - the knower and the known - and they are given as distinct from each other." [5]

"But what is it to know?" Bowne asks. He answers: "It is --- to comprehend the manifold of existence under the various categories of

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1. New Engl., 32(1873), p. 239.
2. Ibid., p. 229.
3. Ibid., p. 242.
4. Loc.cit., H.Spencer (1874), p. 45.
5. Ibid., p. 158.

thought."[1] But more explicitly,

> To know in the only sense possible to men is, first, to be sure that a thing exists; and second, that it falls under certain categories, or has certain definite attributes or ways of working. -----Assuming, for example, that the soul exists, our knowledge thereof would consist not in an insight into its substance, but in our certainty: first, that it exists; and second, that it has certain definite modes of activity.[2]

Because Bowne interprets all of reality in activistic terms, as well as the knowing mind, knowledge itself must be of things actively conceived. A completely passive thing could not act on our sense organs to produce any impression upon us, just as a passive mind could not interpret what was presented to it. Knowledge of anything therefore, is knowledge of it through its activity-modes.

Bowne assumes, in this period, the possibility of scientific knowledge, although he undertakes no systematic treatment of the problem involved. The distinction between the field of science, on the one hand, however, and of religion and metaphysics, on the other, which was to receive large emphasis in his later work, already appears in The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. He writes: Science discovers laws, but is forced to provide an ever-active administrator; this satisfies religion. Religion proves an ever-living Will, but is compelled to grant its steady method; this satisfies science."[3] Therefore, "To religion the cause, to science the method; to religion the power, to science the path."[4]

From the beginning Bowne assumes the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. He writes:

> In this way we gain all our knowledge. Going out from the facts of experience, we are forced to assume, first, that a thing exists; and second, that it has certain properties. This constitutes our knowledge of the thing. Plainly, a

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1. Meth.Quart. Rev.,58 (1876) p. 657.
2. Ibid., p. 657.
3. Loc.cit., H.Spencer (1874), p. 126.
4. Ibid., p. 127.

> knowledge of the first cause in this sense must be possible, because phenomena force us to assume its existence, and to attribute to it definite properties. What these properties may be, must be determined from a study of the facts; but when the facts force us to assume such a first cause, and force us to attribute to it certain definite properties, then we know that first cause in precisely the same sense in which we know anything.[1]

Again, "While insisting upon a real knowledge of God, I am very far from claiming a complete one."[2]

Bowne rejects completely the Kantian and Spencerian assumption of a fundamental reality which we cannot know. Of any reality of which it is possible to affirm the existence, knowledge is possible, for without knowledge of it, there could be no justifiable affirmation of its existence. Our knowledge of appearances is our knowledge of reality; it is our knowledge of things as they appear.[3]

In the moral sphere, knowledge of right and wrong is possible, and is objectively valid, as indicated in our discussion of Bowne's view of the moral instinct, or conscience. "Our claim is that as two motives appear in the mind, we intuitively know which is the higher."[4]

(3). Philosophical Method and Criteria.

Although Bowne presented no systematic statement of his conception of philosophical method in this period, it is possible to bring his various judgments into something of a unified whole. It is clear that at the basis of Bowne's whole procedure was a fundamental faith in the trustworthiness of reason. "The laws of our thought are true for all intelligence."[5] And again, "We refrain from imposing our categories upon other beings, but insist that they are nevertheless true. To deny this,

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1. Meth.Quart.Rev, 58 (1876), p. 658.
2. Loc.cit., H.Spencer (1874), p. 72.
3. New Engl. 31 (1872), pp. 92-97.
4. New Engl. 32 (1873), p. 234.
5. New Engl. 31 (1872), p. 97.

is to commit intellectual suicide."[1] Indeed, all cognitive activity assumes the validity of these categories:

> All our mental operations proceed upon certain assumptions. The reality of an external world, the validity of logical laws, the truth of causation, the reality of space and time: these facts are assumed in all reasoning; and reasoning cannot proceed one step without them.[2]

Another basic assumption, closely associated with that of the trustworthiness of reason and its categories, is that of the intelligibility or rationality of the world. "All science implicitly assumes that Nature is a harmonious system, and its aim is to reproduce that system in thought. But only the rational can be thus reproduced. Hence, the system of Nature is either a rational system or our science is worthless."[3]

But though resting upon the assumed trustworthiness of the mind and intelligibility of the world, philosophical method for Bowne, in this period, must avoid mere deductive speculation and root firmly in the facts of conscious experience. This empirical emphasis became very strong after Bowne's contact with Ulrici. It is conspicuous in his critical references to post-Kantian German philosophy. He writes: "The critic is compelled to declare that German philosophy since Kant has had little in common with logic, less yet in common with the facts of consciousness."[4] Hegel and his followers, Bowne says elsewhere, "were even more superior to facts than Schelling; while they took logic itself by the horns and announced the identity of contradiction as the first principle of philosophy."[5] Ulrici was one of the few who, in the seventies, were "making heroic efforts to recall philosophy to the facts of life and consciousness."[6]

The positive statement of Bowne's conception of empirical method

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1. New Engl. 31 (1872), p. 97.
2. New Engl. 32 (1873), p. 500.
3. Independent, 29 (July 5, 1877), p. 2.
4. New Engl. 33 (1874), pp. 461-462.
5. Ibid., p. 623.
6. Independ. 26 (Jan.22, 1874), p.4.

in this period is perhaps best found in the following passage in which Bowne is reviewing the Logik of Ulrici. Referring to the nature of the laws of thought, he affirms that this question:

> is not to be answered by an apriori speculation, no matter how pretentious, but by an inductive consideration of the mind itself. --- The facts of the common consciousness, must decide this question. And since any being manifests its nature only in its activity, we can only hope to discover the nature of the mind by an examination of its activity.[1]

Again, with respect to metaphysical procedure:

> We rise to the absolute from the conditioned facts of experience, and the content which we put into the absolute must be determined entirely by those facts.[2]

This empirical emphasis in Bowne's early methodology does not exclude the logical, however. The essence of the method is rather the working out of the logical presuppositions and implications of the facts of conscious experience. Both reason and experience are essentially trustworthy.

As to the criteria of knowledge, here also there is no systematic statement in this period. Nevertheless, it is clear that Bowne intends to judge all claims to knowledge by two criteria: consistency and what he comes later to call "adequacy to the facts," for certainly the empirical emphasis here, as well as the logical, is unmistakable. Bowne criticizes Spencer for using inconceivability as a truth criterion on the ground that he confuses inconceivability with incomprehensibility. Only that which is contradictory, which violates the law of reason, Bowne insists, is truly inconceivable. Referring to such inconceivables, he says:

> Violating, as they do, the fundamental intuitions of the mind, as long as we have any faith at all in reason, we must believe these inconceivables to be impossibles.[3]

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1. New Engl. 33 (1874), p. 463.
2. Ibid., p. 644.
3. Loc.cit., H.Spencer (1874), p.88.

Bowne was severe in his criticism of the "Hegelian doctrine of the identity of contradictories" because he understood by it the abandonment of the fundamental law of reason. He believed, too, that this same tendency to disregard the demands of logic was characteristic of much of the work of the scientific agnostics, of Huxley, Spencer, and Fiske. He accumulates illustrations to show "how strong is the reaction among the advanced scientists against consistency as a test of truth."[1] That Bowne clung to consistency as the first criterion of all thinking is shown by such a statement as the following: Referring to the true conception of change and causality, he affirms that this is "not a question which the eyes can settle, but rather one of consistency of thinking."[2]

The empirical criterion we have already illustrated in our exposition of Bowne's empirical method. Though not critically formulating it, he insisted that thought begin with the "conditioned facts of experience," and that the content of any speculation be "determined entirely by those facts."[3] This empirical criterion was later expressed by Bowne as "adequacy to the facts."

In this early period, Bowne seemed to favor Ulrici's formula for the criterion of truth, namely, "thought-necessity." In reviewing Ulrici, he writes:

> When I am compelled to think a thing as so, and not otherwise, then I am certain that it is so. When I am uncertain, that means that I am not compelled to conceive it in the given way. But when a true thought-necessity is present, then all doubt is excluded, andonly certainty remains.[4]

Again, "Whatever a thought-necessity forces upon us, we must accept as real,"[5] and "Whatever we cannot help admitting must be admitted; and nothing else can lay claim to reality."[6] The loose and subjective char-

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1. Zion's Herald 54 (1877), p.361.
2. Independ. 29 (July 5, 1877), p.3.
3. New Engl. 33 (1874), p. 644.
4. Ibid., p. 474.
5. Ibid., p. 474-5.
6. Ibid., p. 626.

acter of such a formulation is immediately obvious. What may be necessary to the thought of one person, may not seem at all necessary to the thought of another. It needs further explication, although Bowne probably intended the formula to cover the two criteria which we have already mentioned, consistency and empirical adequacy; that is, thought is coerced by both logical and factual necessity, and when so coerced may be regarded as true.

That Bowne was thinking also in this period of the pragmatic criterion of fruitfulness, even though only incidentally and without any connection with concrete cases of truth-testing, is suggested by his dismissal of that type of scepticism, which, without any rational basis, holds that though our conclusions may be subjectively necessary for us, they do not possess objective validity. He says of such scepticism that it is "forever irrefutable and forever barren."[1]

Another isolated and incidental statement in this period that is pragmatically toned is one which occurs in Bowne's criticism of Spencer's doctrine of the unknowable. Bowne does not criticize the doctrine in pragamtic terms; he holds only to the strictest logical treatment; but he does say that this doctrine, which logically can be shown to be in error, is one that would never disturb science or practical life:

> Science would go on in just the same way as at present, collecting and coordinating its facts, though the facts were proved to be phantoms. Common life would experience no change. The most thorough-going know-nothing would be as eager to get bread as the realist; he would be as careful to keep out of a relative fire or a relative river, as out of an absolute one. In all these cases the practical necessity would override the speculative error.[2]

That Bowne was not, in this period, conceiving these notions of

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1. Meth.Quart.Rev. 58 (1876), p.662.
2. Loc.cit., H.Spencer, (1874), p.76.

"barrenness" and "practical necessity," even though in isolation pragmatically toned, in any real pragmatic way is shown by the paragraph which follows the last quotation. There Bowne insists that it is not enough that an idea be good for us to believe, or that it have merely regulative value, it must be true in fact.

> It is useless to leave us our religious ideas as regulative truths - that is, things good for us to believe, but without foundation in fact. A regulative truth will regulate until one discovers the fraud; but he must have very little knowledge of human nature who imagines that it will have any authority after the trick has been found out.[1]

A pragmatic emphasis would seem more definitely to have entered into the thought of Bowne in this period in the field of ethical theory. Bowne found strength in both the intuitional and utilitarian views of ethics, but was not satisfied with either alone. Interpreting the intuitional view, that is, conscience conceived as moral intuition or instinct, in Kantian terms of rational objectivity, he sought to combine it with the utilitarian view of consequences as the criterion. In his article, "Moral Intuition vs. Utilitarianism," he writes: "For the control of life · · intuition is blind without the guidance of utility; and utility is the purest selfishness apart from moral intuition ."[2] As we have already observed in our exposition of Bowne's view of the nature of the mind in this period, Bowne separates the function of conscience from that of reason:

> Conscience judges actors; reason judges actions. Conscience selects the motive; reason selects the act which will best express that motive. Conscience gives the principle of action; reason applies it.[3]

With reason thus functioning in the application of the principles of conscience, its only criterion is consequences:

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1. Loc.cit., H.Spencer (1874), p. 76.
2. New Engl. 32 (1873), p.218.
3. Ibid., p.242.

> As actions have no moral quality in themselves, we resign without hesitation the making of a code, or the determination of specific action, to the judging intellect; and we admit consequences to be the only standard of judgment. The only rational aim of action is to secure good of some kind for ourselves or others; and actions are to be selected with reference to their fitness to secure this end. Things hurtful are not to be done, things indifferent may be left undone, things helpful must be done.[1]

The utilitarian emphasis here is strong. Bowne even goes so far as to say:

> Justice and truth have no absolute obligation; it is only as they are the bond and cement of society that they are binding upon us.--- Profanity is forbidden because it destroys reverence for God and his law. Even chastity derives its obligation from its necessity to the family relation, and the proper physical and moral education of the race.[2]

And referring to Kant's demand for unconditional veracity even where the life of an innocent person is at stake, Bowne writes:

> This is conscience gone mad. Truth must be told because society and human happiness are based upon it, and any tampering with it is sure to result in mischief. Whenever it does not hold this relation, it may innocently be dispensed with.[3]

And again, "We hold this to be the infallible test of codes as well as of men, By their fruit ye shall know them."[4]

Yet Bowne was insistent in urging that utilitarianism without moral intuition was incomplete. We must recognize the moral instinct or intuition as giving those principles of right and wrong, by which consequences are to be judged. "Why," Bowne asks, "should I follow the higher motive? Because it is higher. How do I know it to be higher? By insight, not by foresight."[5] It is Bowne's insistence upon the objectivity, the binding-upon-all-alike quality, of the moral judgment that keeps these utilitarian statements from being out-and-out pragmatism. These moral intuitions, he writes, are "authoritative in their sphere."[6]

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1. New Engl. 32 (1873), p. 221-222.
2. Ibid., p. 222.
3. Ibid., p. 222.
4. Ibid., p. 224.
5. Ibid., p. 235.
6. Ibid., p. 226.

And again, "we claim that in such judgments all men agree."[1] These views, therefore, amount to this: the judgment of action in terms of consequences in the light of the objectively valid moral principles established by conscience. That this view is essentially rationalistic is, therefore, clear, but it is also clear that Bowne was modifying his inherited Kantian rationalism in the light of the pragmatic emphases of utilitarianism.

(4). The Nature of Truth.

Bowne has very little to say in this period concerning the nature of truth. Two passages, however, make clear that he was thinking of truth as independent and rational, and not as relative or mechanical. His purpose is to show that truth is without significance on a necessitarian basis. He writes:

> Logically, the materialist has no right to talk of either the true or the good. Upon his theory, there is neither true nor good. For thought is only a product of the brain; and by what right can we say that this product is true and that one is false? Both are produced with equal necessity, and why is not one as good as the other?[2]

Again:

> If the universe be anything but an irrational botch, man's salvation must lie in knowing the truth about it. The notion that truth could be destructive and falsehood conservative, is a view which none of us would care to entertain. Helpful superstitions and beneficent lies can have no place in a rational system. They may serve for a time as palliatives, but in the end nothing but truth can save."[3]

Helpfulness and utility in themselves are no guarantee of truth, although indeed truth must be regarded as conservative.

Summary of Epistemology for First Period (1872-1878):

Mind, experienced as a unified, self-conscious, self-determining

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1. New Engl. 32 (1873) p. 239.
2. Independ. 26 (July 30, 1874) p. 2.
3. Zion's Herald 54 (1877), p. 401.

activity, and logically presupposed as an enduring and identical ego by experience, is active in all knowledge, interpreting, comparing, differentiating, according to a priori norms implicit in its activity; it includes the moral instincts the principles of which are objectively valid. Knowledge, dualistic in its distinction between knower and known, is the active interpreting of presentations in accordance with the a priori categories; knowledge is possible for metaphysical reality and for questions of right and wrong. Philosophical method, beginning with a basic faith in the trustworthiness of reason and in the intelligibility of the world, must root firmly in the facts of experience; all speculation must begin with facts and its content must be determined by facts. The criteria of knowledge, therefore, are those of logical consistency and "adequacy to the facts" (this latter phrase does not actually appear until later in Bowne, but the intention is present in this first period). Two isolated suggestions of pragmatic criteria in this period are clearly incidental and are given no applicability to concrete truth-claims, except in the field of ethical judgments, where consequences are made the empirical criterion for judging the moral quality of any action in the light of the a priori principles established by conscience; but even here the introduction of the utilitarian emphasis upon consequences does not alter the fundamental rationalism of Bowne's ethical theory in this period, inasmuch as moral intuition is the seat of the a priori, objectively valid moral principles which must guide all judgments of consequences. Nevertheless, these pragmatic elements indicate an openness of mind on Bowne's part, even in this early period, to those emphases which were to become characteristic of pragmatism.. Truth is rational, independent, and absolute, though at the same time beneficial and useful wherever it is realized.

Section Two: Second Period, 1879-1883.

(1). Nature of the Mind.

Aside from a pragmatic emphasis upon feelings and interests as determinants in the development of the mind, there is no essential change in the second period in Bowne's views of the nature of the mind. As in the first period, he starts with the experience of the conscious self and then proceeds to develop the logical presuppositions of that experience. The empirical and the logical are kept, therefore, in close conjunction, although with somewhat greater emphasis on the logical development because of Bowne's desire to penetrate beneath appearances to their underlying ground. "The unity of the thinking subject is less a deliverance of consciousness than a necessary condition of all consciousness," he writes in Studies in Theism.[1] And in the first edition of the Metaphysics, published three years later: "It does not follow that we are unitary agents because we appear to ourselves as such, but because we appear to ourselves at all,"[2] that is, "Consciousness of any sort is impossible without the unity of the conscious subject."[3] Again, "Thought and feeling demand a subject. In experience, we know nothing of thoughts and feelings existing apart by themselves. The universal fact is, not feelings and thoughts exist; but I think and I feel."[4] And once again, "My thoughts demand a subject, and that subject is myself.----- I know myself as a thinker and an agent. As such subject or agent, I am substance, in the only intelligible use of that word."[5]

The activity of the mind in the knowing process remains an essential tenet in the developing epistemology of Bowne. In Studies in Theism, he

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1. Bowne, B.P., Studies in Theism, (N.Y.: Phillips and Hunt, 1879), p. 387.
2. Bowne, B.P., Metaphysics, AStudy in First Principles, (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers, 1882), p. 369.
3. Ibid., p. 368.
4. Ibid., p. 361-362.
5. Ibid., p. 382.

writes: "The activity of the mind in knowing is a principle which rational philosophy will never consent to give up.-----the failure to grasp it is at the bottom of the chief errors of ancient and modern philosophy."[1] And in the Metaphysics:

> Knowledge is not passively imported into the soul, but is developed by the soul within itself. Just as we perceive another's thought by constructing it in our own minds, so we perceive the universe by a similar act of construction. The process is active, and not passive. It is constructive rather than receptive; or rather it is reception only through construction.[2]

The mind activity is essentially a process of relating, which in turn involves discrimination and comparison. Bowne is here carrying forward the doctrine of thought as a differentiating activity, which he again specifically acknowledges as having been developed chiefly by Ulrici.[3]

The mind proceeds in its cognitive activity according to the principles of interpretation implicit within it. "Perception proper does not exist at all until the raw material of sensation has been differentiated, and interpreted, and systematized. But the principles of interpretation and differentiation must be in the mind itself."[4] Primarily these principles are "forms of our knowing; and are carried into things rather than found in them."[5] Again, "The mind deals with its objects under the forms of cause and effect, substance, and quality, identity, continuity and space. These forms we regard as contributed by the mind, and for the reason that there is nothing in simple sentiency which shows the least tendency to produce them."[6]

The most striking development in Bowne's view of the nature of the mind in this second period is the emphasis which he now places upon the determinative character of feelings and interests in the life of the mind.

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1. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p. 120.
2. Loc.cit., Metaph., (1882), p. 407.
3. Ibid., p. 367.
4. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p. 123.
5. Ibid., p. 124.
6. Metaph., (1882), p. 507.

This emphasis may well be related to the doctrine of moral instincts which we found developed by Bowne in a single article of the first period, "Moral Intuition and Utilitarianism."[1] There we found Bowne using the term instincts rather loosely to designate the demands of the moral nature. Here we find Bowne using the terms interests and feelings, and again in defense of the rights of the moral, together with the religious, nature. It is in Studies in Theism that the doctrine of the determinative character of feelings and interests in the life of the mind is first developed by Bowne; and it is here developed with positiveness and vigor. In the Chapter on "Knowledge and Belief," we find the following:

> Both in ethics and esthetics the ultimate fact upon which all theory is built, is a movement of the sensibility, which thus founds the distinction of good and bad, beautiful and ugly. The most rigorous rationalist in morals cannot escape the ultimate appeal to feeling to sanction his theories. The whole mental life, also springs out of feeling. It is extremely doubtful if a purely perceptive being, without any subjective interests, could attain to rationality, even if its physical existence were secured. Indeed, it is demonstrable that our sentiments outline and control all mental development. Before mental growth can begin, there must be an awakened interest.[2]

And further:

> When the human mind comes to self-consciousness, it becomes aware of many interests. These are practical, speculative, esthetic and moral interests. These are the motive power of the mind, and outline its development.[3]

It is clear that Bowne intended by this emphasis upon feelings and interests as outlining and controlling mental development simply a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason. Indeed, in the same chapter from which the two preceding passages are taken, Bowne writes:

> It is not without ground, therefore, that Kant insisted upon the primacy of the practical reason, and the subor-

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1. New Engl. 32 (1873), See pp. 218, 226, 229, 234.
2. Loc. cit., Studies, (1879), pp.65-66.
3. Ibid., p. 69.

> dinate character of the speculative. Man is life rather than reason; and reason only strives to formulate what life and reality are. --- Life has the field, and the might of the actual will always prevail at last over aberrant speculation. [1]

But though Bowne intended this stress upon feelings and interests as a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, it is clear that his restatement differs in character from Kant's original doctrine, in so far as it is pragmatic rather than rationalistic in form. Kant, as we have seen (v. pp. 21-23), recognized the place of interests in the mental life, but he distinguished between those interests which belong directly to pure reason and those which rest on empirical grounds. Further, he was careful to specify of the moral law: "dass es nicht darum für uns Gültigkeit hat, weil es interessiert," but rather "dass es interessiert, weil es für uns als Menschen gilt, da es aus unserem Willen als Intelligenz, mithin aus unserem eigentlichen Selbst entsprungen ist." [2] As we have seen, further (v. pp. 19-21), for Kant, the primacy of the practical reason meant the validity of the a priori principles of the practical reason, independent of the possibility of their being established by the speculative reason, as long as they do not contradict the speculative reason, and their validity lies precisely in the fact that they are a priori principles of pure practical reason, and hence objective and necessary. Bowne, on the other hand, makes no attempt to establish the validity of the beliefs which grow out of these interests of the mind beyond affirming their essential character in the life of the mind and their empirical generality and utility. [3] For Kant the moral law and its religious postulates are objectively valid because they are required by pure reason. For Bowne moral and religious feelings are objectively valid because they are no more subjective than

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1. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879) pp. 74-75.
2. Kant, loc.cit., Vol.III. G.M.S., p. 91 (Akademie-Ausgabe,pp. 460-461)
3. Loc.cit., Studies, pp. 75, 76, 77.

the postulates of science and philosophy and because they are universally found in human experience. Kant approached the problem of moral and religious beliefs from the point of view of reason. Bowne approached the problem from the point of view of our experience. There was still the possibility of founding the objective validity of these feelings and interests on the ground that the objectivity of their reference is required by the most coherent view of experience. But Bowne made no use of such method in this second period. He built his case rather upon a circle argument: The feelings require God, therefore God must be; and if God is, then the feelings for God may be regarded as having objective validity. In other words, he simply assumed the validity of the moral and religious interests, without attempting in any way, other than pragmatically, to establish them. It is for this reason that we must judge that, though intending the Kantian doctrine, Bowne succeeded, in this period, in achieving only a pragmatic formulation. We shall examine this view of Bowne more closely in our consideration of the philosophical methods and criteria of this period.

Bowne's view of the function of the speculative reason in relation to these interests of the mind appears as one of regulation. Referring to the interests, he says: "The only function of the logical understanding, with regard to them, is to expound their implications, and determine their mutual relations."[1] Again:

> Just as sensation is an absolute condition of perception, so this feeling of God is an absolute condition of theistic belief. The reflective reason does not originate it, but justifies or rectifies it. The arguments for theism have never originated the belief, but have only aimed to give reasons for the belief already there.[2]

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1. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p. 69.
2. Ibid., p. 81.

(2) The Nature and Scope of Knowledge.

Bowne's treatment of the nature of knowledge in the second period is more broadly developed than that of the first period, although including the essential points outlined in the earlier treatment. This fuller development is shown chiefly in the distinction which he now makes between knowledge and belief. Although closely limiting the scope of that which is strictly knowledge, he treats rational belief as answering our cognitive needs in the largest part of our experience. We shall notice first his definition of knowledge, as given in Studies in Theism:

> Knowledge is the certainty that our conceptions correspond to reality or to truth. By reality, we mean any matter of fact, whether of the outer or inner world. By truth, we mean rational principles. By certainty, it is plain that we cannot mean any thoughtless assurance, but only that which results from the necessity of admission. [1]

Thus, "Rational principles, and the facts of consciousness and immediate perception, are all that can claim to be strictly knowledge." [2] Our knowledge of rational principles consists in having a "clear insight" into them so that they are seen to be "self-evident." [3] And, "Our knowledge of things consists (1) in the certainty that they exist, and (2) that they have certain attributes or ways of working, and certain relations among themselves." [4]

By rational principles, Bowne means those propositions "at the foundation of our mental life --- which cannot be mediated or deduced." [5] They are immediate and original." [6] They include such truths as the logical laws, the law of causation, [7] and mathematical truths.

This close restriction of knowledge, as thus defined, to rational principles and the facts of consciousness and immediate perception means

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1. Loc.cit., Studies (1879), pp. 13-14.
2. Ibid., p. 61.
3. Ibid., p. 15.
4. Ibid., p. 15.
5. Loc.cit., Metaph., (1882), pp. 451-452.
6. Ibid., p. 514.
7. Ibid., pp. 521-523.

that very little of our so-called knowledge is positively knowledge. "Still," Bowne says:

> It does not follow that all else is delusion; for, though not strictly certain, it may be rationally probable, and thus a subject for rational belief. By rational belief, then, we mean the acceptance of any thing on grounds which, while they render it probable, do not strictly compel its admission. They justify the mind in accepting it, but do not exclude the possibility of the opposite.[1]

Bowne defines his meaning further: "A belief, to be rational, must have rational grounds. When held without grounds, it is a volition; when held on irrational grounds, it is a prejudice or a superstition."[2]

The grounds of rational belief are essentially of two classes: objective and subjective. "The former are the facts of sense-perception; the latter are the manifold facts of feeling and instinct, the longing for the true, the beautiful and the good, the sense of dependence and moral obligation, the desire to worship, and the fervors of religious aspiration."[3]

From these definitions it is clear that science and philosophy, the latter including metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of religion, are assigned to the field of rational belief, and it is precisely the assumptions upon which they are based that constitute their sphere one of belief rather than of positive knowledge. Their work is the solution of the problems of our experience, not the demonstration of theorems. Bowne writes:

> The demonstration of theorems belongs only to the formal sciences; all the sciences which deal with reality aim only at the solution of problems. They find their problems in the facts, and then they raise the question how we must think of the backlying cause, or causes, or antecedents, in order that the facts should be as they are.[4]

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1. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p.61.
2. Ibid., p. 62.
3. Ibid., p. 63.
4. Meth.Quart.Rev.,61 (1879), p.226.

In this sense, then, of empirically grounded rational belief, metaphysical knowledge,as well as scientific, is possible. This represents a more precise formulation of the meaning of metaphysical knowledge than that which we found in the first period of Bowne's work. It is those thought interpretations of ultimate reality which seem rationally most probable. And because common sense the world over inevitably holds certain spontaneously evolved notions of the nature of the world, metaphysics becomes the critical examination, correction, and elaboration of those common-sense notions, with the aim of securing the most rational solution of our ultimate thought-problems. It is, writes Bowne, "an exposition and criticism of our fundamental philosophical concepts."[1] Or again, "Our aim," in metaphysics, "is to criticize our notions of reality and thus determine the true nature and connections of things."[2] This determination, however, never goes beyond the limits of rational belief, so that "The question of metaphysics --- finally becomes, How must we think of reality?"[3] And this thought of reality will always be in the nature of an outline-conception. The details of the system cannot be speculatively arrived at, but must be furnished by experience.[4]

(3). Philosophical Method and Criteria.

References to methodology in Bowne's writings of this period are numerous. Any attempt to render a systematic formulation of these various statements of view, is rendered difficult, however, by the lack of assimilation of the methods involved to one another. There are present, for example, in the writings of this period three distinct types of method: inductive, deductive, and pragmatic. At no point does Bowne attempt

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1. Loc.cit., Metaph., (1882), pp. vi-vii.
2. Ibid., p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 7.
4. See Ibid. p.viii, and pp. 529-530.

a systematic presentation of these various types to clarify their relations to one another. For example, Bowne continues with the emphasis of the first period, though somewhat more mildly, that speculation must begin with facts; yet the inductive approach is largely confined to his presentation of the theistic arguments. In his systematic metaphysics, on the other hand, his method is very largely that of a deductive examination of basic concepts. Again, in his examination of moral and religious beliefs, his approach is largely pragmatic. There is less difficulty in harmonizing the inductive and deductive methods, than in harmonizing these, in turn, with the pragmatic, for indeed, the inductive and deductive supplement each other. We may follow the investigation of facts as far as such investigation will lead us, but there still remains the problem of examining the fundamental concepts of interpretation which we have carried into our deductive procedure. It is this latter task that is the chief function of metaphysics as Bowne conceives it. The pragmatic, on the other hand, cannot be harmonized with rationalistic induction and deduction unless it too is carried over to an essentially rationalistic basis. In other words, the final criteria of knowledge and belief must be rational if objectivity is to be established. No genuine objectivity can be established on purely pragmatic grounds. It is the presence, therefore, of these various, and by Bowne unrelated, types of methods in the writings of this period that renders a systematic formulation difficult. An examination of the methodology as it relates to the different phases of knowledge and belief, however, is possible, and it is that to which we now turn.

With the definitions of knowledge and rational belief with which Bowne proceeds in this period, his methodology is manifestly concerned

primarily with the field of rational belief. In the field of strict knowledge the methodology is already included in the definition of that knowledge. That is, the knowledge of ultimate principles is immediate and original, whenever, after its psychological conditioning, it comes to the mind.[1] It cannot be mediated or deduced; it is incapable of demonstration. "Acceptance or rejection alone is possible."[2] Its criteria are the inconceivability of its opposites and immediate self-evidence. "With rational principles --- their opposites are not only incredible, they cannot even be conceived. Their denial is possible in word, but not in thought."[3] Again, "When asked, then, for the ultimate warrant of rational principles, we do not hesitate to declare it to be reason itself. Whatever appears as truly self-evident and necessary, the mind will always feel justified in regarding as true."[4] It rests, therefore, solely "on the authority of the mind."[5] The basic faith in the essential trustworthiness of reason which we found at the foundation of Bowne's conception of method in the first period remains as the ground of all knowledge.

Bowne includes in his definition of strict knowledge[6], as we have noticed, not only rational principles but also "the facts of consciousness and immediate perception."[7] Bowne's meaning with respect to "the facts of --- immediate perception" is made clear by the following passage:

> Allowing the uniformity of nature, natural science falls into two parts. There are first, the perceived facts and their orders of coexistence and sequence. There is, second, the department of theory and hypothesis, whereby we seek to explain the observed facts. If, now, we reckon the facts perceived to the realm of knowledge, we must reckon scientific theories mainly, if not entirely, to the realm of belief.[8]

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1. Loc.cit., Metaph., (1882), p. 514.
2. Ibid., pp. 451-2.
3. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p. 54-55.
4. Ibid., p. 33.
5. Loc.cit., Metaph., (1882), p.519.
6. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p.13-14; p.61.
7. Ibid., p. 61.
8. Ibid., p. 87.

In classifying the facts of immediate perception with the facts of consciousness, Bowne is here disregarding the interpretative element that is present in all perception. Facts of consciousness, indeed, are facts; they are immediately given; they are indubitable possessions of the mind. There is no possibility of error in them; hence no criterion for them; they are simply present to conscious experience. But by facts of immediate perception, as is clear from the passage quoted above, Bowne means the tested facts of perception, that is, presentations whose objective reference is correctly interpreted and verified. But clearly our perceptions may be erroneous; they may deceive us. The problem of how our perceptions are verified is one that Bowne does not consider; indeed he does not even isolate it as a problem.

With strict knowledge defined as rational truths and the facts of consciousness and immediate experience, it is clear that the bulk of the so-called cognitive field belongs to rational belief rather than to strict knowledge. This is the field of assumption and of mediate inference; nothing belonging to this field is ever immediately certain or immediately given or self-evident. At best the field of rational belief is the field of rational probability; there always remains therefore the possibility of error, and, therefore, the need of revision and correction. The one fundamental assumption upon which all rational belief rests is that of the intelligibility of the external world,,the assumption that the world is knowable and knowable by us, that the categories of our thought are valid for the external world. There is no proof, in any strict sense of the word, that our conceptions are valid for reality. As Bowne puts it: "The only proof which the nature of the case admits of, is the feeling of necessity or of fact, which attends knowledge, together with the

inner harmony of our experience."[1] At bottom, therefore, it remains an assumption, although an assumption, indeed, that our experience would seem to confirm.

Rational belief falls into two principal spheres as a consequence of the two types of grounds upon which it may rest: objective and subjective, as has already been observed:

> The former are the facts of sense-perception: the latter are the manifold facts of feeling and instinct, the longing for the true, the beautiful and the good, the sense of dependence and moral obligation, the desire to worship, and the fervors of religious aspiration.[2]

The facts of sense-perception, or the objective grounds, are "such as appeal only to the passionless understanding."[3] The subjective grounds, on the other hand, are such

> as appeal not only to the understanding, but also to the esthetic, and moral, and religious nature. As such, they are no less rational than the former, though their validity would not be recognized by any in whom the esthetic and religious elements were lacking. All beliefs are of this class into which sentiment of any kind enters, whether it be of patriotism, or of duty, or of love, or of art, or of religion.[4]

Science and metaphysics (apart from moral and religious belief) belong to that sphere of rational belief whose grounds are objective. Moral and religious beliefs, on the other hand, belong to that sphere of rational belief whose grounds are subjective. We shall first consider Bowne's methodology, as developed in this period, as it relates to science and metaphysics, and then consider it as it relates to moral and religious beliefs.

Bowne shows no interest in the writings of this period in science qua science. He attempts no definition of scientific method, in any

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1. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p. 49.
2. Ibid., p. 63.
3. Ibid., p. 62.
4. Ibid., p. 62.

strict sense. The fairly frequent references to science are made for the purpose of justifying methodology in the field of moral and religious belief and of contributing to the progress of various metaphysical arguments. In Studies in Theism, the chapter on "Postulates of Scientific Knowledge." presents certain basic assumptions which science, like all cognitive procedure, must make: (1) the existence of the knowing mind with its own interpretive categories; (2) the validity of those categories for the external world; and (3) the existence of a free and rational creator lying back of the world-process if there is to be any distinction between truth and error.

The question of the nature of scientific verification is one that Bowne refers to only as it relates to verification of the theistic hypothesis. He writes:

> How is a theory verified? If it be such that observation is possible, it is verified by observation. But most theories are not susceptible of such a test, and here verification takes another form. In this case, we reason back from the facts to a sufficient cause; and verification consists in showing that only this theory will meet the conditions of the problem.[1]

That Bowne did not conceive of scientific criteria in pragmatic terms is clear from the following:

> The guiding principle in forming hypotheses is, the law of the sufficient reason; and the justification of a theory is not to be found in its utility, but in its providing an adequate cause.[2]

That Bowne held a thoroughly rationalistic view of scientific criteria is further borne out by his criticism that science is too often satisfied with practical fruitfulness at the expense of theoretical consistency.

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1. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p. 97.
2. Ibid., pp.99-100.

> Thus the doctrine[1] is held in each department with only such exactness as the facts of that department call for; and if the conception prove a fruitful one in practice, or even a convenient one for representing the facts to the imagination, little attention is paid to theoretical consistency or to agreement with the results in other departments.[2]

Bowne is clearly implying here that the two fundamental criteria for science must be self-consistency and coherence with the rest of scientific knowledge.

In the methodology of systematic metaphysics, Bowne falls away from the essentially empirical and inductive procedure which he stressed so strongly, in the first period, under the influence of Ulrici. There, as we found, Bowne insisted that all speculation begin with facts. (v. pp. 43-44) This empirical and inductive approach is stilled retained, in the second period, in the theistic argument, but not in the systematic metaphysics. This method in the theistic case is shown in Bowne's argument that in exactly the same way that we infer the existence of other finite minds we may infer the existence of an intelligence back of the world-process. "The only data for inferring other minds are the intelligible and purpose-like activities which are seen to issue from human forms."[3] And it is similarly such purpose-like activities in the world-process all about us that are the data for our inferring an intelligent world-power. Every theory, Bowne holds, must be judged "chiefly by its own positive adequacy to the facts."[4]

In the systematic metaphysics, Bowne does not abandon the requirement that our conceptions be adequate to explain the facts, but his method becomes essentially deductive rather than inductive. This difference is the logical consequence of Bowne's conception of metaphysics as an exam-

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1. The doctrine here referred to is the atomic.
2. Loc.cit., Metaphy. (1882), pp. 275-276.
3. Meth. Quart. Rev., 61(1879), p. 244.
4. Loc.cit., Studies (1879), p.5.

ination of basic philosophical concepts. Bowne specifically relates his procedure in systematic metaphysics to that of Johann Friedrich Herbart. In the Preface to the Metaphysics, he writes: "Herbart supplies the method,"[1] and again, in the Introduction, "It will not escape notice that our conception of metaphysics is identical with that of Herbart, who defined it as 'the working-over of the notions.'"[2] In further exposition of Herbart's method, Windelband's summary is pertinent:

> He (Herbart) knows no other logic than the formal logic whose principle is the principle of contradiction, i.e. the prohibition to commit a contradiction. The supreme principle of all thought is, that which contradicts itself cannot be truly real or actual.
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> Now it is evident that the conceptions in which we think experience are full of internal contradictions --- This experience (therefore) can be only phenomenon; but --- whatever seeming there is, there is just so much indication of Being. To discover this is the task of philosophy; it is a working over of the conceptions of experience which are given and which must be re-shaped according to the rules of formal logic, until we know the reality that has no internal contradictions.[3]

It is clear that Bowne follows this Herbartian method with rigor in his systematic metaphysics. He writes: "Our fundamental notions are always loosely and often contradictorily conceived in spontaneous thought. Our practical thinking is moulded by practical needs, and hence we never spontaneously give any greater precision to our ideas than practice calls for."[4] Consequently, "The metaphysical aim is to rectify our fundamental ideas so as to make them consistent with themselves and adequate to their function."[5] And this is the procedure which Bowne follows. His systematic metaphysics is a critical examination of the fundamental concepts of being, change and becoming, action and interaction, the finite and the infinite, space and time, and motion, matter, and force. The strictly rationalistic procedure is illustrated by such

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1. Loc.cit., Metaph. (1882), p. vii.
2. Ibid., p. 23.
3. Windelband, W., A History of Philosophy, Transl. by James H.Tufts, (N.Y.: MacMillan Co., 2nd Ed., 1901), pp. 583-584.
4. Loc.cit., Metaph. (1882), p.3.
5. Ibid., p.x.

statements as the following:

> Matter as phenomenon is given in sense-perception; but matter as cause can be reached only by reflection. It is a purely speculative and metaphysical notion, whose content can be determined only by reason.[1]

In his examination of the notion of change, he writes: "Our guiding principle throughout the entire discussion is, that a contradiction in a notion proves its untenability."[2] And in his examination of the notion of interaction, he says: "The simple analysis of the notions of interaction and independence shows them to be incompatible. Whichever we retain, the other must be given up. And, as the notion of interaction is essential to the notion of a system, we give up the independence of the interacting members."[3]

Bowne summarizes his view of the criteria of knowledge in Metaphysics in a strictly rationalistic way, without reference to any of the pragmatic emphases that have occurred elsewhere in his writings:

> It being absurd to demand that the mind shall transcend its conceptions and compare them with reality, it follows that the test of knowledge must be found in the content of knowledge itself. Ultimately this test will consist (1) in the self-evidence or necessity of conception, and (2) in the inner harmony of our conceptions with one another. When a conception is self-evident or necessary, and when no mental discord results from it, we have the only test of knowledge possible to any intelligence whatever.[4]

With respect to methods and criteria in this period, there remain to be considered moral and religious beliefs. These, as we have noticed, rest for Bowne upon "subjective" grounds. Yet, "as such," he insists, "they are no less rational then the former."[5] But though holding to their rationality, Bowne's methods with respect to them are characteristically pragmatic rather than rationalistic. At no point does he treat

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1. Loc.cit., Metaph., (1882), p. 273.
2. Ibid., p. 77.
3. Ibid., p. 126.
4. Ibid., p. 8.
5. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p. 62.

the facts of moral and religious experience strictly as a thought-problem requiring a solution that will meet the rationalistic criteria of consistency and coherence. Rather he rests the case for the validity of moral and religious belief essentially upon pragmatic considerations. At no point does he attempt a speculative solution of the facts of moral and religious experience. He restricts the speculative case for theism to establishing the world-ground as unitary and causal, on the ground that any other conception of ultimate reality is involved in contradiction; as free and rational, on the ground that there could otherwise be no distinction between truth and error and no basis for parallelism of our thought-categories with those of the thing-world as required by the possibility of knowledge. His speculative case for theism is built, as he himself puts it, without "reference to the ethical and religious bearings of the question. These must be considered by themselves."[1] The sum of the matter is, therefore, this: Bowne did not conceive of value-experiences as facts to be explained rationalistically; rather they are feelings, which, though inherently rational, are, at the same time, subjective, and can be defended only on the grounds of their satisfying the essential needs and interests of the mind.

Bowne's first step in the process of validating moral and religious beliefs in this period is the attempt to show that they are no more subjective than the assumptions upon which all of science and philosophy rest, and if no more subjective, then their validity is not to be questioned simply on thegrounds of their being subjective. Like the assumptions of science and philosophy, they grow out of basic interests of the mind. Indeed all views of the world, he writes;

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1. Loc.cit., Metaph, (1882), p. viii.

> start from subjective sentiments. Mental unrest causes us to assume that law and reason are universal. Mental unrest causes us to assume that the universe has magnificent meanings hidden in it. Mental unrest also causes us to assume that its most magnificent, its all-interpreting meaning, is love and righteousness. Thus we see that the great, leading manifestations of the mind are based entirely on subjective interests; and thus these interests become to us the great interpreters of the universe.[1]

The essential point of this emphasis is to show that moral and religious beliefs rest no more upon subjective grounds than those of science and philosophy. Indeed, he stresses positively the subjective grounds of science and philosophy. "What we wish especially to insist upon," he writes, "is the subjective character of the scientific and speculative sentiment."[2] This emphasis is most strikingly shown in the following passage:

> The speculator finds himself unable to rest in an unrelated manifold, and hence he posits unity in the diverse. His mental discontent leads him to assume the possibility of unification. But why should nature be unifiable? Why should a mental unrest be made the ground for assuming, that the system really is what we wish it to be? ... The scientist does not hesitate to regard this mental unrest as pointing to the conclusion that reason and law are universal. If we ask him why, he replies that on any other assumption, science would not be possible. But why should science be possible? ....The scientist often mistakes his enthusiasm for science, and his passion for formulation, for proofs that reason and law are universal. It never occurs to him that this is a tremendous assumption, based only on his subjective needs.[3]

Bowne is surely selling his rationalism cheaply here, and introducing a purely pragmatic justification for the assumptions of knowledge. But the difficulty lies in an obvious confusion in Bowne's use of the word subjective. As applied to those assumptions and beliefs which <u>grow out</u> of the interests of the mind, its use is strictly psychological and concerns only the origin in the mind of those assumptions. It in no way

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1. Loc.cit., <u>Studies</u>, (1879), p. 72.
2. Ibid., p. 72.
3. Ibid., pp. 69-70.

settles the question of the logical validity of those assumptions. Bowne's argument thus rests on the confused treatment of subjective in terms of psychological origin while it constantly implies the opposite of logical objectivity. The assumption of the intelligibility of the world may indeed rise out of a subjective (in a psychological sense) cognitive need, but reason does not find the rational validity of that assumption in the fact that it rose out of a subjective need, but rather in the fact that it permits a logical, consistent, coherent view of experience, whatever its psychological origin. Certainly we have no rational right to argue to the objective validity of the moral and religious postulates on the ground that they are no more subjective than the assumptions of science and metaphysics. The only question of logical importance is, not to what extent these assumptions are similarly subjective in their origin, but to what extent they are logically objective and rational. The confusion in the use of the word subjective is thus responsible for Bowne's resting the case for moral and religious belief, in the first place, upon the fact that they, like the postulates of science and speculation, satisfy basic interests and needs of the mind. In the Metaphysics, published three years after the Studies in Theism, Bowne would seem to have avoided this error of confusing the psychological and the logical by distinguishing, after Balfour,[1] between belief as effect and belief as conclusion. Nevertheless, it is a confusion that carries over even into Bowne's later work.

In the second place, Bowne raises the purely pragmatic criterion of workability in judging the interests of the mind. He writes:

> We conclude, then, -- that all general theories of life and the world are based on subjective interests, and that the only questions which can be raised here are, which of these interests should rule, and which works best as a ruler. In this

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1. Loc. cit., Metaph. (1882), pp. 15-16.

> inquiry, too, we cannot help making the general assumption that nature is no more of a step-mother to man than to the lower animals, and that his instincts are equally trustworthy. Those views, therefore, of man and his relations which must develop and dignify human nature, and which work best in practice, are at least presumptively true. Pessimism and despair are the only alternative. In addition, then, to beliefs deduced from formal data, there are other beliefs which are based on results. Such beliefs have not the support of formal proof, but they have what is better, the attestation of reality.[1]

It is true that Bowne presents this criterion only for judging that which is "presumptively true," but it is also true that he supports the criterion with nothing that is more substantial. That he felt the weakness of these criteria of the trustworthiness of instincts and of the utility of beliefs is shown by the paragraph which follows immediately after the one just quoted. Bowne continues:

> But still we have not shown that feeling points to any thing objective. Thus far we have only made out, that all theories are subjective; why not, then, abandon all, and have faith in none? One reason is, that it cannot be done.--- Teleology is the framework of both the speculative and practical reason. But, it will be urged, do you seriously mean to say that a thing is real because we wish it? --- We reply, that of course we cannot intend to base any conclusion on individual and non-essential feelings and interests, but only on the essential needs of the mind; and these, we hold, render an objective correspondence highly probable.[2]

But, the question must be raised, how are the essential needs of the mind to be distinguished from the non-essential? This introduces us to the third step in Bowne's attempt to validate moral and religious beliefs. The essential needs and interests of the mind are distinguished by the empirical <u>generality</u> of the beliefs which grow out of them. He writes:

> We do hold that a general belief renders a corresponding reality highly probable, even when no sufficient formal defense is possible. Such a belief represents the total outcome of a race-experience, the impression which the universe has made upon us. --- We are not prepared, then, to reject the argument from general

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1. Loc.cit., <u>Studies</u>, (1879), p. 75. See also. p. 64.
2. Ibid., pp. 75-76.

> feeling and belief, because on any theory of knowledge, a feeling or want which is common to men is the expression of a fact; it is the way in which reality manifests itself in us. Our feelings are the subjective side of the universe. Upon this point we are in full accord with the evolutionist. They conserve well-being, point out duty, and outline development.[1]

But this account is largely a theory of the relation of our feelings and beliefs to the universe; it in no way whatever establishes the rational validity of those beliefs. It is, further, essentially the Stoic doctrine of consensus gentium as developed in the interests of religion by Herbert of Cherbury.[2] Even though used by Bowne simply as an argument to establish probability, it lacks rational cogency both because generality of belief per se establishes nothing, as witness the generality of erroneous beliefs observable through the course of history, and because the religious beliefs which Bowne was defending cannot be shown to be general in any strict sense of the term.

That Bowne really mistrusted the weakness of the arguments presented in Studies in Theism is further shown by the sentence with which he begins the next and final step in the case. He says: "Our position will appear less strange if we attend to perception in general."[3] He is perfectly aware that the case which he is developing is indeed 'strange' for any rationalist. The final argument now presented is that religious belief is coerced, in the same way in which sensation is coerced, and therefore may be accepted as similarly valid. He writes:

> The senses do not give us reality, but only states of self. The reality is reached only by the mind. Now the final test of reality in perception is, that it compels and coerces our sensations. How the object does this we do not know; and we know that there is an object only because the sensations are coerced. If, then, there is any other element in the totality of our experience which equally coerces our belief, and which, when denied, invariably comes

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1. Loc.cit., Studies, (1897), pp.76-78.
2. See Windelband, Loc.cit., p.436.
3. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p. 78.

> back, then there is the best ground for saying that in such experience, as well as in sense-perception, we come in contact with something not ourselves. There is nothing in psychology to forbid the thought, that contact with reality may take place other than through the senses.---- The subjective impressions of conscience, the haunting conviction of things not realized, the dreams of a beauty and a good beyond all that we have experienced, may well be the revelation in us of some power which besets us on every hand, and makes for righteousness.---The sense of things unseen often drifts in upon us with such a feeling of reality that the solid earth grows phantom-like in contrast. This is the conviction which these experiences have made upon the race. They coerce us, and we cannot escape them. That they are indeed the working of an objective power may not be proved, but still less is it disproved,...If we find that with the growth of moral character such convictions become firmer and firmer, until they arise to a subjective certainty which cannot be shaken, then there is good ground for assuming that they lie parallel to reality, and are derived from it. On the basis of certain impressions, we posit material objects. On the basis of other impressions, we posit spirits like our own. On the basis of its total mental and moral experience, the race has posited God.[1]

The empirical emphasis here is strong: moral and religious beliefs must indeed begin with experience, and they must always be tested by experience. But the rational inadequacy of the argument as it stands alone is admitted by Bowne in the statement that there may be no proof that this feeling of coercion is the working of an objective power. Moral and religious experiences can justify our beliefs as objectively valid, only as reason finds them to be consistent in themselves, and coherent with the rest of our knowledge and experience. In other words, important as the argument from experience is, it cannot stand alone; in itself it cannot establish rational probability. And Bowne, resting his case as he has done largely upon pragmatic considerations, fails to support this empirical argument by the necessary logical methods.

In his Studies in Theism, then, Bowne, rests the case for belief in the moral and spiritual nature of God largely on pragmatic considerations.

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1. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), pp. 78-79.

At the beginning of the investigation, he stressed that belief to be valid must be rational; but it is manifest that he has not, with the methods he has employed, established that rationality. He has not treated the idea of a moral God as required by the most coherent view of experience. Nor has he established the identity of interests and feelings, upon which the pragmatic methods rest, with the practical reason. It is clear, therefore, that though Bowne intended to ground moral and religious beliefs, as did Kant, in the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, he did not, as did Kant, follow a strictly rationalistic methodology.

(4). The Nature of Truth.

Bowne uses the term truth in this period both in the restricted sense of the rational a priori principles of reason and in the larger inclusive sense of both the a priori principles of reason and the validity of our thought for the real world. The narrow meaning is explicitly given in the statement: "By truth, we mean rational principles."[1] As applied to truth so defined, Bowne says: "The mind does not make, it recognizes, the truth."[2]

The use of the term truth to designate the validity of our thoughts for things is shown in the statement:

> The mind can never transcend its conceptions so as to grasp things other than through its conceptions; and hence truth cannot be viewed as the correspondence of thought and thing, but as the universally valid in our thought of the thing.[3]

Again, "As the conscience will not tolerate a relativity of duty, so the intellect will not tolerate a relativity of truth. Truth is absolute or nothing."[4]

As in the first period, Bowne continues to think of truth as being at once independent and rational, on the one hand, and useful, on the

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1. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p. 14.
2. Ibid., p. 15.
3. Loc.cit., Metaph., (1882), p. 8.
4. Ibid., p. 488.

other; that is, though not defining truth in terms of utility, he does find truth useful and valuable. There is value in knowing the truth. In Studies in Theism, he says: "Truth, as simple correspondence of thought with fact, cannot arouse enthusiasm. It has, indeed, a low value of utility, but nothing on which a soul may live. --- The enthusiasm of knowledge tacitly assumes that the object is worth knowing."[1] Again, in criticizing the position of the materialist, Bowne refers to the pragmatic criterion used by some materialists: "This standard is simply results. Those thoughts and views are true which work well; and those are false which work ill. In a rational system such a test would be valid; but the materialist has no such system."[2] This is a statement of extreme interest in showing Bowne's conception of truth. Truth is indeed absolute and rational; but the fact that it is also useful and purposive makes utility itself an indication, if not a criterion, of truth wherever a belief can be shown to possess it.

Summary of Epistemology for the Second Period. (1879-1883):

The unity and free agency of the thinking self, though indicated by self-conscious experience, are established by the fact that they are logically presupposed by experience. The mind is active in the knowing process according to the principles of interpretation implicit in it. The development of the mental life is outlined and controlled, however, not by the free activity of the mind but by basic feelings and interests. Bowne intends this stress upon the determinative character of feelings and interests in mental development as a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, but it is clear that he gives it a pragmatic rather than a rationalistic form. With respect to the interests

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1. Loc.cit., Studies, (1879), p. 66.
2. Ibid., p. 115.

of the mind, the function of speculative reason is regulative. The field of knowledge is divided between strict knowledge - defined as rational truths and the facts of consciousness and immediate perception, the criteria of which are their immediacy and self-evidence - and rational belief. The grounds of rational belief are of two types: objective, namely, the facts of perception, upon which science and philosophy are built; and subjective, namely, basic feelings and interests of the mind, upon which moral and religious beliefs are formed. Scientific belief is verified by observation where possible, and always by consistency, harmony, and adequacy to the facts. Metaphysical beliefs, constituted by the criticized and corrected basic philosophic concepts, are tested by their self-evidence, consistency and mutual harmony. Moral and religious beliefs, resting upon subjective grounds of feelings and interests, though rational, are defended chiefly on pragmatic grounds, namely: (1) they are required to satisfy the subjective interests of the mind in the same way that the postulates of science and philosophy are so required; (2) they are justified by their results and their usefulness for human life; (3) they are validated for reality by their generality (which latter ground, though not per se pragmatic, is given pragmatic setting); (4) they are supported by super-sensuous coercion by the divine reality. Truth is conceived as rational, independent, and absolute, but is at the same time to be regarded as purposive and useful.

Section Three: Third Period. 1884-1896.

(1). Nature of the Mind.

Although there is no essential modification in Bowne's conception of the nature of the mind in the writings of this period, slight development

of view along two lines is apparent: first, there is a fuller elaboration and a sharper distinction of the phases of mind-activity than appeared in the preceding period; second, the intended identification of the determinative character of feelings and interests with the Kantian primacy of the practical reason is given stronger rational support, although the pragmatic emphasis is not abandoned. The unity and free agency of the thinking subject remain basic.

As stressed throughout Bowne's work, the mind proceeds in its cognitive activity according to forms or norms implicit in it. "The categories inherent in our mental constitution give a form to experience and produce original syntheses, before the mind itself becomes conscious of its own aims and the principles which govern it."[1] "We do not regard them," Bownes continues elsewhere,"as existing primarily as ideas, but as being determinative principles of mental procedure, or as constitutive principles of intelligence."[2] They are the norms of judgment in all cognitive activity. Bowne does not regard them as admitting of speculative deduction from some single, basic category. Rather, "we have to take them as given, without any hope of deducing one from another."[3] Likewise, Bowne is not concerned with establishing any rigid system of categories; indeed, de says: "Whether a completed system of categories is possible is much discussed; our own conviction is that it is not possible."[4]

In distinguishing further the nature of mind-activity, Bowne shows that knowledge is possible because of the abstracting, generalizing and classifying activity of the mind, by which the logical universal or unit of thought is developed. Without such logical universals, to which the particulars of experience can be referred, there could be no cognition, for

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1. Bowne, B.P., Introduction to Psychological Theory, (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1886), p. 286.
2. Ibid., p. 174.
3. Ibid., p. 174.
4. Ibid., p. 174.

cognition is, indeed, the recognition of an object, that is, the "referring it to a known class."[1]

> When many experiences have a common element, the mind tends by a certain psychological necessity to fix attention upon that element, to abstract it from its surroundings, to form it into a fixed unity of thought, and finally to use it as a standard of classification.[2]

The various phases of mind activity are summarized by Bowne thus:

> This, then, is the way in which our world vision is built up. Sensations are produced in us, and associate according to certain laws. The mind next reacts upon them by classifying and distinguishing them, and finally objectifies them under the forms of space and time, of cause and effect, and of substance and attribute. Our objectified representations constitute for us the external world.[3]

The emphasis upon the mind as a complex of vital interests, which we found appearing in the second period of Bowne's writings, continues in this period. That this emphasis is not casual and incidental, but basic and characteristic, is shown by its repeated occurrence. In 1884, for example, we find Bowne writing:

> The driving and directive force of the mind lies in its living interests, and not in the discursive faculty. The principles of mental movement are to be sought, not in logic, but in life. --- There is no department of belief into which subjective interests do not enter as controlling.[4]

And in 1885:

> Mental activity runs in lines determined by our fundamental interests, and all our theories are adjusted to them.[5]

And again, in 1886:

> Our feelings and interests are the deepest thing in us. They furnish the great impulses to action, and they also

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1. Loc. cit., Psychol. Theory, 1886, p. 263.
2. Ibid., pp. 281-282.
3. Ibid., p. 258.
4. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 660.
5. Independ., 37(Jan. 8, 1885), p. 35.

> outline its direction. The great distinction between the human and the brute mind lies less in the cognitive faculties than in the motive powers. Man can interest himself in truth, in righteousness, in beauty, in a great variety of ideal aims, which thus become the norms and guides of his action. [1]

Likewise, in the Philosophy of Theism, in 1887:

> Man is not only, or chiefly, an abstract speculator, he is also a living being, with practical interests and necessities, to which he must adjust himself in order to live at all. It has been one of the perennial shortcomings of intellectualism that man has been considered solely as an intellect or understanding; whereas he is a great deal more. Man is will, conscience, emotion, aspiration; these are far more powerful factors than the logical intellect. [2]

And once again, also in the Philosophy of Theism:

> The mind is not a disinterested logic-machine, but a living organism, with manifold interests and tendencies. These outline its development, and furnish the driving power. [3]

What Bowne means in stressing the controlling character of these subjective interests is chiefly that they give rise to certain basic postulates which constitute the ground of all our cognitive procedure. He writes:

> As cognitive, we assume that the universe is rational. --- We are moral beings also, and our moral interests must be recognized. Hence arises a moral ideal, which we join to the cognitive. The universe must be not only rational, but righteous at its root. --- Finally, we are religious, and our entire nature works together to construct the religious ideal. [4]

Thus:

> In its practical unfolding the mind makes a great variety of practical postulates and assumptions which are not logical deductions or speculative necessities, but a kind of modus vivendi with the universe. They represent the conditions of our fullest life, and are at bottom expressions of our practical and ideal interests or necessities. [5]

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1. Loc.cit., Psychol. Theory, 1886, pp. 217-218.
2. Bowne, B.P., Philosophy of Theism, (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1887),p. 13.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
5. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

We observed in our consideration of the writings of the second period that Bowne intended by this emphasis upon the determinative character of interests and feelings a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, but it was equally clear that the form that he gave to the doctrine was more pragmatic than rationalistic. In this third period, Bowne's intention is still the essentially Kantian position. His usual references, however, do not make clear just how feelings and interests are to be regarded as rational, that is, just what constitutes their rationality; nor, if some feelings and interests are to be accepted as rational, how they are to be distinguished from those which are admittedly not rational. Bowne was fully conscious of the objection that our feelings, because of their particularity and subjectivity, cannot be the legitimate ground of belief. In referring to this objection, in 1885, he writes:

> Our thoughts, feelings, and consciousness in general, must always be particular. How they can at the same time, have a universal element, is one of the mysteries which speculation has not yet made over-clear; but the mystery is no greater in one realm than in another. [1]

To designate the universality of feelings and interests as no more of a "mystery" than the universality of thought is not, indeed, to establish that universality. The fact of the matter was, it seems clear, that Bowne was here struggling with the whole problem of the objectivity of value-judgments, for by basic feelings and interests of the mind, he meant what we should call today the feelings associated with our value-judgments. Nevertheless, it is true that he did scarcely more than point to the problem. He was satisfied in simply affirming the rationality of the feeling elements. In the Introduction to Psychological Theory, he writes:

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1. Independ., 37(Jan. 8, 1885), p. 36.

> A scruple is sometimes raised as to the possibility of a judgment founded on feeling; as feeling is said to be subjective and particular, while the judgment must be objective and universal. But there is no reason why there may not be universal elements in the sensibility as well as in the reason. [1]

But such a statement establishes nothing; it simply assumes the point at issue. The question is, if our interests and feelings, any or all of them, have cognitive value, if they possess rational, objective validity, how is that validity to be recognized, and what is its ground ? In just one passage in this period does Bowne approach a careful answer to this problem. In the Introduction to Psychological Theory, he writes:

> It is often objected that feeling cannot be a basis for ethics, because feeling is particular while ethical law must be universal, and hence must be founded in reason. This is merely a war of words. --- The fact is not made universal by calling it an utterance of the reason; nor is it made less than universal by calling it feeling. Its universality depends upon its content, and not upon its psychological classification. --- We have here the mistake --- of holding feeling and reason apart in unreal separation. [2]

That Bowne is coming closer to the problem here is clear, but unfortunately this is only a casual reference, and is at no other point systematically elaborated. If we were to take this passage as representative of Bowne's thought in this period, it would certainly mark an advance over the teaching of the preceding period. There Bowne defended the rationality of our feelings and interests on the grounds that they are universal and necessary in our experience, which universality he sought to establish inductively. But here Bowne is suggesting for the first time in his published writings that rational feelings and interests are to be distinguished from the non-rational and

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1. Loc.cit., Psychol. Theory, 1886, p. 198.
2. Ibid., pp. 206-207.

irrational by their content. But even this position, representing as it does an advance over the earlier teaching, is not, as Bowne has suggested it, free from difficulty. For clearly, if it is the rational content which determines the validity of a belief generated by feeling and interest, then it is that rational content and not the fact that it is generated by feeling or interest that provides the criterion. The relevant question, therefore, is not whether feelings may or may not have a universal element, but whether feeling qua feeling or reason is to be the arbiter of the beliefs which grow out of those feelings.

The difficulty here is that Bowne is treating feelings and interests in a two-fold and essentially incompatible manner. On the one hand, he designates them as of basic importance in subjectively determining our fundamental beliefs and in outlining and controlling mental development. On the other hand, he refers to them as essentially objective and rational. We find here the same confusion which appeared in the earlier period as a consequence of designating these fundamental interests of the mind as subjective. Clearly if they actually determine what the mind believes, then their rationality must rest not upon any free activity of the mind, but upon a teleological theory of the universe by which all fundamental determining factors in human experience are regarded as rational. But this, of course, is the circle argument again. The critical question is, what is the cognitive validity, if any, of these feelings and interests ? Clearly the question must be answered entirely aside from a pre-determined metaphysics.

Although, therefore, Bowne has come much closer to a rationalistic view of feelings and interests in the field of value-judgments in this

period, it is true that it is not yet correct to designate his position as a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the practical reason. This is clear on two grounds: first, because reason for Kant was altogether free in its value-judgments, that is, in its moral judgments; in no sense did Kant think of reason as being controlled by feelings and interests; second, because the validity of the moral law for Kant rested in its a priori necessity and universality, not in its inductively discovered generality. That Bowne brought far stronger rational support to his position in this period than in the preceding will appear in our consideration of philosophic methods and criteria, but the point to be stressed here is that feelings and interests, considered by themselves, as defined by Bowne, are not to be identified with the Kantian practical reason.

As regards the function of the speculative reason in relation to the basic interests and feelings of the mind, Bowne conceived it, as in the preceding period, to be strictly regulative. "For these basal interests, the intellect is simply instrumental, and the will is merely executive."[1] Again:

> What, now, is the function of logic with regard to these postulates ? Plainly not to prove them, but to bring them and their implications out into clear consciousness, and to keep them from losing their way.[2]

And again: "Speculative thought has had the function of criticizing and clarifying religious beliefs, but never of originating them."[3] Religious beliefs rise only in the moral and spiritual nature, and with respect to them, "the understanding has only the negative function of maintaining consistency and preventing collision with the laws of thought."[4]

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1. Loc.cit., Psychol. Theory, 1886,pp.217-218.
2. Loc.cit., Phil. of Theism, 1887, pp. 25-26.
3. Ibid., p.4.
4. Ibid., p.262.

(2) The Nature and Scope of Knowledge.

Bowne's treatment of the nature and scope of knowledge in the third period follows closely that of the second period. No new element emerges in his teaching. The field of cognition is again divided between strict knowledge and rational belief. "Facts which are immediately given in experience, and propositions which are either proved or directly seen to be true, are elements of knowledge. Besides these, there is a great realm of belief."[1] Or, as Bowne elsewhere classifies the matter of cognition:

> An inventory of our mental possessions reveals three classes of facts. These are (1) the data of experience, internal or external, (2) the laws and forms of pure thought and their implications, and (3) interpretations of experience. The first class is found, or given, and admits of no question. The second class expresses the essential build of intelligence, and is questioned only by the professional skeptic, and by him only verbally. In the third class, the mind aims to unite the first two by giving the facts of experience a rational form and interpretation.[2]

The first two classes constitute the sphere of strict knowledge; the third constitutes that of rational belief.

As a consequence of this classification, logic and mathematics, apart from the facts of conscious experience, are the only parts of the cognitive field that can be called strict knowledge. Science and philosophy, on the other hand, as well as moral and religious belief, belong to the field of rational belief. "In this realm," Bowne says, "we reach conclusions, not by logical demonstration, but by a weighing of probabilities, or by a consideration of practical needs, or by a taking for granted in the interest of ideal tendencies."[3] The field of belief is thus divided between that portion which rests upon objective grounds and that portion which rests upon subjective. The beliefs of

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1. Loc.cit., Psychol.Theory, 1886, pp. 295-296.
2. Independ., 40 (Jan.26,1888), p. 99.
3. Loc.cit. Phil. of Theism, 1887, p. 261.

the first class are "those which are deduced from facts, either as their explanation or as their consequence. They are not knowledge because they do not compel acceptance; but they may be rational, because the probabilities are in their favor."[1] The beliefs of the second class are those which:

> are not founded on objective facts, but on subjective tendencies, and express only subjective interests or postulates. They are not inferences from given facts, either as their explanation or as their consequence. They are rather the implication of our nature itself, or its reaction against our total experience.[2]

The entire field of belief rests upon basic assumptions or postulates; it is indeed the necessity of such assumptions that distinguishes this field from that of knowledge.

(3) Philosophical Method and Criteria.

Bowne's consideration of methodology in the third period belongs largely to the field of moral and religious belief, although several references of importance to systematic metaphysics also appear. His treatment of logic, mathematics, and science, however, is only casual and incidental. In the field of strict knowledge, the facts of conscious experience are indubitable; they are simply given. Likewise the rational truths of logic and mathematics are either immediately evident or are derived by strictly logical processes from truths that are original and immediately evident. Their sole authority is the mind's insight. With reference to mathematics, Bowne writes:

> For mathematical truth there is no source beyond the mind itself. The science is built upon the basis of definitions, and the corresponding intuitions. --- In all these cases the mind works by methods of its own invention, and tests these methods by its own insight.[3]

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1. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 649.
2. Ibid., p. 649.
3. Loc. cit., Psychol. Theory, 1886, pp. 294-295.

In the realm of rational belief, faith in the essential trustworthiness of reason remains basic for all procedure. "No theory can be allowed which would overturn reason itself. The trustworthiness of reason is the presupposition of all speculation; and when a theory conflicts with this, it must be rejected."[1]

As in the preceding period, Bowne recognizes that science and philosophy must be built upon probability rather than upon strict demonstration.

> It is plain that all thought of strict demonstration must be given up. Demonstration is necessarily confined to the subjective and logical relation of ideas, and can never attach to reality without some element of assumption. --- This is as true for physical science as it is for religion. --- There is no such thing as an objective and self-sufficient demonstration.[2]

Science and philosophy, like religious belief, proceed upon basic assumptions. "All investigations of the world of reality rests upon certain postulates, and is absurd without them. These are interaction, law, and system."[3] In every investigation, "our starting-point --- is the conception of things interacting according to law, and forming an intelligible system."[4] Again,

> Our interpreting activity presupposes the intelligibility and hence the rationality of all existence. It presupposes that the objective reality is cast in the molds of thought, so that the irrational is the impossible. It presupposes, also, that what we need to make the facts rational to us is necessary to the facts themselves. Without these suppositions our theorizing is but a projection of our mental nature upon the world of reality.[5]

The distinction which Bowne repeatedly made between the respective provinces of science and metaphysics is characteristically suggested in the following sentence: "Evolution, --- in the scientific sense,

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1. Loc. cit., Phil. of Theism, 1887, p. 112.
2. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
3. Ibid., p. 47.
4. Ibid., p. 49.
5. Independ., 40(Jan.26,1888), p. 99.

carries with it no theory of metaphysics; for the question of method is forever distinct from the question of cause."[1] The province of science is the phenomenal world, that of metaphysics is the causal ground of that phenomenal world.

Bowne's conception of metaphysics as empirically rooted and tentative in its formulations is strikingly suggested in his article "What is Rationalism ?" published in 1888. The speculative excesses of post-Kantian philosophy accomplished, Bowne believed "an invaluable service." By their very absurdities, they "taught us that man must become a learner and submit his reason to the facts, instead of submitting the facts to his reason, before knowledge can advance."[2]

This empirical grounding of metaphysics does not mean an abandonment of the assumption that the universe is essentially rational,but:

> It does involve a very decided abatement of the claims concerning actual human insight. We still believe in the universality of rational law, but we are far from being so sure that we have fully comprehended it. We still believe in the interpretability of facts, but we are seldom able to say that we have reached a final interpretation. The only thing that is fixed is that nothing can be allowed which contradicts the laws of thought; but these leave a great many possibilities open, and which of these have been realized cannot be learned by a priori reflection, but only by experience.[3]

Bowne's distrust of speculation that pretends to a fixed and final view of the universe finds further expression in the following passage:

> One of the most promising features in the present outlook is a growing indifference to abstract and finished systems and speculative finalities of all sorts, and a growing respect for living experience as having full right to be. Existence is too large, too manifold, too mysterious, to be shut up in any neat little scheme, whether molecular or theological.[4]

The chief development in metaphysical method in this period is the insistence that ultimate explanation must be teleological. Purpose is a metaphysical category, and reality cannot be understood without it. The

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1. Meth. Rev., 75(1893), p. 687.
2. Independ., 40(Jan. 26, 1888), p. 100.
3. Ibid., p. 100.
4. Independ., 45(Feb. 2,1893), p. 138.

general point of view represented by this emphasis was undoubtedly present in the thought of Bowne in the first two periods of his work, but it was not clearly and sharply articulated until this third period. In an article, "Explanation - A Logical Study," published in 1888, Bowne considers the various types of explanation. Among rational principles, explanation is simply the comprehension of a truth as a necessity of reason. In the world of things, explanation largely "consists in referring the fact or event to a class or law."[1] This is essentially the method of science. But for the questions of metaphysics, the only ultimately satisfactory form of explanation is the teleological. "The mind demands the thought of a goal, an end toward which things are working. When this thought is given, our explanation is formally complete."[2] That this emphasis upon purpose in explanation was becoming basic with Bowne is indicated further by another striking passage written in the same year as the preceding. Bowne asks, "What is rational?" and answers, "First, that is rational which accords with the fundamental laws of thought. Second, that is rational which is viewed as fitting into an intelligible system. Third, that is rational which has in it evidence of purpose, outcome, final cause."[3] The fundamental criteria of the rational become for Bowne, therefore, consistency, coherence, or harmonious system, and intelligent purpose.

Included within the scope of metaphysical method is the speculative argument for theism based on inference from the facts of experience. With this method "God appears as an hypothesis to explain the facts of experience, or to satisfy the demand of the reason for a sufficient

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1. Meth. Rev., 70(1888), p. 648.
2. Ibid., p. 662.
3. Zion's Herald, 66(1888), p. 401.

cause. As thus conceived, theism belongs to the realm of probabilities, and our faith should vary directly as the evidence."[1] But empirical arguments alone, Bowne holds, are not sufficient to establish the validity of religious belief. "They all rest upon picked facts, and ignore some of the most prominent aspects of experience."[2] Neither by the way of deduction nor by inductive inference can the moral and spiritual nature of God be established. The validity of religious belief must depend, in the final analysis, Bowne holds, upon the demands of our subjective nature.

The field of moral and religious belief stands apart, therefore, from the field of scientific and metaphysical belief; its grounds are subjective rather than objective. The beliefs of science and metaphysics "are founded on objective facts, and--- their strength varies directly with the objective evidence. --- All such beliefs belong to the realm of probability; that is, our belief rises and falls with the amount of objective evidence."[3] Moral and religious beliefs, on the other hand,

> are not founded on objective facts, but on subjective tendencies, and express only subjective interests or postulates. They are not inferences from given facts, either as their explanation or as their consequence. They are rather the implication of our nature itself, or its reaction against our total experience. They are also psychologically different from the preceding class of beliefs in that they are not matters of probability, and our conviction does not rise or fall with each new fact experienced, but only with the intensity of the emotion which produced it. In the realm of probability, opposing facts weaken belief; but here they are set aside as something not understood, and do not weaken our faith.[4]

In the distinction which Bowne is here making between the two classes of belief, it is clear that he is not thinking of moral and religious

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1. Meth. Quart. Rev. 66(1884), pp. 649-650.
2. Loc.cit., Phil. of Theism, 1887, p. 221.
3. Meth. Quart. Rev. 66(1884), p. 649.
4. Ibid., p. 649.

belief as resting upon rational evidence. "They are not matters of probability," and "opposing facts --- are set aside as something not understood." If Bowne were speaking simply descriptively here, the account would be essentially valid; but his intention seems also to be to speak normatively. And if the account is normative, it is manifestly pragmatic in the most narrow sense of the word rather than rationalistic. He is not dealing with the facts of moral and religious experience as rational evidence for the probability of a theistic world-view. Rather he is claiming that moral and religious interests stand in their own right; they are their own justification, regardless of the facts of experience. That this goes beyond the position of rationalism, or indeed beyond that of any normal empiricism, would seem to be clear.

We have seen that Bowne stressed repeatedly the determinative character of the basic interests and feelings on belief. We have further observed that the question of the psychological origin of belief is one thing, and the question of rational validity is another. This distinction is one to which Bowne gave little critical attention in the earlier periods. In the third period, however, he defines sharply the line between the psychology and the logic of religious belief. We need, he says, a "better knowledge of the psychology of belief"; we need to understand that "our deepest beliefs are not deduced, but grow; they are not made by logic, but developed from life."[1] Bowne indicates as examples of such beliefs: "the existence of God, the efficacy of prayer, and life beyond the grave."[2] Elsewhere he summarizes the psychology of belief thus:

> A very slight consideration of the actual procedure of the human mind shows that it does not live by logic alone.

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1. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 646.
2. Independ., 36(Jan.24, 1884), p. 98.

> The fundamental outlines of human belief are determined by various circumstances, chief of which are the essential interests of the mind. Mental activity runs in lines determined by our fundamental interests, and all our theories are adjusted to them. Accordingly, we find a variety of postulates underlying our mental procedure, which are at bottom only expressions of those interests; and we also find that any theory which cannot be adjusted to them is sure, sooner or later, to be set aside. As intellectual, we make certain assumptions; as ethical, we make other assumptions; and as religious, we make others still. Primarily, all of these assumptions are but the projection upon the universe of the demands and interests of our total nature. [1]

In contrast to the psychological description of the origin of fundamental beliefs there stands the need of determining the logical validity of those beliefs. In his article "The Logic of Religious Belief," referring to these psychological considerations, Bowne states explicitly:

> These considerations, however, only refer to the origin of belief, and do not establish its truth. We may allow that belief has a highly complex genesis which admits of no very clear presentation; but we must not affirm that therefore belief has no accountability to logic. That men do believe does not prove that they have a right to believe. Hence, after the genesis of a belief has been described its truth remains an open question. It is therefore the province of logic to go through the luxuriant growths of credulity and cut down such as cannot prove their right to exist. [2]

That there may be no question about the importance of this distinction as drawn by Bowne, it is worth quoting the following passage from the Philosophy of Theism:

> Beliefs can be viewed in two ways: as produced by causes, or as deduced from grounds. That is, beliefs may be merely mental events due to certain psychological antecedents, and they may be logical convictions which rest on logical grounds. The distinction of rational from irrational beliefs is that the former have grounds which justify them, while the latter are only effects in us, deposits of habit, prejudice, tradition, caprice, etc. They have their sufficient psychological causes, but no justifying rational grounds. [3]

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1. Independ., 37(Jan. 8, 1885), p. 35.
2. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 648.
3. Loc. cit., Phil. of Theism, 1887, p. 112.

And again:

> The rational value of a proposition can be determined only by considering its content and the reasons which are offered for it. [1]

Now it would seem perfectly clear that Bowne, while recognizing on the one hand the determinative character of interests and feelings in the genesis of religious belief, purposes to ground that belief rationally before accepting it as objectively valid. We turn, therefore, specifically to Bowne's methods of establishing the validity of religious belief. It quickly becomes apparent that those methods are just as pragmatic as those of the preceding period, although there are in addition certain definite rationalistic elements. We shall consider the pragmatic first.

After the careful distinction which Bowne has made between the origin and the validity of belief, it is somewhat surprising to find him approving as method in belief simply the acceptance of whatever has been determined by our subjective interests. We may accept religious belief as valid, he affirms, in so far as it satisfies the basic subjective interests of the mind, so long as no positive disproof stands in the way. After distinguishing, therefore, between the psychology and the logic of religious belief, Bowne actually identifies them by finding in the causes of belief their rational grounds. This is repeatedly affirmed by him in his statement of the method which the mind actually follows in validating its beliefs, in contrast to the logical method:

> The law which the logician lays down is this: Nothing may be believed which is not proved, or at least made probable,

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1. Loc.cit., Phil. of Theism, 1887, p. 6.

> by objective facts. The law which the mind actually follows is this: whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as real, in default of positive disproof.[1]

But Bowne carries the method even farther; he affirms that so long as beliefs satisfy the subjective interests of the mind, even contradictory facts are not to be allowed to weigh against those beliefs. The fundamental postulates of the rationality of the universe, its moral grounding, and the reality of the absolute ideal, must stand, Bowne holds, even though facts stand over against them. The mind "prefers --- to maintain its faith in the ideal, and to set aside the conflicting facts as something not yet understood, but which to perfect insight would fall into harmony."[2]

As it stands, the argument that those beliefs are to be regarded as true which satisfy our basic interests in the absence of positive disproof is pragmatically toned. Any rational force that the argument would have would depend upon the presupposition that those basic interests are themselves essentially rational. But as we have seen in our consideration of Bowne's conception of the nature of the mind, in this period, Bowne did not succeed in identifying interests and feelings with the practical reason. He assumed their rationality, indeed, but he rested the assumption upon the theory that they are the product of a purposive world-intelligence. Indeed, Bowne himself recognizes that these subjective interests have rational value "only as we assume some theory of their origin."[3] Yet, this theory of their origin, namely, a theistic world-view, is itself the point eventually to be established. Certainly there is no rational justification for assuming a theistic

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1. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 652. See also Phil. of Theism, pp. 13, 14, 25.
2. Loc. cit., Phil. of Theism, 1887, pp. 223-224; See also ibid., pp. 21, 263; and Independ., 37(Jan. 8, 1885), p. 35.
3. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 661.

position to validate religious belief. Such would clearly be a petitio principii. Religious beliefs may indeed serve as partial evidence for a theistic world-view, that is, they are facts that have to be considered in our total view of experience, but clearly their cognitive validity cannot properly be made to rest upon the theory that they are products of the world-process. Occasionally, however, Bowne does so treat them.

> When it is seen that belief is made for us rather than by us, that the great outlines of belief are drawn in life and by life, then the great catholic beliefs of humanity begin to acquire the significance of any other great natural product. They show the direction of the evolving movement, the trend of the universe of mind.[1]

But even assuming the theistic position, the designation of true beliefs as products of the universe of mind is valueless as a criterion; for manifestly all beliefs, true and false alike, can be so considered as natural products. There is no basis here for distinguishing the true from the false. That Bowne realized that he had not established the rationality of our interests and feelings as he defined them is clear from his recognition that "our nature must finally be taken on trust."[2] But this, clearly, gives us no basis for deciding between the conflicting claims of any given individual's nature or between the claims of different individuals.

A second step in Bowne's treatment of religious belief is one which we found stressed in the writings of the preceding period, namely, that religious beliefs are no more subjective than the assumptions upon which all of science and philosophy rests, and if no more subjective, then their validity is not to be questioned on the grounds that they are subjective. Bowne, in the article "Science Must Go," writes: "We propose to point out that the logical procedure which seems

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1. Independ., 48(Apr.2,1896), p. 439.
2. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 661

so scandalous in religious thinking also underlies scientific thinking, so that, if religion must go as illogical, science must go too."[1] Bowne's point is that all knowledge of the external world proceeds on the basis of certain fundamental postulates or assumptions which are not logically derived,but are required by the interests of the living mind. "A purely speculative knowledge of reality, which shall be strictly deductive and free from assumption, is impossible."[2] The mind assumes, because of its speculative interest, the intelligibility and rationality of the world, and because of its moral and religious interests, it assumes the moral and spiritual government of the world. But "the desire to find the universe intelligible is as purely subjective as the desire to find it moral. The desire to comprehend it is as subjective as the desire to worship."[3] As for the postulates of science, Bowne writes:

> This reign of law, especially of intelligible law, is a subjective postulate. The admissibility of interpretation is a pure assumption. All this is done in the interests of the cognitive faculty. It could not deal with the facts without the assumption of law; but what right has it to deal with them ? --- From a logical point of view, science is simply an idol of the human tribe, a projection into the world of reality of the subjective interests and postulates of the cognitive faculty. As to the objective validity of these postulates, cognition stands on the same logical plane as ethics and religion.[4]

And further, "If the instinctive affirmations of the mind are accepted in default of proof in the field of sense-perception, there seems to be no good reason why similar affirmations should be rejected in the field of morals and religion."[5]

Bowne's argument here, therefore, is this: the ultimate warrant for our accepting the postulates of the intelligibility and rationality of the world is the satisfaction which it gives to our subjective specu-

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1. Independ., 36(Jan.24,1884), p. 98.
2. Loc. cit., Phil. of Theism, 1887, p. 22.
3. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 657.
4. Independ., 36(Jan.24,1884), p. 98.
5. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), pp. 655-656

lative interest; on the same ground, therefore, the postulate of the moral and spiritual government of the world is to be accepted because of its satisfaction of the subjective moral and religious interests. But the first difficulty in Bowne's procedure at this point, as we found in the preceding period, is that of designating the speculative or cognitive interest as subjective. Unless the purely rational interest of the mind is objective and universal then it is manifestly absurd to attempt to deal objectively with anything. The practical needs of knowledge may indeed account for the genesis of the belief or postulate that the world is intelligible, but only reason can establish the rational justification of that assumption on the ground that it yields the most reasonable, that is, the most consistent and coherent view of experience. And it follows at once that if the warrant of the cognitive postulates is to be found in their rational character rather than in the fact that they satisfy "subjective" interests of the mind, the warrant of the moral and religious postulates must be found in the same way, and not on the pragmatic grounds that they, like the cognitive postulates, satisfy subjective interests of the mind. The weakness of Bowne's method, therefore, lies not in his affirmation that assumptions and postulates are necessary, for this has indeed been manifest since the failure of Descartes to reach the external world by strict deduction, but rather in his repeated treatment of the purely rational interest as subjective and his consequent attempt to validate the cognitive postulates in terms of the satisfaction which they give to this subjective interest.

A third step in the pragmatic side of the methodology is the argument from favorable results, which we also found in the writings of

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the second period. Bowne argues:

> An immoral and godless universe is a conception which could not lie long on the human mind in general without producing pernicious results, either in the form of insubordination and violence, or in the form of listlessness, paralysis, and a gradual abandonment of moral ideals. What avails it to fight the universe ? On the other hand, the opposite conceptions are full of blessing both for the individual and for society. If, now, this is no ground for believing them, we are under the disagreeable necessity of admitting that a true belief may be paralyzing and pernicious, while a false belief may be necessary to our best development. [1]

And because Bowne does hold that truth is beneficial and useful, although not constituted by that utility, he accepts the argument from results as contributing to the case for religious belief. Because religious beliefs are fruitful in their favorable results for human life, and because atheistic beliefs are pernicious in their results, we may assume the truth of the one and the falsity of the other. The rational validity of this argument rests, manifestly, on the arbitrary definition that truth never has results that are harmful to human life, but the definition itself is essentially pragmatic. The rationalist may hold that utility is a presumption of truth, but in itself it does not establish truth; and conversely he may hold that results harmful to human life may constitute a presumption against the truth of a given view, but they do not establish its falsity, for truth and falsity must, in the final analysis, depend upon considerations other than simply results qua results.

Another pragmatic element in Bowne's case for religious belief, though presented only incidentally, is the argument from history and survival. As between beliefs, he says, "More and more history becomes the argument, and the survival of the fittest the judge." [2] Again,

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1. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 654.
2. Ibid., p. 665.

"If there be others with a different set of fundamental sympathies and interests, and no mediation is possible, history and the survival of the fittest must decide between them."[1] The validity of this argument depends, as in the case of the argument from the satisfaction of our interests, upon a metaphysical presupposition. If the universe is rationally and purposively controlled, then indeed we may believe that the Creator will allow only true beliefs to survive, although even this rests upon the assumption that we understand the purposes of the Creator. In any event, the argument has no rational validity as method independent of a metaphysical presupposition; its completely pragmatic character is obvious.

The 'will to believe' doctrine appears in Bowne in this period even before the publication of the famous essay by James. In the Philosophy of Theism, Bowne writes: "There is an element of faith and volition latent in all our theorizing. Where we cannot prove, we believe. Where we cannot demonstrate, we choose sides."[2] And this, Bowne held, was essentially the position of Kant. With respect to the question of theism, Bowne wrote of Kant: "He claimed to have shown that, by way of speculation, neither proof nor disproof is possible; and in this balance of the speculative reason practical interests may be allowed to turn the scale."[3]

A further pragmatic emphasis that appears in this period is the doctrine that beliefs must be tested in action. No one, Bowne says, can really test the belief in God, for example, until he has tried to live on the basis of such a belief; only then can he be genuinely certain of

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1. Independ., 42(Oct.9,1990), p. 1401. See also Phil.of Theism, p. 32.
2. Loc.cit., Phil. of Theism, 1887, p. iii.
3. Ibid., p. 242.

its validity. Belief reaches full power only as it "is put into action, and life is built into and around it. Indeed, in a great many cases, the test of belief would appear to be just the willingness to act upon it; and through acting upon it the belief acquires reality, and passes from assent to conviction."[1] The practical value of this emphasis is clear; and likewise its rational value. Nevertheless it should be seen that the rational value lies in the fact that practice gives to us data for interpretation and that it is not the practice itself which provides the criterion. He who acts on the basis of faith in God finds certain facts of experience which would not otherwise be presented to him. To the extent that those facts require a theistic view as their rational explanation it may be said that practice and action open the way to a validation of belief in God. From a critical point of view, however, practice and action must be seen as providing the data for belief; they are not themselves the criteria.

As in the first period, Bowne continues to include the utilitarian emphasis in his moral theory, combining it, as in the earlier period, with the Kantian formalism. In his The Principles of Ethics, he summarizes his view by saying that "morality has a subjective and an objective aspect. The former looks to the motive, the disposition, the spirit of the agent. The latter looks only to the objective nature and consequences of the deed."[2] Though taken from the Utilitarian doctrines, this emphasis in Bowne is not in itself characteristically pragmatic for the reason that it presupposes the moral will as the source of moral principles; it does not make consequences an exclusively empirical criterion.

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1. Independ., 48(Apr. 2, 1896), p. 439.
2. Bowne, B.P., The Principles of Ethics, (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1892), p. 140.

Thus far we have considered simply the pragmatic emphases in Bowne's methodology in the field of moral and religious belief in this period. Their validity rests largely, as we have seen, upon metaphysical presuppositions. They are not in themselves valid methods for establishing the rational validity of belief. That Bowne had not felt it necessary carefully to distinguish the criteria of belief is indicated by the very fact that he so often speaks of truth-criteria as being too complex to formulate. Only the living mind can serve as criterion of the truth. "The test of fundamental beliefs can never be any simple rule, but will rather be as complex as our nature itself."[1] Again, "There is no simple and compendious standard of real truth as distinct from formal truth. To seek for such a thing is to follow a chimera."[2] It is precisely because Bowne never made the criteria of religious belief a critical problem for investigation that he achieved no systematic formulation of methodology in the field of religious belief. He depends largely, as a consequence, upon considerations that are essentially pragmatic. In addition to these pragmatic elements, however, there are certain emphases that are distinctly rationalistic, and it is to these that we now turn.

In so far as Bowne argues for the validity of moral and religious beliefs on the basis of their harmony and coherence with experience as a whole, his method is essentially rationalistic and sound; and occasionally he does so argue. In the article, "Science Must Go," for example, we find him writing:

> It is not correct to say that the mind believes its postulates because it wishes to, but because it cannot bring

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1. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 665.
2. Independ., 37 (Jan. 8,1885), p. 36.

> its total experience into harmony without them so that every side of our complex nature shall receive full recognition.[1]

In so far as Bowne intends "harmony" to be understood rationally, and not psychologically, he is approaching here the criterion of coherence. But the coherence criterion is suggested more clearly in the following:

> It is in this sense of having many implications which can be unfolded in systematic statement that the ethical and religious consciousness may be spoken of as an independent source of truth.[2]

That is, the objective character of moral and religious beliefs is indicated by their capacity for systematic and coherent representation. Again, in 1890, Bowne writes:

> But, it is said, this is to declare that one is free to believe what he pleases. By no means. Of those basal interests and sympathies which determine belief, one must be sure that they are well founded, either in their own right as expressions of our nature, or in some other fact, or facts; and one must also invoke logic to secure consistency in unfolding them into a formulated system.[3]

Bowne's argument here is not by any means clean-cut in the rationalistic sense; it is still confused with interest-satisfactions without establishing any criterion for rational interests. Nevertheless, there is significance in the point that these beliefs must be capable of being unfolded into a "formulated system." In this case, coherence is made the incidental and secondary criterion, rather than the primary; but that Bowne should use it at all in the case of moral and religious beliefs is indeed a point of interest.

A second rationalistic element in Bowne's methodology in the field of religious belief is the moral argument. "We demand," he says, "an

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1. Independ., 36(Jan. 24,1884), p. 98.
2. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 662.
3. Independ., 42(Oct. 9, 1890), p. 1401.

expanation which shall satisfy the conscience as well as the intellect. Accordingly, we interpret the First Cause morally."[1] At this point, Bowne is certainly speaking of conscience in terms of practical reason, for he is implying the objectivity of moral judgments entirely apart from any interest or instinct satisfactions. This is borne out further in the following passage, in which he is speaking of the postulates of the mind as axiomata, that is, as "things worthy to be believed" :

> In the last analysis these axiomata have an ethical root. They rest upon the idea, not of what must be, but of what ought to be. They are accepted because of their practical value, or their unconditioned worth. This basal faith rests upon nothing deeper than itself, and hence it cannot be argued.[2]

That is, it is not feeling qua feeling that establishes these postulates but rather the rational conviction that that which is neceessary for the moral life must be true, so long as reason can establish nothing to the contrary. And the rationality of the moral life, in turn, rests precisely on the objectivity of the moral judgments, in so far as that objectivity can be shown to be rationally probable. Bowne's use of this rational moral argument is, however, not systematic; it occurs only incidentally.

A third rationalistic element in Bowne's attempt to validate religious belief is the argument that the facts of moral and religious experience require God as their explanation. This is so highly significant in any rational case for belief in God that one would expect that Bowne would have made much of it. Actually, however, the argument is found only once, and in an incidental connection, in the writings of this period. He says: "The existence of the conscience and of religion demands an explanation; and this must finally be found in God."[3]

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1. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 651.
2. Ibid., p. 661.
3. Ibid., p. 653.

Thus, though some rationalistic considerations are adduced in Bowne's treatment of religious belief, they are not systematically developed; in the main the case for the validity of religious belief is allowed to rest upon essentially pragmatic arguments. The substance of his position is that religious belief is valid because it satisfies our religious interests, which interests we must assume to be trustworthy. The essential position of Bowne is certainly defensible on a rationalistic basis, but the methods which he has employed are more pragmatic than rationalistic.

(4) The Nature of Truth.

There is no change in Bowne's conception of truth in the writings of this third period. He distinguishes as before between rational truth and the truth of contingent fact, but holds that ultimately all truth is grounded in purposive intelligence.

> Rational truth, as distinct from truth of contingent fact, is never anything more than an expression of the necessary relations of ideas, or of the way in which reason universally proceeds. As such it is nothing apart from the mind or antecedent to it, but is simply an expression of the mental nature. --- There is no realm of truth apart from the world-ground; and we must look in this being for the foundation of truth itself, and of all those principles whereby the distinction of true and false, consistent and contradictory, possible and impossible, themselves exist. [1]

Bowne makes the conception of truth somewhat more explicit in the following passage, in which he defines truth relationally:

> The relation of ideas in the judgment is not merely a subjective fact in the individual consciousness, but claims to represent an independent truth. --- This claim presupposes an order existing independtly of individual volition and consciousness. This may be an order of fact or an order of reason. In the order of fact there are certain things in certain relations and with certain

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1. Loc.cit., Phil. of Theism, p. 162.

> laws. In the order of reason there are certain ideas which belong together, and others which are mutually repugnant. Judgments are true which agree with this order; those are false which depart from it. In the true judgment conceptions are joined which in the nature of things or in the nature of reason belong together; in the false judgment conceptions are joined which in the nature of things or in the nature of reason should be kept apart.[1]

That Bowne continues to regard truth as not only independent and absolute but also beneficial is indicated in a passage already quoted from the article on "The Logic of Religious Belief." After affirming the pernicious influence of atheistic beliefs and the beneficial influence of theistic beliefs, he says, "If, now, this is no ground for believing them (i.e. theistic beliefs), we are under the disagreeable necessity of admitting that a true belief may be paralyzing and pernicious, while a false belief may be necessary to our best development."[2]

Summary of the Epistemology for the Third Period (1884-1896):

Bowne continues in this period with the activistic view of the thinking subject, its cognitive activity proceeding according to norms, or categories, implicit in it, which norms are empirically discoverable, not logically deducible from some basic category. Mind-activity is to be further distinguished as an abstracting, generalizing, and classifying activity. The emphasis upon the determinative character of interests and feelings in the life of the mind continues in this period. Though Bowne thinks of these basic interests and feelings, as he has defined them, in terms of the Kantian practical reason, it is clear that his formulation is far more pragmatic than rationalistic. The

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1. Loc. cit., Psychol. Theory, 1886, p. 290.
2. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 654.

function of the theoretical reason with respect to these interests and feelings is regulative. As regards the nature and scope of knowledge, the treatment is the same as that of the preceding period. The cognitive field is divided between strict knowledge and rational belief. Under the former are included logic and mathematics, with the criteria of self-evidence and consistency. Under the latter are included science, metaphysics, and moral and religious beliefs. The criteria in science and metaphysics are consistency, harmony, and adequacy to the facts. Metaphysical explanation is further defined to include purpose. Science and metaphysics rest on objective grounds; moral and religious beliefs rest on subjective grounds, namely, feelings and interests. Bowne distinguishes between the psychology and logic of religious belief, but he finally identifies the two by finding in the causes of beliefs their grounds. His pragmatic methodology includes: (1) interest-satisfaction as warrant of belief; (2) the acceptance of the subjective determination of our religious beliefs on the ground that our acceptance of scientific and philosophical postulates is also subjectively determined; (3) beneficial results as warrant of belief; and (4) the measure of belief in terms of survival. The 'will to believe' doctrine is also suggested in this period, together with the teaching that beliefs must be tested in action. The rationalistic emphases are not systematically developed. They include: (1) the criterion of harmony with experience as a whole and the possibility of systematic formulation; (2) the argument from the objectivity of our moral judgments; and (3) the argument to God as the most rational explanation of the facts of moral and religious experience. The conception of truth is essentially that of the earlier periods, rational and independent, yet beneficial and fruitful.

Section Four: Fourth Period. 1897 - 1910.

(1) Nature of the Mind.

The only change in Bowne's conception of the nature of the mind in this fourth and last period is in the direction of a more articulate emphasis upon its teleological character, which we shall consider in connection with the categories. The fundamental notion of the mind as a unified, self-directing center of activity remains unchanged. The unity of the thinking subject is known both through experience and through logical deduction from that experience. We notice first the empirical emphasis:

> In affirming the self we affirm nothing picturable or sensuously presentable, but only what we mean and experience when we say 'I'. And this self, so far from being a questionable fact, is one of the surest items of experience. [1]

Again:

> The self itself as the subject of the mental life and knowing and experiencing itself as living, and as one and the same throughout its changing experiences, is the surest item of knowledge we possess. [2]

The logical necessity of accepting the unity of the thinking subject is shown by such a consideration as the following:

> Let us take the judgment a is b, where a and b are any two particular states of consciousness. How is this judgment possible ?
> The answer is, It is possible only as there is a conscious subject M, which is neither a or b, but embraces both in the unity of its own consciousness. [3]
> Over against the plurality of coexistent particular states the self must be one; over against the plurality of successive particular states the self must be both one and abiding. [4]

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1. Bowne, B.P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge, (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1897), p. 27.
2. Bowne, B.P., Personalism, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,1908), p.88.
3. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, p. 21.
4. Ibid., p. 22.

The activistic conception of the mind remains basic with Bowne to the end of his work. In the Preface to the Theory of Thought and Knowledge, he says: "The root thought of the work is that thought is an organic activity which unfolds from within, and can never be put together mechanically from without."[1] Of the different kinds of mind-activity, "Thought --- is that form --- whose aim is truth or knowledge."[2] Thought is always active. The fact that impressions of the outside world are received by the mind does not mean that the mind is ever passive, for "they become anything for intelligence only through a constitutive, organizing, classifying activity of thought upon the impressions."[3]

The distinguishing, differentiating activity of the mind, as Bowne learned to describe it under the influence of Ulrici, proceeds according to the categories, or norms of differentiation, implicit in itself. Here again Bowne's approach to the categories is both empirical and logical. Not only are they presupposed by the differentiating activity of the mind as logical forms of that activity, but they are actually experienced as modes of mental procedure. Logically, Bowne argues that "experience is possible only through a certain constitutive mental activity, according to principles immanent in the understanding."[4] But the empirical emphasis here is even stronger than the logical. For example, Bowne criticizes the Kantian deduction of the categories as inadequate. He says:

> We may say that the categories are the condition of all knowledge and of all objects, but this is by no means to deduce them, it is rather to discover them as the actual conditions of the consciousness we actually possess.[5]

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1. Loc.cit., Thought and Knowledge, p. iii.
2. Ibid., p. 9.
3. Ibid., p. 45.
4. Loc.cit., Personal., p. 55.
5. Bowne, B.P., Kant and Spencer: A Critical Exposition, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912), p. 77.

The activities of the mind "fall into certain classes, and these classes may only be looked upon as expressing general forms of mental action and as founded in the nature of the mind itself."[1] Thus, the categories are "modes of mental operation. They are the forms which the mind gives to its experience."[2] Again, "They are the norms by which the mind proceeds, implicitly or explicitly, in fixing, defining, and relating its objects. They constitute the framework of thought, and form the contents of the pure reason."[3] And as such, they are "immanent in the activity itself."[4]

> The categories, then, are simply abstractions from self-conscious life. They are the modes of operation of the intellect and derive their meaning only from that self-conscious life as they find their only realization in it.[5]

Concerning the number of categories, Bowne makes it clear that that is a matter with which he is not particularly concerned. The important thing is that that which is designated as a category of the mind should really be one. He writes:

> There is, then, no objection to one's making as many categories as he pleases, provided always they represent real forms of mental activity; and there is also no objection to making as few as one pleases, provided, again, the categories do not put incommensurable things together, and do not overlook real forms of mental activity.[6]

And even more explicitly:

> It is not shown that reason admits only of the existing categories, no more, no less, and no others. Reason - that is, our reason - is not able to complete its own system; and is compelled to accept itself in many respects as a fact which is by no means transparent ---. We make no attempt, therefore, at deduction or systematic completeness.[7]

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1. Loc.cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 115.
2. Loc. cit., Personal., 1908, p. 105.
3. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 59.
4. Ibid., p. 61.
5. Kant and Spencer, 1912, pp. 86-87.
6. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, pp. 115-116.
7. Ibid., p. 113.

Bowne classifies the categories, in so far as he designates them, as phenomenal and metaphysical. Under the former he places those of space, time, motion, quantity, and number; under the latter, those of being and quality, identity, causality, and purpose, with necessity and possibility indicated as doubtful. Bowne's inclusion of purpose among the categories represents a further articulation of the teleological emphasis which we have found in his writings from the begining, and which found expression in the third period in the teleological definition of metaphysical explanation. In the earlier teaching, the emphasis was upon the fact that the mind does actually act with reference to ends. In the third and fourth periods, the additional point is made that not only does the mind act with reference to ends, but it can know and understand its experience in any ultimate sense only within a framework of purpose. "In our experience of intelligence we find its activity taking on the purposive form. --- Every where the mind seeks to relate its objects as means to ends, or to comprise them in a scheme of purpose or an all-embracing plan."[1] "Thought must become teleological before it can complete itself."[2] From a cognitive point of view, however, purpose is not necessary as a principle of interpretation on the phenomenal plane, although, indeed, the mind is teleological in all of its vital activities; but the completion of the metaphysical interpretation of experience is impossible without it. Bowne specifies: "The categories are not all on the same plane. Some are necessary to even elementary experience, while others are necessary only for the reflective systematization of experience."[3] Again, "The necessity of purpose as a principle of thought --- is reflect-

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1. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 107.
2. Ibid., p. 107.
3. Ibid., p. 107.

ively rather than intuitively reached."[1] We see reflectively, for example, that causality is intelligible only as volitional and purposive. "From this point of view the affirmation of purpose is made solely to enable thought to maintain itself and to attain to systematic completeness."[2]

With purpose designated as one of the categories of thought, Bowne's conception of the mind becomes completely teleological, for, as we have seen, he holds that the general activities of the mind are controlled by subjective feelings and interests. This emphasis upon the activity of the mind in terms of its fundamental interests continues with the same vigor to the end of his work. He repeats in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge and in Theism, as well as elsewhere, the description of the mind which he has previously given.

> Man is not only, or chiefly, an abstract speculator, he is also a living being, with practical interests and necessities, to which he must adjust himself in order to live at all. It has been one of the perennial shortcomings of intellectualism that man has been considered solely as an intellect or understanding; whereas, he is a great deal more. Man is will, conscience, emotion, aspiration; and these are far more powerful factors than the logical intellect.[3]

And again:

> The mind is not a disinterested logic-machine, but a living organism, with manifold interests and tendencies. These outline its development, and furnish the driving power.[4]

The way in which these interests exercise control over mental development is by giving rise to certain postulates or assumptions which, while satisfying the interests, determine the direction of mental growth.

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1. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 108.
2. Ibid., p. 108.
3. Bowne, B.P., Theism, (N.Y.: American Book Company, 1902), pp. 17-18; see also Thought and Knowledge, p. 376.
4. Loc. cit., Theism, p. 22.

As Bowne expresses it again:

> In its practical unfolding the mind makes a great variety of practical postulates and assumptions which are not logical deductions or speculative necessities, but a kind of modus vivendi with the universe. They represent the conditions of our fullest life; and are at bottom expressions of our practical and ideal interests or necessities. [1]

As cognitive we assume that the universe is rational; as moral we assume that it is fundamentally righteous; as religious we assume the existence of the inclusive ideal, the Perfect Being. "All of these ideals are, primarily, alike subjective. They are produced, indeed, under the stress of experience, but they are not the transcript of any possible experience." [2]

> Thus we see that all our thinking rests on a teleological foundation. The mind is not driven by any compulsion of objective facts, but rather by the subjective necessity of self-realization and self-preservation. [3]

That Bowne continued to identify, in his own thought, these interests of the mind with the practical reason is clear. But the looseness of that identification is equally clear. In the last article which he wrote we find this putting of it:

> We see that thought roots in life rather than in speculation. We recognize the primacy of the practical reason. Kant did not succeed in limiting thought to the sphere of sense phenomena, but he did succeed in showing what a large element of relativity there is in our thinking and in showing how unwarranted the old-fashioned dogmatism is in any field of knowledge. --- By breaking down this dogmatism Kant has made it possible for us to trust our human instincts again, our higher spiritual instincts as well as the lower animal ones. --- Man is now seen to be not merely a speculative intelligence, but a living will with practical necessities, with instincts that are the outcome of life and which may well be trusted not to lead us astray. [4]

How instincts, whose expression is of necessity heteronomous, can be rational Bowne does not establish. His assumption is simply that they stand in their own right independent of any validation by theoretical

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1. Loc. cit., Theism, 1902, pp. 17-18.
2. Ibid., p. 24.
3. Ibid., p. 27.
4. Meth. Rev., 105(1922), pp. 363-364.

reason. Indeed his concern seems to be far more to stress the independence of instincts and interests of the theoretical reason than to establish positively their rationality. In Theism, he writes:

> Of course if we sum up all the interests and intuitions of the soul in the term 'reason,' we may make reason cover the whole field of conviction and insight; but reason as the faculty of inference through argument is second and not first; for it presupposes premises. [1]

Elsewhere, referring to the beliefs growing out of these basic interests, Bowne says, "While reason may be implicit in them, the reflective, analytic, and self-conscious reason commonly has little to do with their production." [2] Thus, though constantly assuming their validity, his emphasis is upon their independence of theoretical reason rather than upon the critical right of assuming their rational character, In another of Bowne's last articles, though making interests and instincts deeper than logical processes, he speaks of them as cognitive:

> It is now seen that life and action are deeper than logical processes, that immediate premises are behind all inferences, that thought cannot begin until life furnishes the data, and that there is nothing deeper in cognition or life than the fundamental needs, interests, and instincts of the mind. [3]

We have seen that Bowne even in the earlier periods intended an identification of interests and feelings with the practical reason; and we have further observed that he carried the intention scarcely beyond the assumptive stage. Certainly, at least, he did not establish them as equivalent to the practical reason as conceived by Kant, for the reasons already specified, namely, first, that for Kant, the activity of reason, practical as well as theoretical, was essentially free; reason as reason was never determined by feelings and interests; and second, that for Kant, the moral law, together with the religious

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1. Loc. cit., Theism, 1902, p. 26.
2. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 376.
3. Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p. 892.

postulates logically presupposed by it, was valid because, as a priori, it was necessary and universal; its validity did not depend upon the empirical discovery of its generality in human experience. There was no emphasis of Kant's that was clearer than that the principles of pure reason cannot be established empirically. Experience cannot make moral obligation binding upon us. Only reason can do that. Yet Bowne argues to the rationality of the moral and religious interests on the grounds that experience finds them to be general, that they are to be regarded as a natural product of the universe of mind, and that they are to be trusted as an essential part of our nature. Now for these same reasons, Bowne's doctrine of interests even in this fourth period is not to be identified with the Kantian doctrine of the practical reason. It is true that he stresses more than in the earlier periods the rational character of these interests and feelings; they may all be included under the conception of reason in the larger sense of that word; they are in themselves essential to cognition. Yet things are not made rational simply by calling them so, as Bowne has told us in defending his doctrine,[1] and the teaching as Bowne has formulated it is essentially pragmatic rather than rationalistic.

The object of Bowne here is clear; his concern is primarily axiological. His problem, though he does not so define it himself, is to establish the objectivity of our value-judgments. As seen by him, the problem was simply the safeguarding of our moral and religious interests. Rather than focusing attention on moral and religious beliefs in terms of objective value-judgments, he defended them on the ground that they grow out of and are determined by essential needs and inter-

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1. See Psychol. Theory, Loc.cit., pp. 206-207.

ests of the mind, which interests and needs he assumes to be rational. But there is difficulty here, manifestly. If the instincts and interests of life are to be subsumed under the concept of practical reason, then either all of them must be so subsumed or only a part of them. If all of them, then there is left no distinction between the rational and irrational in life. Yet Bowne clearly recognizes that some of our interests and feelings are not rational grounds for belief. This leaves us with the alternative that only part of the interests and instincts of life are to identified with the practical reason. But if only part of them, what is to be the principle of distinction between those interests which are essentially rational and those which are not ? Bowne's usual answer is that those interests are rational which are essential to the mind and which are represented by the most catholic beliefs of the race. But clearly generality of belief is no basis for determining the essential or rational interests of mankind. In the first place, the religious beliefs which Bowne speaks of as general are not general. And Bowne himself recognizes this fact when he provides the criterion of survival of the fittest as between the beliefs of those who are favorable to religion and those who are opposed. But even if religious belief were general, it might still be erroneous in spite of its generality. Bowne gives us, therefore, no basis by which the rationality of the interests and instincts of the mind shall be determined. It is true that Bowne, at one point in the third period, suggested that feelings and interests are to be known as rational by their content. But nowhere does he systematically develop this point, nor does he recognize that if their validity rests in their rational content then their validity is determined solely by that rational content and not by the fact that it happens to be carried by feelings and interests. Feelings

and interests may well be the source of cognitive data, but the test of validity must rest not in the fact that their source is in feeling but in the fact that their claims are seen to be essentially rational. The appeal to feelings and interests qua feelings and interests continues in Bowne's writings to the end of his work, and as such it is primarily a pragmatic rather than a rationalistic doctrine.

The pragmatic tone of the appeal to feelings and interests is made further clear when seen in the light of Bowne's own doctrine of free rational activity. His argument for the speculative significance of freedom would make all rational activity, in so far as it is truly objective and free from error, essantially free and undetermined activity. The mind distinguishes without any sort of compulsion, except that of reason itself, the true from the false. Yet these great catholic beliefs of the race are not, as defined by Bowne, the free achievement of the mind; they are determined by vital interests; they grow; they are products of the universe. Bowne seems in some places even to teach that these beliefs are determined entirely beyond the possibility of our rational control. Any reasons we may attempt to give for them are nothing but rationalizations. The difficulty of reconciling this insistence upon free activity of the mind in the pursuit of truth with the doctrine that our moral and religious postulates are determined by our subjective interests is one that Bowne seems not to have given attention to. Indeed, in the interests of moral and religious beliefs, he seems to have ignored it. In the Theory of Thought and Knowledge, he says:

> We must find in human freedom, in our wilfulness and carelessness, an explanation in principle of the whims and aberrations of thought. But when we have done this we cannot

> discredit the great catholic beliefs and tendencies of humanity without involving the whole system of knowledge in disaster. Their universality and necessity in human life are the best grounds for belief. [1]

The relation of the theoretical reason, or the logical understanding as Bowne usually calls it, to the basic feelings and interests of the mind is, as we have seen in the preceding periods, essentially one of regulation. Bowne states his view again in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge:

> What now is the function of the logical understanding in the case? ---
> --- This question, of course, has no application to those beliefs which are admittedly based on objective evidence which must be objectively presented. But even in the case of beliefs based on mental interests and tendencies, logic has a very important function. --- Our mental postulates and interests exist primarily as implicit tendencies, and not as clearly defined principles. In this state they readily lose their way. --- Left to themselves and without the guidance of criticism, they often fail to recognize their own implications, and sometimes even contradict themselves. --- Hence the need of a critical procedure which shall help the mind to self-knowledge, define and clarify its aims, secure consistency in the development of its practical postulates, and adjust their mutual relations. This is the field of logic; and in this work of development, adjustment, and rectification logic has its inalienable rights and a function of supreme importance. [2]

Bowne would thus give the logical understanding the authority to correct and harmonize the beliefs which grow out of our fundamental interests and feelings. At first sight this would seem to be in conflict with his repeated teaching that the great catholic beliefs of the race must be allowed to stand even in the face of conflicting facts, that is, against any interference by the theoretical reason. Bowne's meaning here, however, is clearly this: the beliefs in God, immortality, prayer, etc., must be allowed to stand in their general form as required by our fundamental feelings and interests. The specific forms of these beliefs, however, that is, their detailed content, must be worked out

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1. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 377.
2. Ibid., p. 383.

and criticized by the logical understanding. In case of conflict between a belief in God and disbelief in God, the conflict would have to wait for pragmatic determination by survival. In case of conflict between one particular idea of God and another particular idea of God, the issue would be decided by the logical understanding. That this, however, leaves the matter on a subjective plane is clear enough. If Bowne argues that religious beliefs, even in their general forms, find their rational validity in their satisfaction of our essential interests of the mind, then manifestly the door is open to any one to defend any idea of God by the same method. If pragmatism becomes the validating principle of belief at any single point, there is no possible rational way of keeping it from being claimed as sufficient as a principle of validation at any, or all, other points. As Bowne has formulated his views, therefore, theoretical reason has only a pragmatic, regulative function so far as religious beliefs are concerned.

(2) The Nature and Scope of Knowledge.

The dualistic nature of the cognitive relation remains a fundamental element in Bowne's epistemology to the end of his work. "However necessary our thoughts as mental events may be for the grasping of the fact, they can never be identified with the fact."[1] And again, "From the human standpoint --- there is an ineradicable dualism of thought and thing."[2]

Bowne continues, in this last period of his writing, to make the distinction between knowledge and belief. He writes:

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1. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, pp. 15-16.
2. Ibid., p. 296.

> In strictness only that is knowledge which is indisputably given, rationally self-evident, or cogently deduced from unquestionable facts. Hence, strict knowledge is limited to the immediate data of consciousness or to the contents of the rational sciences. All other so-called knowledge is properly belief. [1]

Whereas strict knowledge is the field of absolute certainty, belief is the field of simply rational probability. All belief, that is, all interpretations of the facts of experience, rests upon certain assumptions or postulates concerning knowledge and nature. "We assume that things form a rational and intelligible whole, that the laws of our thought are parallel with the laws of things; but we cannot be said to demonstrate any of these things." [2] Indeed, "Our entire cognitive procedure rests upon postulates of this sort ---. They spring out of our cognitive nature and cognitive interests, and if we ask for their ultimate ground we find that they have no other than the energy of the mental life itself." [3]

> The general character of rational belief, in distinction from knowledge, is that it is a conviction based on reasons which lend some support but do not compel it. These may make it probable, but do not prove it. [4]

As we have before seen, Bowne distinguishes between those grounds of belief which are objective and those which are subjective.

> The grounds of belief may be both subjective and objective. Many beliefs make no appeal to subjective interest, and their grounds may be objectively set forth. This is the case with most scientific beliefs, and with matters of historical fact. Such beliefs, so far as they are rational, are based upon objective facts and evidence. --- But many beliefs are not thus objective in their grounds. They have their roots in feeling and our system of mental interests. Their grounds, then, cannot be objectively presented, but must be sought rather in life itself. [5]

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1. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 185.
2. Ibid., p. 374.
3. Ibid., p. 374.
4. Ibid., p. 369.
5. Ibid., p. 369.

With this distinction in the grounds of belief, it is clear, as we have seen in the earlier periods , that science belongs to that part of the field of belief which rests on objective grounds. This is also true of metaphysics.

> Philosophy aims at a rational and systematic comprehension of reality. Or, since experience is the fundamental fact in all theorizing, and since reality can be known only in experience, in the largest sense of that word, we may say that philosophy aims at a rational and systematic comprehension of experience.[1]

Moral and religious belief, on the other hand, belong to that part of the field of belief which rests on subjective grounds. But the volitional element is not confined exclusively to moral and religious beliefs, inasmuch as it is present in all of the postulates of science and philosophy. "There is an element of faith and volition latent in all our theorizing. Where we cannot prove, we believe. Where we cannot demonstrate, we choose sides."[2] The distinguishing difference in the case of moral and religious beliefs is that their grounds, unlike those of science and philosophy, are in no way objective.

Bowne recognizes that our interpretations of experience seldom, if ever, achieve a final and fixed form. "If now we ask for a theory which shall be final we must admit that we have very little that is secure from overthrow,"[3] he affirms, for "the facts are rarely so unambiguous as to exclude competing interpretations."[4]

(3) Philosophical Method and Criteria.

There is no essentially new development in Bowne's methodology in this fourth period of his work. As we have already observed, he contin-

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1. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 3.
2. Loc. cit., Theism, 1902, p. iv.
3. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 213.
4. Ibid., p. 214.

ues to divide the cognitive field between strict knowledge and rational belief. The rational truths of logic and mathematics are alone designated as strict knowledge. Their criteria are their immediate self-evidence and the inconceivability of their opposites. The field of rational belief includes, as we have seen in the preceding period, science, metaphysics and moral and religious belief, or, in other words, all beliefs which, though rationally probable, fall short of the absolute certainty of strict knowledge. Science and metaphysics belong to that portion of the field of rational belief which rests upon the objective facts of perceptual experience, whereas moral and religious beliefs belong to that portion of the field which rests upon the subjective facts of feelings and interests. It is this distinction in the grounds of belief, as we have noticed in the preceding periods, that is responsible for the sharp differences in methodology between science and metaphysics,on the one hand, and moral and religious belief on the other. The very fact that Bowne regards the grounds of religious belief as subjective is responsible for essentially pragmatic procedure in his attempt to validate them.

The entire field of belief rests upon certain basic postulates or assumptions. Indeed it is because of these necessary postulates, incapable in themselves of demonstration, that science, philosophy,and moral and religious belief, must be designated as belief rather than as knowledge. They rest upon postulates which are simply to be accepted or rejected; they cannot be strictly proved. From the cognitive point of view, these postulates are the trustworthiness of reason and the intelligibility and rationality of the external world. Bowne emphasizes again and again

that these postulates are not capable of being demonstrated. Their only rational ground is that they satisfy our cognitive interests. The emphasis here is certainly pragmatic. The strictly rationalistic position would be that it is the nature of reason to require objectivity, consistency, and coherence of all propositions which claim to be true. It is impossible to build a view of our experience that is completely coherent which does not rest upon the postulate of the intelligibility of the external world. We cannot, indeed, strictly demonstrate the postulate, but it finds its rational ground not in the fact that it satisfies our interests, but in the fact that it permits a coherent view of experience.

Bowne's references to science in this period are only casual and incidental. He continues to accept experiment and observation as the fundamental methods. Further, scientific theories, like those of metaphysics, must be tested by their adequacy to the facts and by self-consistency and harmony with the rest of knowledge. Bowne elaborates still further in this period the differences between scientific and philosophic method. The field of science is the field of the connections of things and events. "These uniformities of coexistence and sequence admit of being studied and described and registered without reference to metaphysics."[1] The knowledge of these uniformities "can be gained only by observation and experiment. No amount of reflection upon ideas will enable us to deduce a priori any of these facts."[2] The field of science is definitely limited. It does not touch the "question of meaning and causal interpretation."[3] "Science discovers, describes, registers the facts; philosophy interprets them."[4] And again, "We give

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1. Loc. cit., Personal., 1908, p. 36.
2. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
3. Ibid., p. 40.
4. Ibid., p. 41.

up, then, the whole scientific apparatus, from mechanics on, as anything ontological, and hold it only for its practical value in mastering experience."[1]

In metaphysics, Bowne continues to use the Herbartian method of critically examining and reworking the fundamental philosophical concepts. Metaphysics was not, for him, an inductive science. This is illustrated again in this period by his reference to the question of causality. It is not, he says,"a question of inductive science or common sense experience, but solely of consistent thinking."[2] This emphasis upon logical consistency in Bowne's metaphysical writings is not meant to exclude the criterion of adequacy to the facts, although the use of the word 'solely' in the sentence just quoted would suggest the narrower view. The fuller method is indicated more clearly in the statement: "The value of competing solutions is to be found in their adequacy to the facts and to the demands of our reason."[3]

Bowne describes his method in metaphysics in this period as follows:

> Our method, then, is critical, not creative. Experience, as a whole, is our datum, and the question is, How must we think about reality on the basis of this experience as interpreted by thought ? We take, then, everything as it seems to be, or as it reports itself, and make our conceptions adequate and harmonious.[4]

By adequacy to the facts, Bowne means that our notions and theories must be capable of explaining experience. In his Personalism, he writes:

> We have again and again pointed out that experience is first and basal in all living and thinking, and that all theorizing must go out from experience as its basis, and must return to it for verification.[5]

It must be understood, however, that verification by experience does not

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1. Loc. cit., Personal., 1908, p. 212.
2. Ibid., p. 195.
3. Ibid., p. 196.
4. Bowne, B.P., Metaphysics, (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1898), p. 5.
5. Loc. cit., Personal., p. 303.

mean for Bowne any direct testing by experience. Rather it means that any theory must be tested by its adequacy to explain experience. In other words, Bowne does not use the appeal to experience positively to establish the truth of any proposition; manifestly our basic philosophic concepts could not be so tested; but rather negatively, to show that no philosophical theory is to be regarded as true unless it provides an adequate explanation of the facts of experience. "Every speculator," Bowne insists, "has to go behind the world of experience, and his explanation of the world must be judged by its own positive adequacy to the facts or its ability to satisfy our reason."[1] This phrase "adequacy to the facts" was undoubtedly close in meaning for Bowne to the term 'coherence' as used ordinarily by the empirical rationalist. Bowne himself, however, never made systematic use of the term 'coherence.' It does appear in his Personalism, in 1908, where he says, after outlining the general theory of philosophical naturalism, "To what extent this is a coherent and consistent system we have now to consider."[2] And it appears again, in negative form, in Kant and Spencer: "A system --- depends only on its logic. An incoherent system is none."[3]

The case for the metaphysical attributes of God was included by Bowne within the field of metaphysics. The nature of his procedure is indicated in the following passage:

> From the side of pure intellect --- the theistic question can take on two forms. We can seek to show that the order of the world cannot be understood without intelligence as its cause, and that reason itself falls into discord and despair without God. In the former case God appears as a necessary hypothesis for the understanding of the facts; in the latter case God appears as a necessary implication of the rational life.[4]

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1. Meth. Rev., 105(1922), p. 366.
2. Loc. cit., Personal., 1908, p. 222.
3. Loc. cit., Kant and Spencer, 1912, p. 221.
4. Loc. cit., Theism, 1902, p. 40.

But the speculative intellect, Bowne urged, can arrive only at the purely metaphysical attributes of God. It cannot establish the religious conception. "From the religious standpoint, --- in distinction from the metaphysical, the important attributes concern the divine character, or ethical nature."[1] Concerning the moral character of God, Bowne says:

> There is no way of speculative deduction; for the metaphysical attributes of the world-ground are ethically barren. We must, then, either have immediate faith in our ideal of the perfect being or else appeal to experience to prove that the world-ground proceeds according to ethical principles. Our actual procedure is a mixture of both.[2]

However, the empirical arguments for the moral character of God cannot be regarded as establishing the case. Bowne writes:

> These empirical arguments, --- while they serve to illustrate and confirm our faith, are plainly not its source. They all rest upon picked facts, and ignore some of the most prominent aspects of experience.[3]

The final ground of the rationality of our religious beliefs, therefore, is our faith in the reality of the ideal and in the validity of our human interests. Now it is at this point that Bowne turns to pragmatic methods and criteria. Rather than finding the justification of our faith in the rationality of the universe and in the reality of the moral ideal in the fact that such a faith permits the most rational and coherent view of our total experience, Bowne continues to depend primarily upon pragmatic considerations. He even begins with a pragmatic formulation of the classes of belief. In the Theism, he writes:

> A mental inventory reveals several classes of propositions; some which we must believe, some which we must not believe, and some which we may believe or assume. The first two classes rest upon the essential structure of intelligence; and whatever conflicts with them will, sooner or later, be

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1. Loc. cit., Theism, 1902, p. 249.
2. Ibid., p. 250.
3. Ibid., p. 256.

> abandoned. The third class belongs to the realm of practice and probability, where most of what is valuable in life and conduct lies. It is only in this class that our interests or desires can have a vote, or that the 'will to believe' has a permissible function. [1]

And again, in The Essence of Religion:

> Our fundamental beliefs are never things which can be technically proved. They are of the nature of choices. They represent our assumptions, or postulates, or practical platform, or the things for which we stand. Or rather, they represent us. They reveal the tendencies of our nature, our affinities, the things we like or wish to be. [2]

Probably no one would would question that our beliefs are in the first instance largely determined by what we are, by our particular interests and tendencies. But this leaves the matter purely in the realm of the psychology of belief, and in no way touches the question of logical validity. Likewise, it may be recognized that the volitional element, the element of choice, is an important factor in belief, but unless this is to be regarded pragmatically, it must be emphasized that the choice must be rationally made; it must be made in the light of our total experience, and not blindly or simply because of inclination. It is because Bowne seldom speaks of the rational emphasis here, that his formulation gives the impression of being essentially pragmatic.

The pragmatic character of Bowne's general treatment of religious belief is shown even more strikingly in the following paragraph:

> By way of speculation we can justify neither religion nor science; but since speculation itself is discredited, we need not be concerned at its failure. But life still remains with all its practical interests, and we are permitted to believe and assume whatever this practical life may suggest or demand, and that without being molested by speculative philosophy. [3]

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1. Loc. cit., Theism, 1902, pp. 33-34.
2. Bowne, B.P., The Essence of Religion, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910), p. 182.
3. Loc. cit., Personal. 1908, p. 309.

Again, the stress upon the practical life, rather than upon rational considerations, as the test of belief, is distinctly pragmatic in tone: "Our practical life has been the great source of belief and the constant test of its practical validity, that is, of its truth."[1] Again, in one of the last articles which Bowne wrote, "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation," he speaks of the general increase of the pragmatic emphasis as a distinct gain. He writes: "This result also has great religious value. It changes the venue in the case of religious belief from the court of logic and speculation to the court of life, action, and history. We now see that we have to trust our nature or instincts in order to move at all."[2] The biological tone of this pragmatic evaluation of life and instincts is further borne out by the following reference: "Thus the old rationalising is finally discredited, and religion has a free field for manifesting itself in life and action. The argument is no longer syllogistic, but biologic and pragmatic."[3]

In his Kant and Spencer, published posthumously, Bowne specifically refers to the procedure in the realm of moral and religious belief as pragmatic. He writes: "Thought has become pragmatic, especially in ethical and religious fields, and we are very little concerned at speculative inadequacy, provided a doctrine works well in practice and enriches and furthers life."[4] By speculative inadequacy, Bowne means the impossibility of defending religious belief upon what he has called the objective grounds of perceptual fact.

Bowne felt that he could consistently hold to such a pragmatism in the field of religious belief, no doubt, because he regarded the subjective grounds upon which religious belief rests as essentially rational. As we have pointed out, he assumed the identity of the interests and feelings of

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1. Loc. cit., Personal., 1908, pp. 310-311; see also Thought & Knowl., p. 376.
2. Hibbert Journ., 8(1909-1910), p. 893.
3. Ibid., p. 893.
4. Loc. cit., Kant and Spencer, 1912, p. 209.

the mind with the practical reason. But we have further pointed out that he did not establish that identity; for him it was pure assumption. For Kant, the primacy of the practical reason meant the rational universality and necessity of the moral law. For Bowne, it means the setting of the vital over against and above the intellectual. Indeed, Bowne so interprets Kant's work, as permanently establishing "the primacy of life over speculation."[1] Bowne's conception of the practical reason is well indicated in such a sentence as the following: "We have come to a point at last where we are trusting our instincts again, our higher spiritual instincts as well as the lower ones."[2] Bowne's chief ground for asserting the identity of interests and feelings with the practical reason was the universality, empirically discoverable, of the beliefs which grow out of those interests and feelings.

> Historically, there has been a good deal to justify suspicion of and impatience with appeals to feeling in any form as reasons for belief.
> But this impatience is itself short-sighted. First, it overlooks the fact that there are feelings and feelings. There are particular fancies, and there are the great catholic sentiments of the race. There are individual desires, and there are the great fundamental human interests in which life itself roots.[3]

And further, these interests and feelings are to be regarded as rational because they are products of the world of reality. Bowne writes:

> The mind itself, its nature and needs, are certainly parts and products of reality, and we are not to suppose them misleading without good reason.[4]

We have already pointed to the inadequacy of the argument from generality of belief, particularly when no such generality can be established,

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1. Independ., 56 (Jan.14, 1904), p. 67.
2. North American Review, 191 (1910), p. 103.
3. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 370.
4. Ibid., p. 370.

and we have pointed to the petitio principii present in the argument that our interests and needs must be rational because they are the product of a good, rational universe, which is indeed the point to be established.

Against the background of the assumed trustworthiness of our interests and feelings and instincts, Bowne builds his case for the validity of religious belief. The first point of importance in his methodology is that that validity rests upon the fact that religious belief satisfies our basic interests. As we have shown, this argument has no more than pragmatic value because of Bowne's failure to establish the interests as themselves rational. Bowne contrasts the method of strictly logical demonstration, which he calls the method of "rigor and vigor," after Matthew Arnold, with the actual procedure of the mind in the field of belief, quite as he did in the preceding period:

> The law the logician lays down is this: nothing may be believed which is not proved. The law the mind actually follows is this: whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof. [1]

The pragmatic character of the formulation here is clear. The criterion of what is to be accepted as true or as real is not self-consistency and coherence, or harmony with experience, but rather satisfaction of "subjective interests and tendencies." With the moral and religious nature designated as "subjective" it is only natural that Bowne fell into this essentially pragmatic form of their defense.

Another pragmatic element in Bowne's methodology is the insistence that our fundamental postulates must be allowed to stand even if the facts seem to contradict them. Our postulates that the universe is rational,

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1. Loc.cit., Theism, 1902, p. 18.

and righteous at its root, and that the inclusive ideal is real, must all stand regardless of the facts. "We do not ignore the facts which make against the view; but we set them aside as things to be explained, yet which must not in any way be allowed to weaken our faith."[1]

Bowne finds further support for moral and religious beliefs in the view that they are products of the universe of mind. We have noticed the use of this argument in connection with the interests and feelings of the mind; here we indicate it further in connection with the validity of our beliefs qua beliefs. Bowne writes:

> As long as we viewed belief as consciously wrought out by the formal logical processes it seemed permissible, and even obligatory, to test it by syllogistic forms and the law of contradiction. But when it is seen that belief is made for us as well as by us, that it is wrought out in action rather than in speculation, that the great outlines of belief are the products of life itself, then the basic catholic beliefs of humanity and the unfolding tendencies to believe begin to acquire the significance of any other great natural product. They show the direction of the evolving movement, the trend of the universe of mind. They are no longer accidents or whims of the individual, but are as much entitled to be viewed as belonging to the nature of things as the law of gravitation itself.[2]

As descriptive, this account is perfectly acceptable, for indeed everything in the universe must be regarded as a product of the universe or of the power back of it. But as a logical case for the rational character of these beliefs which are the natural products of the universe, it is clearly a petitio principii, as we have before observed. It assumes the theistic position to validate our beliefs in theism. And even with the theistic assumption, it affords no distinguishing criteria, for all beliefs alike, true and false, are similarly the products of the universe.

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1. Loc.cit., Theism, 1902, p. 23.
2. Loc.cit., Thought and Knowledge, p. 377.

Another indication of the pragmatic character of Bowne's procedure is the loose way in which he speaks of proof of religious beliefs in terms of vital energy. Indeed, speaking of the postulates of the mind in general, Bowne says: "And the proof of such beliefs rests entirely on the energy of the life they express, and on their power to further that life in practice."[1] To be sure, Bowne did not think of vital energy as logical proof; his point was rather that no logical proof is possible, and that the case must of necessity rest upon a practical consideration.

Bowne's use of the phrase "practical absurdity" in this last period of his work also has pragmatic tone. Whereas the test of formal truth is the law of contradiction, "the test of concrete truth is practical absurdity."[2] For example, in the case of solipsism, "The absurdity that emerges is practical, rather than speculative. Life is crippled. Thought has no object, action no aim."[3] Anything which robs life of its fruitfulness must be regarded as untrue.

We have seen that much of Bowne's case for the rationality of the basic interests of the mind rested on the alleged generality of those interests and the beliefs which grow out of them. Because of this, it is somewhat surprising that Bowne should proceed to consider what criterion must be adopted in those cases where the fundamental interests of life conflict, that is, where they are actually not general. And the criterion which Bowne repeatedly uses is that of survival. Speaking of those who accept and those reject the belief in the ressurrection of Christ, Bowne says:

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1. Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p. 892.
2. Loc. cit., Theism, 1902, p. 25.
3. Ibid., p. 25.

> As between these views decision must be made by the survival of the fittest, and the court has been in session for nearly two thousand years. The anti-religious views have lived along in the lower ranges of human thought and life, and they have been equally the enemies of humanity, its hopes, its inspirations, and its aspirations. --- These views have not been great enough to command the faith or stir the hearts of men. In this fact the survival of the fittest, as the supreme court for considering the matter, hands down a final decision. [1]

Likewise, in speaking of the attitude of acceptance or that of rejection with reference to the Christian Gospel, Bowne writes: "At last the personal equation decides, and the survival of the fittest revises the decision."[2] And again, with reference to the differing moral interests of men, Bowne uses the same test:

> We can only proclaim the faith that is in us, and the reasons for it, in the hope that reality may not utterly reject it. --- Faith and unfaith alike can do no more; and the survival of the fittest must decide between them. [3]

And once more, referring to differences in personal beliefs:

> The real conflict is between different ideas and ideals and these have to fight it out on the field of personal experience and the larger field of history. [4]

Closely associated with survival value as a criterion, is fruitfulness, or results. In an examination of the various religions of the world, Bowne says: "After all, fruit is the final test; and Asia, past and present, is the sufficient condemnation of the Asiatic religions."[5] The same use is made of fruitfulness when Bowne is considering, at one point, the question of personal freedom. In Personalism, he writes, referring to the idea of freedom, that it may seem "a poor foundation for science and philosophy, but it is the best foundation there is; and apart from closet intimidations it is good enough, and it works well enough in practice."[6] It must be quickly added, however,

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1. Loc. cit., Essence of Religion, 1910, p. 298.
2. Meth. Rev., 92(1910), p. 187.
3. Loc.cit., Theism, pp. 36-37.
4. Loc.cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 181.
5. Bowne, B.P., The Christian Revelation, (N.Y.: Eaton & Mains,1898),p.25.
6. Loc. cit., Personal., p. 210.

that Bowne's chief case for freedom is a strictly logical and speculative one; the reference is included here only to indicate the general way in which Bowne allowed pragmatic considerations to find expression in his work.

In attempting to secure some sort of unity among the various criteria which he has suggested for knowledge and belief, Bowne uses again and again the rather obscurantist notion that in the final analysis the mind itself must be the test of truth, and his emphasis even here is pragmatic. He writes:

> The general problem of the criterion of knowledge, in whatever field, is practical rather than speculative. Academic discussion is futile and barren. In both religion and philosophy there has been a deal of abstract theorizing about the ultimate standard of truth or authority, as if there were some simple standard which, by external application, would reveal the truth. But there is no such standard. The mind itself, alert and critical, and with all of its furniture of experienced life, is the only standard, and this can never be brought into any single and compendious expression. The mind has no standard of certainty, but it is certain about various things. Practical certainty is all we can hope for in concrete matters; and this is born, not of closet speculation, but of actual contact with reality. [1]

Again:

> The problem of knowledge can never be solved by itself in advance of all concrete investigation, but only in the actual exercise of all the cognitive powers. We learn that we can walk by walking, and in the same way we learn that we can know by knowing. Academic discussions of the the standard of certainty or of the criterion of truth are barren of any valuable result. There is no general standard which the mind can mechanically apply. The standard is the mind itself, dealing with particular and concrete cases; and any given item of knowledge must stand or fall, not because it agrees or disagrees with some assumed standard, but because of the evidence with which it presents itself to the living mind in contact with the facts. [2]

The specification of experience as a criterion of truth is clear enough from this passage, as well as the implication of consistency in

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1. Loc. cit., Christ. Revelation, 1898, pp. 69-70.
2. Loc. cit., Thought and Knowledge, 1897, pp. 292-293.

the emphasis upon the mind. But it may well be asked whether the designation of the mind itself as criterion is not too vague and indefinite to be indicated in more than a general, if not in an obscurantist, way.

It is strange indeed that Bowne would include these pragmatic considerations as steps in the rational validation of religious belief, when he himself used at times essentially rationalistic arguments for those beliefs. In presenting the moral argument for the existence of God, for example, Bowne considers the objection sometimes made against the argument on the ground of its being a selfish demand for a power that will reward us for our present virtue. Bowne's answer to the objection is cogent, and shows the power of the rationalistic method in his hand. He points out that we must distinguish

> between a demand that we be paid for our virtue, and the revolt of our nature against a system that treats good and bad alike, and throws the better half of our nature back upon itself as absurd and meaningless. Neither God nor the future life is needed to pay us for our present virtue, but rather as the conditions without which our nature falls into discord with itself, and passes on to pessimism and despair. We need them, not for our egoistic satisfaction, but to save the rationality of the system; and we believe in them on that account. [1]

That Bowne did not interpret the moral argument for the existence of God in the Kantian or rationalistic sense, however, is indicated by his own statement of it:

> God is seen to be that without which our ideals collapse or are made unattainable, and the springs of action are broken. Hence the existence of God is affirmed not on speculative or theoretical grounds, but because of the needs of the practical life. This has often been called the moral argument for the divine existence; a better name would be the practical argument. [2]

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1. Loc. cit., Theism, 1902, p. 309.
2. Ibid., p. 291.

That is, though Bowne occasionally used the moral argument, he interpreted it chiefly in a pragmatic rather than in a rationalistic sense. Nowhere do we find him systematically developing the view that the existence of God is rationally required to give the most coherent view of the facts of our moral experience. He frequently approaches a rationalistic formulation, as in his statement of the moral argument that "it is essentially a conclusion from what we think ought to be to what is,"[1] but he keeps it from being fully rationalistic by some qualification. In the case of the statement just quoted, for example, he adds that it is thus a conclusion "from our subjective interests to objective facts; and such a conclusion is forever invalid in logic."[2] It is clear, therefore, that fundamentally Bowne was not arguing from the objectivity of the moral law. This brings us to the end of our survey of philosophical methods and criteria in the fourth period of Bowne's work. We turn, finally, to the conception of the nature of truth.

(4) The Nature of Truth.

The conception of truth articulated by Bowne in the earlier periods of his work remains basic in this last period. Truth, though rational and independent, is essentially purposive. Knowing the truth means better adjustment of life to the universe. It is helpful and beneficial. And indeed that which works well must be presumptively true.

> Every theory of knowledge implicitly assumes this test. If we are theists, we can hardly believe that the truth will work mischief. If we are evolutionists and believers in natural selection, we must equally believe that these evolved beliefs are the best adjusted to reality, as being the outcome of that evolving and selecting process whose function it is to eliminate the false and preserve the true.[3]

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1. Loc. cit., Theism, 1902, p. 291.
2. Ibid., p. 291.
3. Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p. 892.

Summary of the Epistemology for the Fourth Period (1897-1910):

Bowne continues to think of the mind as a self-directing center of activity whose unity is known both empirically and logically. The categories are the mind's modes of procedures, and are empirically discoverable as norms of differentiation in the cognitive activity. The number of categories is not fixed. By adding to their number purpose Bowne makes his view of the mind completely teleological. He continues to describe the mind as an organic unity of vital interests which outline and control mental development and determine our basic beliefs. Bowne continues to think of these interests and feelings as essentially rational, but he fails both to establish their identity with the Kantian practical reason and to establish their rationality on any other ground. Interests as determining are thus placed over against reason as free, and no harmony is effected between them, except in so far as final supremacy is given to the practical interests. The function of theoretical reason with respect to them is merely instrumental. The nature and scope of knowledge are defined and described as in the earlier periods. With the cognitive field divided between knowledge and belief, logic and mathematics belong to strict knowledge and have as their criteria self-evidence and the inconceivability of their opposites. Science and metaphysics belong to that portion of the field of rational belief which rests on the objective facts of sense-perception; moral and religious belief to that portion of the field which rests on the subjective grounds of feelings and interests. Inferences from the facts of experience can establish the metaphysical attributes of God but not the religious conception; this can be supported

only by pragmatic methods. The chief method is that of the 'will to believe,' which is given characteristically pragmatic interpretation with the satisfaction of our subjective interests as the criterion. Although the doctrine is qualified by the phrase "in default of positive disproof, the qualification loses any possibility of being meaningful by the further specification that our basic beliefs must stand even in the face of opposing facts. The criteria employed in the field of moral and religious belief are: (1) satisfaction of interests and needs; (2) survival of the fittest among beliefs; (3) the life-energy of beliefs; (4) favorable results; (5) the "living mind." Truth is conceived of as purposive and beneficial, though at the same time as rational and independent.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENTS IN BOWNE'S EPISTEMOLOGY

As a result of our developmental analysis, we are now in a position to distinguish and define the pragmatic elements in Bowne's epistemology as a whole. These may be summarized under the following heads: (1) The Nature of the Mind; (2) The Method of Validating the General Cognitive Postulates of Science and Philosophy; (3) The Methods and Criteria of Moral and Religious Belief; (4) The Function of the Theoretical Reason with Respect to the Interests of the Mind; and (5) The Nature of Truth.

(1) The Nature of the Mind:

Beginning with the publication of Studies in Theism, in 1879, and continuing to the end of his work, Bowne described the mind as an organic whole of vital interests and feelings which outline and control our mental development and determine our fundamental beliefs.

> The mind is not a disinterested logic-machine, but a living organism, with manifold interests and tendencies. These outline its development, and furnish the driving power. [1]

> The driving and directive force of the mind lies in its living interests, and not in the discursive faculty. The principles of mental movement are to be sought, not in logic, but in life. --- There is no department of belief into which subjective interests do not enter as controlling. [2]

As Bowne presented this doctrine of interests and feelings as determinative in the life of the mind, it is clear that he intended simply

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1. Loc. cit., Phil. of Theism, 1887, p. 19.
2. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 660

a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the practical reason; and many of those who have investigated his work, as we observed in the Introduction of the present study, have accepted his statement of intention. Nevertheless, it now appears clear that it is not correct to identify Bowne's doctrine of interests and feelings with the Kantian doctrine of the practical reason.

In the first place, the practical reason for Kant was strictly autonomous. It had its interests, indeed, but its judgments were made in the light of a priori principles, and not because of any interests or feelings. Kant specified of the moral law "dass es nicht darum für uns Gültigkeit hat, weil es interessiert," but rather "dass es interessiert, weil es für uns als Menschen gilt, da es aus unserem Willen als Intelligenz, mithin aus unserem eigentlichen Selbst entsprungen ist."[1] Bowne's doctrine, on the other hand, makes moral and religious beliefs, in so far as determined by the interests and feelings of the mind, heteronomous expressions of reason, rather than autonomous. These basic beliefs and postulates are not the work of autonomous reason, but the result of the controlling influence of interests and feelings; they are products, not conclusions.

In the second place, for Kant the validity of the principles of the practical reason rested in their a priori nature; they were seen by reason to be a priori universal and necessary without respect to experience. There was no emphasis of Kant's that was clearer than that the principles of pure reason cannot be established empirically.

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1. Kant, loc. cit., Vol. III. G.z.M.d.S., p. 91 (Akademie-Ausgabe, pp. 460-461.)

Experience cannot make moral obligation binding upon us; only reason can do that. The primacy of the practical reason meant the validity of the a priori principles of the practical reason, independent of the possibility of their being established by the speculative reason, so long as they do not contradict the speculative reason. Bowne, on the other hand, made the rational validity of interests and feelings depend upon their empirically discoverable generality and necessity in human experience. That this is in direct conflict with Kant's conception is immediately evident. Further, empirically discoverable generality establishes nothing. It is the consensus gentium argument in a slightly altered form; obviously that which is general may be utterly irrational. But further it is to be added that even Bowne himself recognized that the interests and feelings of which he made so much were not strictly general, for he specifically provided a criterion for judging between those persons who do have moral and religious interests and those who do not.

It is clear, therefore, from these considerations that Bowne did not succeed in establishing the identity of feelings and interests, as he defined them, with the Kantian practical reason. But further, it is to be emphasized that Bowne did not establish their rationality in any other way. He did indeed frequently support his affirmation that they are rational by pointing to them as the natural product of the universe of mind. But that this is a circle argument is manifest. To assume a theistic hypothesis in order to validate our religious feelings is a petitio principii indeed. The critical question at issue

is precisely what is the rational validity of these interests and feelings in and of themselves; have we the rational right to accept their claims in building our world-view ? Obviously we have no right to assume a world-view in order to validate them. Bowne gives us, therefore, no basis for distinguishing between those interests and feelings which are rational and those which are not rational, and he fully recognizes that there are irrational interests and feelings.[1] It is true that at one point[2] Bowne does suggest that the objective validity of interests and feelings depends upon their content. But nowhere does Bowne develop this idea; he leaves it as a casual reference, and repeatedly adduces the other considerations which we have noticed. And even in the form in which Bowne has left the idea, the implication is that the content has its validity because it rests in feeling rather than because it is seen to be rational by reason itself.

Both because Bowne does not succeed in establishing the identity of the essential interests and feelings of the mind with the Kantian practical reason and because he fails to establish their rationality in any other way, it must be recognized that the doctrine of interests and feelings as formulated by him is pragmatic rather than rationalistic.[3]

(2) The Method of Validating the General Cognitive Postulates of Science and Philosophy:

According to Bowne's teaching, the fundamental interests of the mind give rise to certain basic postulates without which the mind could

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1. See Thought and Knowledge, 1897, loc.cit., p. 370.
2. See Psychol. Theory, 1886, loc. cit., pp. 206-207.
3. Compare with James' pragmatic formulation: Collected Essays and Reviews, loc. cit., pp. 46, 61.

not proceed in its cognitive activity. The mind, because of its cognitive interest, assumes that the world is intelligible and rational, and because of its moral and religious interests, that it is righteous and spiritual at its root. Now as a part of his methodology in supporting moral and religious beliefs, Bowne affirms that the postulates of science, like moral and religious beliefs, are simply assumptions based upon our subjective needs.[1] But Bowne is confusing here the questions of psychological origin and logical validity. The uniformity and rationality of the external world may indeed rise as postulates because of the cognitive needs of the mind; but the validity of the postulates is found not in the fact that they rise out of subjective needs, but rather in the fact that they permit a logical, consistent, coherent view of experience, whatever their psychological origin. The weakness of Bowne's method here is in designating the cognitive interests of the mind as subjective. Unless the purely rational interest of the mind is objective and universal then it is manifestly absurd to speak of anything as rationally objective. As a consequence, therefore, of describing the cognitive interest, together with the moral and religious interests, as subjective, Bowne uses the purely pragmatic criterion of the satisfaction of subjective needs and interests as sufficient to establish the validity of the cognitive postulates.

(3) The Methods and Criteria of Moral and Religious Belief:

Although Bowne made use of several rationalistic arguments in the field of moral and religious beliefs, the use is never systematic. The

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1. See Studies, 1879, loc.cit., pp. 69,70,72; Independent, 36(Jan. 24, 1884), p. 98; Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 657.

considerations which he repeatedly depends upon are pragmatic. His method is primarily that of the 'will to believe.' "There is an element of faith and volition latent in all our theorizing. Where we cannot prove, we believe. Where we cannot demonstrate, we choose sides."[1] But in the choosing of sides Bowne allowed our subjective interests and feelings to be the determining factor without distinguishing those interests and feelings which are rational from those which are not. And it is in this way that he interprets the 'will to believe' element which we found in Kant.[2] Bowne writes of Kant: "He claimed to have shown that, by way of speculation, neither proof nor disproof is possible; and in this balance of the speculative reason practical interests may be allowed to turn the scale."[3] Bowne's own formulation of the method finally took the following form: "Whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as real, in default of positive disproof."[4] In the phrase "in default of positive disproof" Bowne would seem to be qualifying what would otherwise be a completely pragmatic formulation of method. But because Bowne frequently affirms that positive disproof in the field of ultimate religious beliefs is impossible, which he holds has been established by Kant, this qualifying phrase becomes rather indifferent, and the method is left in purely pragmatic terms. But even accepting the qualifying phrase as meaningful, it is still clear that the positive formulation of the method is pragmatic rather than rationalistic for it makes the criterion of belief the satisfaction of our subjective interests and tendencies. With

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1. Phil. Theism, loc. cit., 1887, p. iii; see also Theism, loc.cit., 1902, p. iv.
2. See Kant, K.d.r.V.,loc.cit., Vol. I, p. 680(Orig. 2nd ed., p. 852); and K.d.p.V., loc.cit.,Vol. II, pp. 182-185 (Akademie-Ausgabe,pp.143-146).
3. Phil. Theism, loc.cit., p. 242.
4. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884),p.652; see also Phil.Theism, 1887, pp. 13, 14, 25; and Theism, 1902, p. 18.

this procedure Bowne affirms that moral and religious beliefs may be admitted as just as valid as the postulates of science and philosophy, because, like them, they satisfy the essential needs and interests of the mind.

That Bowne made this method characteristically pragmatic is further shown by the fact that he did not leave it simply with the qualifying phrase "in default of positive disproof." He repeatedly added that the mind must hold to its fundamental beliefs even in the face of conflicting facts. "Our conviction does not rise or fall with each new fact experienced," he writes, "but only with the intensity of the emotion which produced it."[1] And again, "We do not ignore the facts which make against the view; but we set them aside as things to be explained, yet which must not in any way be allowed to weaken our faith."[2] Now we may agree that faith rationally arrived at does not need to be modified in the light of every new opposing fact of experience; one may wait to see if other facts of counteracting effect will not soon emerge. This is particularly true if the faith rests upon the apprehension of the moral law as rational and absolute, for in this case reason is, for the time being, balancing empirical facts over against an a priori principle. But faith that is grounded on empirical interests and needs could scarcely offset opposing facts except on purely pragmatic grounds. But the pragmatic tone in Bowne's formulation lies chiefly in the defiance it bespeaks to the facts of experience. The rationalist must, after all, recognize that there may be facts in subsequent experience that may change even his faith in the moral government of the world. To insist

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1. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 649.
2. Theism, 1902, loc.cit., p. 23; see also Independ.37(Jan. 8,1885),p.35; and Phil.Theism, 1887, pp. 223-224; and ibid. pp. 21,263.

that opposing facts "must not in any way be allowed to weaken our faith" loads the dice, and it does so on essentially pragmatic grounds. One other element in Bowne's pragmatic methodology that should be mentioned, although it appears only incidentally, is the doctrine that beliefs must be tested in action.[1] Only as we act as though a belief were true can we really test its validity. But action and practice provide the data for belief; they are not themselves the sufficient criteria.[2]

As regards the criteria of belief, Bowne's methodology includes several that are clearly pragmatic. We have already noticed the first, namely, the satisfaction of subjective interests and needs. The second is that of workability or favorable results. As early as 1879 Bowne uses this criterion: "We conclude -- that it is no objection to a belief that its grounds do not admit of satisfactory formal statement, provided always that it works well,"[3] and: "In addition, then, to beliefs deduced from formal data, there are other beliefs which are based on results."[4] And in one of the last articles that Bowne wrote, in 1910, he says of the essential beliefs of the mind:

> They are the principles by which men live, and without which they cannot live their best life. And the proof of such beliefs rests entirely on the energy of the life they express, and on their power to further that life in practice. They meet our mental needs and they work well in life. This is the pragmatic test of truth, and for concrete truth there is no deeper or surer test than this.[5]

We have also noticed that Bowne combined the utilitarian emphasis upon consequences with intuitionism in his ethical theory, but the emphasis as he formulated it is not in itself characteristically pragmatic for

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1. Independ., 48(Apr. 2, 1896), p. 439.
2. For comparison with James' doctrine of the 'will to believe' see James, Collect. Essays and Reviews, pp. 65-66; and The Will to Believe, loc.cit., p. 11.
3. Studies, loc.cit., pp. 64-65.
4. Ibid., p. 75.
5. Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910),p. 892; see also Meth.Quart.Rev., 66(1884) p. 654; Christ. Revelation,1898,p.25; Personalism, 1908, p. 210.

the reason that it presupposes the moral will as the source of moral principles; it does not make consequences an exclusively empirical criterion.[1] But another form in which the criterion of workability or results appears that is clearly pragmatic is the phrase "practical absurdity."[2] Bowne uses it negatively to indicate unfavorable results.[3]

A third pragmatic criterion used by Bowne is that of survival. As between conflicting beliefs and interests, Bowne frequently affirms that "history and the survival of the fittest must decide between them."[4] And speaking of anti-religious views of the world, he writes:

> These views have not been great enough to command the faith or stir the hearts of men. In this fact the survival of the fittest, as the supreme court for considering the matter, hands down a final decision.[5]

Other pragmatic expressions of criteria are these: that the only proof for the fundamental beliefs of mankind is the energy which produces them, and that the only standard of truth is the living mind. The first is expressed by Bowne thus: "The proof of such beliefs rests entirely on the energy of the life they express, and on their power to further that life in practice."[6] The pragmatic, biological character of such a criterion is manifest; if taken seriously it could be used to support any range of divergent and conflicting beliefs. The other criterion is found in the following:

> Academic discussions of the standard of certainty or of the criterion of truth are barren of any valuable result. There is no general standard which the mind can mechanically apply. The standard is the mind itself, dealing with

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1. Ethics, loc.cit., 1892, p. 140.
2. Theism, loc.cit., 1902, p. 25.
3. Compare with James' doctrine: Collect.Essays and Reviews, p. 66.
4. Independ., 42(Oct. 9, 1890), p. 1401.
5. Essence of Relig.,loc.cit.,1910, p.298; see also Meth.Quart.Rev., 66(1884) p. 665; Phil.Theism,1887,p. 32; Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 181; Theism, 1902, pp. 36-37; Meth.Rev., 92(1910), p. 187. Compare with James' doctrine: Collect.Essays and Reviews, pp. 60-61, 65.
6. Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p. 892.

> particular and concrete cases; and any given item of knowledge must stand or fall, not because it agrees or disagrees with some assumed standard, but because of the evidence with which it presents itself to the living mind in contact with the facts. [1]

Experience and the reasonableness of evidence are certainly implied as criteria in this statement, and as such are sound, but to indicate that the standard of truth is the living mind has little of methodological value. It asserts the mind as the ultimate authority, but it gives no standards of distinction by which the living mind can judge the true from the false. Clearly the living mind itself could be claimed as the warrant for almost any world-view.

(4) The Function of the Theoretical Reason with Respect to the Interests of the Mind:

Bowne did not conceive reason simply in instrumental terms; his own systematic metaphysics is evidence enough that he allowed reason certain independent rights of its own. Nevertheless, he held that the function of the theoretical reason with respect to the basic interests and feelings of the mind is essentially instrumental. "For these basal interests, the intellect is simply instrumental." [2] The function of the logical understanding with respect to the postulates which grow out of these interests is "to bring them and their implications out into clear consciousness, and to keep them from losing their way." [3] Again, "The understanding has only the negative function of maintaining consistency and preventing collision with the laws of thought." [4] Bowne did not conceive it to be the positive function of the theoretical reason to establish the religious view of God as the most reason-

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1. Thought and Knowledge, op. cit., 1897, pp. 292-293.
2. Psych. Theory, op.cit., p. 218.
3. Phil. Theism, op.cit., 1887, p. 26.
4. Ibid., p. 262; see also Studies, 1879, p. 69; Thought and Knowledge, 1897, p. 383; Theism, 1902, p. 31.

able explanation of our total experience in view of the facts of moral and religious experience. And that the negative,or instrumental, function was pragmatically conceived is clear as one considers Bowne's real meaning. For example, where belief in a moral God and disbelief in such a God clash, Bowne did not make reason the arbiter, but left the issue to the survival of the fittest. And even where two different ideas of God clash, in which case the theoretical reason is supposed to have the instrumental function of adjusting the differences and clearing away the inconsistencies, the rational validity of the general belief in God still rests in the fact that it satisfies our basic interests . But it is obvious that if the argument from the satisfaction of our basic interests is allowed for the validation of general religious belief, it may just as well be claimed for the validation of any particular idea of God. In other words, if pragmatism becomes the validating principle of belief at any single point, nothing can keep it from being claimed as sufficient as a principle of validation at any, or all, other points. Even the instrumental function of the theoretical reason, therefore, is left to operate in terms of subjective needs.[1]

(5) The Nature of Truth:

Bowne conceived of truth as rational and independent. "The mind does not make, it recognizes, the truth.[2] Yet truth also has its beneficial and fruitful aspects; the truth of any theory may be rationally presumed if its results are favorable to human life. Referring to the criterion of results as used by materialists, Bowne says:

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1. Compare with Dewey's instrumental view of the mind: Studies in Logical Theory, p. 75.

2. Studies, op. cit., 1879, p. 14.

as being made; verification for him was veri-fication.[1] This notion of truth as being made by us does not appear at all in Bowne. It is not correct, therefore, to speak of Bowne's conception of truth as out-and-out pragmatic, but it is clear that his formulation was pragmatic in tone.

This completes our definition of the pragmatic elements in the epistemology of Bowne. They are confined, as we have seen, to Bowne's conception of the nature of the mind, to the validation of the general cognitive postulates, to methodology in the realm of moral and religious belief, to the instrumentality of the mind with respect to the basic interests of the mind, and to a pragmatically toned conception of the nature of truth. But this leaves the entire sphere of logic and mathematics, and that of science and systematic metaphysics, to a strictly rationalistic methodology. The pragmatic elements, therefore, have relevance almost exclusively to the field of moral and religious belief.

The next question to be raised is that of whether these pragmatic elements are to be regarded as casual and incidental, in point of time, or whether they are general and characteristic in the writings of Bowne. As we observed in our review of the work of other investigators in the field of this dissertation, Professor George C. Cell has taken the view that the pragmatism of Bowne increased with the later development of his thought, so that he was much more of a pragmatist at the conclusion of his work than at the beginning. That this is not the case is already clear from our developmental analysis of the thought of

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1. James, Pragmatism, op.cit., p. 201.

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1. James, Pragmatism, op.cit., p. 201.

Bowne. In the Studies in Theism, published in 1879, nearly every element which we have distinguished and defined is clearly expressed: (1) the emphasis upon the determinative character of the interests and feelings of the mind;[1] (2) the validation of our cognitive postulates in terms of the satisfaction of our subjective cognitive interests;[2] (3) the criterion of workability and results;[3] (4) the instrumental function of reason;[4] and (5) the conception of truth as fruitful.[5] And the 'will to believe' method was first stated in the article "The Logic of Religious Belief," published in 1884,[6] and even in its extreme form, namely, that our beliefs must stand even in the face of conflicting facts. The criterion of survival appears for the first time in the same article.[7] The idea of testing beliefs in action[8] did not, it is true, appear until 1896, but its appearance then was only casual; nothing was made of it in the later work of Bowne. It is clear, therefore, that the pragmatic development in the thought of Bowne came almost entirely in the early part of his work; practically every element appearing either in the Studies in Theism in 1879 or in the article "The Logic of Religious Belief" in 1884.

But the opposite question may be asked: is it possible that Bowne developed his pragmatism in the early years of his work and then gradually abandoned it in the later years ? The answer, as is clear from our developmental analysis, is that these pragmatic elements continued in Bowne's epistemology to the end of his work. In the Theism, published in 1902, eight years before his death, and in his article "Gains for

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1. Studies, op.cit., 1879,pp. 65,66,69.
2. Ibid., pp. 69-72.
3. Ibid., pp. 64-65, 75.
4. Ibid., p. 69.
5. Ibid., p. 115.
6. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 652; see also ibid., p. 649.
7. Ibid., p. 665.
8. Independ., 48 (Apr. 2, 1896), p. 439.

Religious Thought in the Last Generation," published in the Hibbert Journal the very year of his death, practically all of the pragmatic elements which we have defined appeared: (1) the emphasis upon the determinative character of interests and feelings;[1] (2) the 'will to believe' method,[2] even in the face of opposing facts;[3] (3) the criterion of workability;[4] (4) the criterion of survival;[5] (5) the instrumentality of reason;[6] (6) the conception of truth as fruitful.[7] The emphasis upon the validation of the cognitive postulates in terms of the satisfaction of our subjective interests does not, indeed, appear in the work of these later years. But with this exception, all of the pragmatic elements which we found in the early years of Bowne's work are to be found likewise in the work of the last eight years of his life. We are justified in stating, therefore, that the pragmatic emphases in Bowne's thought were not casual and incidental, but general and characteristic throughout the realm of moral and religious belief, beginning chiefly in the Studies in Theism in 1879 and continuing to the end of his work in 1910.

The general character and frequency of these pragmatic emphases in Bowne's writings will be further borne out by a listing of the chief books and articles in which they appear. It will be noted that their distribution throughout the period of his creative work, after 1879, is exceedingly uniform:

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1. Theism, op.cit., 1902, p. 22.
2. Ibid., pp. iv, 18.
3. Ibid., p. 23.
4. Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p. 892.
5. Theism, op.cit., pp. 36-37.
6. Ibid., p. 31.
7. Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p. 892.

1879 - Studies in Theism, especially Chapter II, on "Knowledge and Belief."
1884 - "Science Must Go," Independ., 36(Jan. 24), p. 98.
1884 - "The Logic of Religious Belief," Meth. Quart. Rev., v.66, pp. 642-665.
1885 - "Concerning the 'Christian Consciousness,'" Independ., v. 37 (Jan. 8),pp. 35-36.
1887 - Philosophy of Theism, especially the Introduction.
1890 - "Cardinal Newman and Science," Independ., v. 42(Oct.9), pp. 1401-1402.
1895 - "The Foundations of Belief," Zion's Herald, v. 73, p. 274.
1896 - "Faith in Our Immortality," Independ., v. 48, (Apr. 2), p. 439.
1897 - Theory of Thought and Knowledge, especially Chapter V, on "Knowledge and Belief."
1902 - Theism, especially the Introduction.
1904 - "Spencer's Nescience," Independ., v. 56 (Jan. 14), pp. 67,71.
1909 - "Morals and Life," Meth. Rev., v. 91, pp. 708-722.
1910 - "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation," Hibbert Journal, v. 8, pp. 884-893.
1910 - "Present Status of the Conflict of Faith," Meth. Rev., v. 105, pp. 358-369.

That the pragmatic emphases of Bowne were deeply and characteristically rooted in his thinking throughout the entire period of his productive work, after 1879, must now be clear.

With the isolation and definition of so many characteristically pragmatic elements in the thought of Bowne, the question arises as to his general relation to the development of pragmatism as a movement. It is clear that although Bowne consciously employed much of pragmatic methodology, he did not think of himself as a part of the new development as a movement. And this fact is perfectly intelligible in the light of Bowne's conception of methodology in the fields of logic and mathematics on the one hand, and in those of science and systematic metaphysics on the other. In no sense did Bowne carry his pragmatism over into these fields. Logic and mathematics belong, according to his classifica-

tion, to the field of strict knowledge. They are rational truths, and their criteria are immediate self-evidence and inconceivability of their opposites. Science and metaphysics belong to that portion of the field of rational belief which rests upon the objective grounds of sense-perception. The methods of science are observation and experiment, and the criteria are consistency, harmony with the rest of knowledge, and adequacy to explain the facts. The methods of metaphysics are those of inductive inference from the facts of experience, as in the case of the general theistic arguments, and of deductive, critical examination of our basic philosophic concepts, as in the case of systematic metaphysics proper. Consistency, harmony with the rest of knowledge, and adequacy to explain the facts are likewise the criteria here. It is clear, therefore, that Bowne remained a thoroughgoing rationalist in the fields of logic, mathematics, science and metaphysics. Only in the field of moral and religious belief did he depend upon pragmatic methodology. With this limitation upon his use of pragmatic method it is clear why Bowne did not think of himself as an integral part of the pragmatic movement. It explains further why Bowne felt critical of certain features of pragmatism. In his article "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation," after describing certain characteristic emphases of pragmatism, Bowne says: "This is the doctrine of pragmatism, which needs, indeed, some guarding lest it deny intellect its full rights, but nevertheless it expresses an important truth."[1] This sentence epitomizes well Bowne's entire attitude toward the pragmatic movement. Its emphasis upon the controlling character

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1. Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p. 892.

of the interests and feelings of the mind, its use of pragmatic methods in support of moral and religious belief, its conception of the intellect as instrumental with respect to the interests and feelings of the mind, its conception of truth as fruitful - all of this Bowne accepted; but he rejected outright its denial of rationalistic method in the field of logic and mathematics and metaphysics. Here, Bowne affirmed, the intellect has rights of its own.

Bowne was further critical of pragmatism as a movement in so far as its leaders presumed to be teaching a doctrine that was new, for he accepted it simply as a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason. In a letter which Bowne wrote to Professor Knudson, January 18, 1905, he says:

> Schiller's Humanism, Dewey's Pragmatism, and James' Will to Believe are all one-sided but useful. I find nothing in them beyond what you suggest - reaction against an overdone intellectualism. Schiller's fancy that he has anything new is certainly naive. At best, it is only a specification of Kant's Primacy of the Practical Reason. However, it is in vogue just now, and we must understand it. You will find Dewey's utterances in a book on Logical Theory published some two years ago. On the other hand, Bradley is just as one-sided. The truth lies between them. The fact is in this matter, whichever one has the last word wins the day. Bradley's criticism of Schiller is capital and the retorts of Schiller are excellent. 1

It is clear that Bowne did not regard himself as one of the movement. Rather he stood aloof, taking whatever he regarded as valid, and leaving the rest, and in the taking, feeling no indebtedness to the pragmatists as such for the reason that he regarded their doctrine

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1. Quoted from: Borden Parker Bowne, by Francis John McConnell, (N.Y.: Abingdon Press, 1929), p. 149.

as simply a specification of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason.

Yet in spite of this critical attitude toward pragmatism as a movement and his feeling that it represented nothing original, Bowne does express definite approval of its general work at several points. In Personalism, for example, he writes approvingly:

> And just now the pragmatists, distantly echoing Kant's doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, are pointing out what sorry stuff the traditional philosophy is. [1]

And criticizing the excesses and confusions of traditional philosophy himself, Bowne continues:

> It is equally clear from a survey of conditions that philosophers themselves need to bring forth fruits meet for repentance, if their science is to receive general respect. Some improvement in this direction may be hoped for from the pragmatists' criticism. We need to pay more attention to first principles and to practical bearing and outcome. [2]

It is clear from both these passages that Bowne approved the general work of pragmatism, although he himself did not regard himself as one of them. He judged as an outsider.

Again, speaking of the traditional tendency to abstraction in the field of ethical theory, Bowne writes, in 1909,

> One of the good signs of the times is a reaction against this tendency. We are now testing these abstractions more carefully, and inquiring into their practical value and concrete significance. Pragmatism is becoming the order of the day. Ethical science also is sharing in this tendency, to its great enrichment. [3]

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1. Personal., op.cit., 1908, p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 13.
3. Meth. Rev., 91(1909), p. 708.

Perhaps the most extreme statement of approval with respect to the emphases of pragmatism, and one that is especially difficult to reconcile with the rationalistic side of Bowne's thought, is the following, in which Bowne is again interpreting pragmatism in terms of the Kantian doctrine:

> We have become so used to recognizing the practical and volitional basis of most of our beliefs that no one would be at present disturbed by anything that Kant has said. Thought has become pragmatic, especially in ethical and religious fields, and we are very little concerned at speculative inadequacy, provided a doctrine works well in practice and enriches and furthers life. [1]

The emphasis here "especially in ethical and religious fields" is significant in showing that Bowne consciously and openly accepted pragmatic methodology in the field of moral and religious belief. His own estimate of the use of pragmatic methodology, therefore, coincides with what we have found to be true in our examination of his epistemology.

It is now clear to what extent the terms rationalism and pragmatism are applicable to the thought of Bowne. In his acceptance of the trustworthiness of reason and of the rationality of the real, in his conception of the mind as creative in its cognitive activity, in his definition of logic and mathematics as strictly rational truths which are valid independently of experience, in his use of the deductive method in systematic metaphysics in the critical examination of our basic philosophic concepts, and in the acceptance of the criteria of consistency, harmony with the rest of knowledge, and adequacy to explain the facts, Bowne was completely and thoroughly rationalistic. Even the empirical tendency, which is fairly strong in his work from

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1. Kant and Spencer, op.cit., pp. 208-209.

the beginning, is rationalistically rather than empiricistically interpreted. On the other hand, in his description of the mind as an organic unity of vital interests which outline and control basic beliefs, in his doctrine of the instrumentality of the theoretical reason with respect to these interests, in his validation of the cognitive postulates in terms of interest-satisfaction, in his acceptance of the 'will to believe' method in the field of moral and religious belief, and in his use of the criteria of interest-satisfaction, workability and favorable results, and survival value, Bowne was characteristically pragmatistic. His doctrine of truth, though fundamentally rationalistic, was pragmatically toned.

It must be recognized, therefore, that Bowne employed both rationalistic and pragmatic methodologies. For him the field of thought was fundamentally divided between that portion which rested upon objective grounds and that portion which rested on subjective grounds. And this reflected an essential dualism in Bowne's view of the mind, for it set interests and feelings over against the theoretical reason, life over against logic. With feelings and interests defined as determinative in the field of belief, clearly those beliefs could not be the expression of autonomous reason. Bowne attempted to harmonize the two sides of the mind-life by making the theoretical reason instrumental with respect to the practical, as we have observed. But if interests and feelings are determinants of beliefs even in their general form, then theoretical reason cannot be autonomous with respect to them, although it is left supreme in the realms of logic and mathematics, science and metaphysics. We have, therefore, a division of the cognitive field between

the theoretical and the practical, between freedom and determinism, between rationalistic methodology and pragmatistic. In case of conflict between the two, as might well happen between a metaphysical view and a religious belief, the practical must be given the supremacy, for opposing facts or theories must not be allowed to destroy faith; they must he held as simply not yet understood. The conflict,which may exist so long as reflective reason is allowed to assert itself, is only resolved by giving supremacy to the basic interests and feelings which have not only not been established as identical to the Kantian practical reason but have not been established as rational in any other way. The conclusion is evident: Bowne used two distinct types of methodology which he did not succeed in harmonizing.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOURCES OF THE PRAGMATIC ELEMENTS IN BOWNE'S EPISTEMOLOGY

Bowne made no claim to originality in his pragmatic defense of moral and religious belief. If we were to accept his own judgment of indebtedness, however, we should rest in the idea that his methodology in this field was simply and entirely a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason. In his first presentation of a completely pragmatic defense of religious belief in the chapter on "Knowledge and Belief" in the Studies in Theism, Bowne implies directly the similarity of his doctrine with that of Kant: "It is not without ground, therefore, that Kant insisted upon the primacy of the practical reason, and the subordinate character of the speculative."[1] And in his article "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation," published in 1910, Bowne says, in speaking of the view which allows the fundamental needs and interests of the mind their place in determining belief, "The view has not been unknown in philosophic circles since Kant set forth the primacy of the practical reason, but it has been more extensively and emphatically taught in recent years."[2] It seems clear, however, that there other influences than that of direct familiarity with Kant at work in the early development of the pragmatic side of Bowne's thought. Our purpose here is to distinguish any such other possible influences.

In an attempt to trace the sources of the pragmatic elements in the epistemology of Bowne, it is important to bear in mind the general thought

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1. Studies, op.cit., 1879, p. 74.
2. Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), p. 892.

milieu in which his first critical work was done. Bowne's undergraduate studies at New York University were done during the period from 1867 to 1871, and his first published articles began to appear the following year. From September, 1873,[1] to the fall of 1874,[2] he carried on graduate studies in Germany, chiefly at Halle and Göttingen. Bowne was beginning his critical work, therefore, in the early seventies. In the thought-life of the western world at that time there were at least three major trends having direct relevance to the early development of pragmatism. These were: (1) the doctrine of evolution, with its biological emphases of adaptation and survival; (2) empirical psychology, with its emphasis upon feelings and interests in the life of the mind; and (3) utilitarianism in ethical theory with its emphasis upon consequences as the moral criterion. All of these trends had their first, and except for empirical psychology, their most important, development in Great Britain. These were trends with which Bowne must have come in contact both during his undergraduate days in New York University and during his studies of English writings in the years that followed. It is significant to note that their character was distinctly empirical and practical. Bowne's work in Germany, on the other hand, carried on chiefly under Ulrici and Lotze, brought him into close and sympathetic touch with the traditional metaphysical and speculative emphases of German thought. This very play of two widely different types of emphasis, the English and the German, the empirical and practical and the speculative and metaphysical, may well be reflected in the parallel develop-

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1. This date is clear from a letter of Bowne to his Mother written during the ocean passage to Europe, and dated Sept. 5, 1873. See McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, op.cit., p. 32.
2. I have found no evidence of the exact date of the return from Europe, although it was some time before the end of the year, 1874, inasmuch as he assumed his duties on the editorial staff of the Independent at the beginning of the year 1875.

ment of the pragmatic and the rationalistic sides of Bowne's thought. It is not, of course, true that the German influence was lacking in a practical and empirical emphasis; but it is true that that emphasis, wherever it appeared in philosophical circles, tended to be subordinate to the logical and speculative. Such, then, was the general thought background of Bowne's early work: the empirical, practical trends of British philosophy, and the primarily metaphysical, speculative emphases of German philosophy.

In our developmental analysis of Bowne's thought, we found no out-and-out pragmatism in the first period of his work, that is, from 1872 to 1878. There is no evidence that Bowne's teacher of philosophy at New York University, Professor Benjamin N. Martin, had exerted any influence on his thought that could be regarded as characteristically pragmatic. He was a man of religious interests, and Bowne dedicated his first book, The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, to him as "one of those rare souls who knew how to combine faith and freedom." His influence on Bowne was chiefly in the field of metaphysics rather than in methodology. But either under the teaching of Professor Martin, or very soon after finishing his work at New York University, Bowne made his acquaintance with utilitarianism, as evidenced by his article "Moral Intuition vs. Utilitarianism," published in April, 1873. He states as his purpose in this article the synthesizing of the utilitarian emphasis upon consequences and the intuitionist emphasis upon an a priori moral faculty. That his understanding of the utilitarian emphasis came from John Stuart Mill, whose essay on "Utilitarianism" was published in 1863, may be assumed from his references to Mill and to his doctrine. He says, for example, "The best that can be

said for utilitarianism as a complete system, has been said by Mr. Mill."[1] And again,

> We believe with the utilitarian that consequences are the only test of abstract action; but when he applies this canon to motives, he argues in a circle.[2]

According to Bowne's ethical formulation, conscience as the a priori faculty furnishes the principles of judgment, and reason applies the principle with consequences as the criterion. Bowne is thus assimilating to his own moral theory the utilitarian emphasis upon consequences as criterion, although in no way whatever did he make any epistemological use of the emphasis in the first period of his work. And even in his moral theory he kept the doctrine from being pragmatic by holding to a moral faculty of a priori principles. But though Bowne's use of the utilitarian doctrine was not directly pragmatic, we may certainly indicate the writings of John Stuart Mill as an influence closely akin, at least, to other more definitely pragmatic influences that were to follow.

The chief critical occupation of Bowne in the first period of his work was with Spencer, Ulrici, and Lotze. His attitude toward Spencer was almost entirely a negative one. His early essays in The New Englander, which were reproduced in book-form in The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, were severe in their criticism both of Spencer's logic and of his conclusions. Nevertheless, it is clear that Bowne made one of his first contacts with evolutionary doctrines in Spencer's work. As a consequence of that contact, at least two ideas that came later to fit into his pragmatic methodology became familiar to him, namely, the idea of our beliefs

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1. New Englander, 32 (1873) p. 231.
2. Ibid., p. 234.

as themselves an evolutionary product and the idea of the survival of the fittest as an explanatory principle of evolution. The idea of belief as a cosmic product is clearly suggested in Spencer's First Principles, which Bowne reviewed in The New Englander in January, 1872. Spencer writes:

> He (man), with all his capacities, and aspirations, and beliefs, is not an accident, but a product of the time. --- He, like every other man, may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause; and when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief. --- Not as adventitious therefore will the wise man regard the faith which is in him. [1]

The similarity of Bowne's statement of the same idea is evident. In the Studies in Theism, he writes:

> We do hold that a general belief renders a corresponding reality highly probable, even when no sufficient formal defense is possible. Such a belief represents the total outcome of a race-experience, the impression which the universe has made upon us. --- It is the way in which reality manifests itself in us. Our feelings are the subjective side of the universe. Upon this point we are in full accord with the evolutionist. [2]

And again, speaking of "the basal catholic beliefs of humanity," Bowne writes:

> They show the direction of the evolving movement, the trend of the universe of mind. They are no longer accidents or whims of the individual, but are as much entitled to be viewed as belonging to the nature of things as the law of gravitation itself. [3]

Not only is Bowne's statement of the idea closely similar to that of Spencer, but he definitely speaks of his view as "in full accord with

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1. Spencer, Herbert, First Principles of a New System of Philosophy, (N.Y.: Appleton & Co., 1864) p. 123.
2. Studies, op.cit., 1879, pp. 76-78.
3. Thought and Knowledge, op.cit., 1897, p. 377.

the evolutionist," and the one evolutionist whom Bowne knew well in the early period of his work was Herbert Spencer. That we may think of this as a definite mark of influence would seem, therefore, to be reasonably clear. The second idea with which Bowne must have become familiar in the reading of Spencer is that of the survival of the fittest. This idea was not, however, present in Spencer's first edition of the Principles of Psychology, published in 1855. As a formulated doctrine it appeared first in Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859. But in the second edition of Spencer's Principles of Psychology, which Bowne reviewed in The New Englander in 1873, Spencer does refer to the survival of the fittest as "a co-operating cause" in the evolutionary process.[1] It is possible, of course, that Bowne may have read Darwin before reading this second edition of Spencer's work; but we know that he read Spencer's work and there is no indication in his writings that he had already read Darwin's. At least it is clear that the idea must have been familiar to him in the reading of Spencer whether he had read Darwin previously or not. However, the pragmatic significance of the idea of survival of the fittest lay in its epistemological application as a criterion of belief, and Spencer did not so use it in his Psychology. And because the pragmatic use of survival as a criterion of belief does not appear in Bowne until 1880 ("A New Aspect of Natural Selection," Independent , 32, July 22,1880, pp.2-3) and 1884 ("The Logic of Religious Belief," Methodist Quarterly Review, 66, Oct. 1884, p. 665), another source for it is made probable.

We indicated that Bowne's chief critical occupation during the first period of his work was with Spencer, Ulrici and Lotze. His contact with Ulrici and Lotze was in a teacher-student relationship. He studied

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1. Spencer, Herbert, The Principles of Psychology, (N.Y.: Appleton & Co., 1888) Vol. I, footnote, p. 423; see also Vol. I, pp. 615-616.

under Ulrici at Halle during the winter-semester of 1873-1874.[1] Ulrici's influence on Bowne's general theory of thought and knowledge was definitive, as Bowne himself recognized.[2] His insistence that the mind must be studied as we find it in our experience and not simply a priori and his description of mind-activity as a differentiating activity became permanent elements in Bowne's system of thought. Neverthless, there seems to have been no pragmatic emphasis in Ulrici's teaching, so that Ulrici is not to be indicated as a source for this side of Bowne's thought.

Bowne studied under Lotze at Göttingen during the summer-semester of 1874. Although Lotze's influence on Bowne was almost exclusively a speculative one, for Bowne's whole procedure in metaphysics followed closely that of Lotze, there were certain emphases in his thought which indicate a genuine practical interest. He stressed in his teaching that philosophy must keep close to the facts of life and experience, and he held that "reality is infinitely richer than thought."[3] The closeness to this statement of that of Bowne's - "Life is richer and deeper than speculation"[4] - is evident. Further, in Lotze's interest in the moral and religious life the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason found new expression. Lotze's interpretation of the doctrine was, however, strictly rationalistic. He closes the second edition of his Metaphysics with the well-known passage:

> When, now several decades since, I ventured on a still more imperfect attempt, I closed it with the dictum that the true beginning of Metaphysics lies in Ethics. I admit that the expression is not exact, but I still feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek in that which should be the ground of that which is.[5]

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1. This date is confirmed by the notation at the end of Bowne's article "Faith and Morals," Independ., 26(May 14,1874),p.3, which reads: Halle,Prussia, Feb. 15, 1874.
2. See Bowne's article: "Ulrici's Logic," New England., 33 (1874), pp. 458-492; and Metaphysics, op.cit., 1882, p. 367.
3. Lotze, Hermann, Metaphysic, trans. by T.H.Green, B.Bosanquet, C.A. Wittuck, A.C.Bradley, (Oxford Press, 1887), Vol. I, p. 178.
4. Phil. Theism, op.cit., 1887, p. 14; see also Theism, 1902, p. 18.
5. Lotze, Metaphysic, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 319.

We have seen that this ethical emphasis was taken up by Bowne and occasionally given rationalistic expression. In general, however, his use of the moral argument was pragmatic, rather than rationalistic. Although there are clearly marked influences of Lotze on the thought of Bowne, therefore, they can scarcely be regarded as pragmatic.

During the first period of Bowne's work as we have designated it, that is, from 1872 through 1878, Bowne wrote at least twenty-three signed articles, in addition to several unsigned editorials in the Independent during 1875, and published his first volume: The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. It is conspicuously true that no characteristically pragmatic elements appear in Bowne's methodology in these first years. We have noticed, indeed, that Bowne borrowed the doctrine of consequences from utilitarianism in the formulation of his own ethical theory, but this was kept from being pragmatic by its synthesis with the doctrine of an a priori moral faculty, and further, it was at no point carried over into methodology in the field of knowledge and belief. With characteristically pragmatic elements in methodology lacking entirely in the first six years of Bowne's work, it is striking indeed that with the appearance of the Studies in Theism, in 1879, he should suddenly adopt an out-and-out pragmatic methodology in the field of religious belief. If the Studies in Theism represented Bowne's first treatment of religious belief it might be supposed that the pragmatic methodology was simply incidental to that first treatment, and that had he treated religious belief earlier the pragmatic methodology would have appeared earlier. That this was not the case,

however, is shown by the fact that as early as 1872 Bowne began writing on religious questions. In that year his article "Aspects of Theism" appeared in The New Englander. Likewise, it is perfectly evident that the chief motivating force in Bowne's criticism of Spencer was his interest in a spiritual view of the universe and his feeling that the philosophy of Spencer was destructive of religious belief. The Studies in Theism, therefore, does not represent either Bowne's first interest in, or his first treatment of, religious belief. The sudden appearance of pragmatic methodology in the Studies in Theism must, therefore, be accounted for on some other basis.

The Preface to the Studies in Theism is dated May 5, 1879. Nearly a year and a half earlier, namely, in January, 1878, an article by William James under the title "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence" appeared in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. We gave attention to this article in our survey of pragmatism in Chapter One, where we noticed that practically all of James' later doctrine of pragmatism is here expressed, either explicitly or in the germ. That Bowne was familiar with this article is clear from his own specific reference to it, which occurs as a footnote on page 66 of the Studies in Theism. Bowne is discussing the determinative character of interests and feelings in the life of the mind. The footnote reference follows the sentence, "It is demonstrable that our sentiments outline and control all mental development," and reads: "This point has been very happily put by Dr. James in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, for January and July, 1878."

Not only do we thus know that Bowne had read the January article of James; we are further confronted with a striking parallelism of the pragmatic emphases in Bowne's chapter on "Knowledge and Belief" in the Studies in Theism and in the article by James. It will be instructive to make something of a detailed comparison of Bowne's use of method and his description of the nature of the mind with these same elements in James' treatment. In the first place, Bowne is emphasizing for the first time, in this chapter, the nature of the mind as a vital unity of interests and the determinative character of these interests in mental development. Bowne writes:

> When the human mind comes to self-consciousness, it becomes aware of many interests. There are practical, speculative, esthetic, and moral interests. These are the motive-powers of the mind, and outline its development. [1]
> The whole mental life --- springs out of feeling. It is extremely doubtful if a purely perceptive being, without any subjective interests, could attain to rationality, even if its physical existence were secured. Indeed, it is demonstrable that our sentiments outline and control all mental development. Before mental growth can begin, there must be an awakened interest. [2]
> We conclude --- that all general theories of life and the world are based on subjective interests. [3]

Now if we may compare with these statements of Bowne sections from the article written by James sixteen months before:

> 'Mind,' as we actually find it, contains all sorts of laws - those of logic, of fancy, of wit, of taste, decorum, beauty, morals, and so forth, as well as perception of fact. Common sense estimates mental excellence by a combination of all of these standards, and yet how few of them correspond to anything that actually is - they are laws of the Ideal, dictated by subjective interests pure and simple. [4]
> We are all fated to be a priori teleologists whether we will or not. Interests which we bring with us, and simply

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1. Studies, op.cit., 1879, p. 69.
2. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
3. Ibid., p. 75.
4. Collected Essays and Reviews, op.cit., p. 46.

> posit or take our stand upon, are the very flour out of which our mental dough is kneaded. [1]
> Interests are the real a priori element in cognition. --- The interests precede the outer relations noticed, --- (before these outer relations can be altered, something must first) awaken an interest. [2]

In the second place, Bowne makes use for the first time, in this chapter, of the criterion of workability. The following sentences are taken from the chapter:

> We conclude -- that it is no objection to a belief that its grounds do not admit of satisfactory formal statement, provided always that it works well. [3]
> We conclude --- that all general theories of life and the world are based on subjective interests, and that the only questions which can be raised are, which of these interests should rule, and which works best as a ruler. [4]
> Those views, therefore, of man and his relations which must develop and dignify human nature, and which work best in practice, are at least presumptively true. --- In addition, then, to beliefs deduced from formal data, there are other beliefs which are based on results. Such beliefs have not the support of formal proof, but they have what is better, the attestation of reality. [5]

Parallel to these statements of Bowne are the following taken from the article by James:

> ---our several individual hypotheses, convictions, and beliefs. Far from being vouched for by the past, these are verified only by the future.--- They have to keep house together, and the weakest goes to the wall. The survivors constitute the right way of thinking. [6]
> How shall I say that knowing fact with Messrs. Huxley and clifford is a better use to put my mind to than feeling good with Messrs. Moody and Sankey, unless by slowly and painfully finding out that in the long run it works best? [7]

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1. Collected Essays and Reviews, op.cit., p. 61.
2. Ibid., p. 50, footnote.
3. Studies, op.cit., pp. 64-65.
4. Ibid., p. 75.
5. Ibid., p. 75.
6. Collected Essays and Reviews, op.cit., p. 65.
7. Ibid., p. 66.

The criterion of survival suggested in these last citations from James was not explicitly used by Bowne in Studies in Theism, although it made its appearance in the article "The Logic of Religious Belief" published five years later.

Another close similarity between Bowne's treatment and that of James is to be found in the notion of coerciveness as a criterion of reality. It is an idea that Bowne does not make use of in subsequent writings, at least in this form, but it is worth noting here because of its striking closeness to the idea as presented in James' article. Bowne writes:

> The final test of reality in perception is, that it compels and coerces our sensations. --- If, then, there is any other element in the totality of our experience which equally coerces our belief, and which, when denied, invariably comes back, then there is the best ground for saying that in such experience, as well as in sense-perception, we come in contact with something not ourselves. [1]

James' putting of the same idea sixteen months before is as follows:

> The only objective criterion of reality is coerciveness, in the long run, over thought. Objective facts --- are real only because they coerce sensation. Any interest which should be coercive on the same massive scale would be eodem jure real. [2]

Because, therefore, Bowne had not made use of pragmatic methods before the writing of the Studies in Theism, and because the treatment which he gives to them and to the pragmatic conception of the nature of mind as a unity of interests follows so closely the treatment given by James to the same topics sixteen months before, it would seem highly probable that Bowne is directly indebted to James for these emphases. The matter is complicated, however, by Bowne's

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1. Studies, op.cit., p. 79.
2. Collected Essays and Reviews, op.cit., p. 67.

failure to acknowledge indebtedness to James in the Preface to the Studies in Theism, where he does acknowledge indebtedness to Ulrici and Lotze,[1] and by the fact that Bowne is reported by at least one of his students, namely, Bishop Francis John McConnell,[2] as stating that he was conscious of no indebtedness to James. It is possible, of course, that Bowne and James had happened to read independently a common source for these pragmatic elements and that each worked them into his own writing independently of the other. But there seems to be no indication of any work that could have been a common source to both writers of all of these common elements. As we indicated at the opening of the present chapter, empirical psychology had already begun, by the early seventies, to stress the importance of feelings and interests in the life of the mind. Indeed, even as early as 1822, Thomas Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind devoted a chapter to the controlling influence of feeling in the mental life, particularly in the association of ideas.[3] And Bowne shows that he was familiar with the work of Brown by referring, in an article published in The New Englander in 1872, to Brown's causal argument for theism.[4] There is nothing in Bowne's writings to indicate, however, that he was familiar with Brown's thirty-fifth lecture, in which the emphasis upon feelings is made; or if he had been, it is strange that he should wait for seven years before making use of the idea. But even if Bowne had been familiar with Brown's thirty-fifth lecture, it could not be the common source for James and Bowne for

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1. Studies, op.cit., p. vi.
2. This item was given to me by Professor Edgar S. Brightman.
3. Brown, Thomas, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, (Andover: Mark Newman, 1822, 3 volumes) Chp. 35, Vol.II.
4. New Englander, 31(1872) p. 467.

which we are looking, for (1) its doctrine of feelings is not developed in the form in which we find it in both James and Bowne; (2) it makes no suggestion of the criterion of workability which we find in both James and Bowne, and (3) it makes no use of the criterion of coerciveness of experience which we likewise find in both James and Bowne.

In 1865, Shadworth Hodgson published his Time and Space, in which he devotes a chapter (Chapter 5) to the subject of the determinative character of feelings and interests in the processes of association and redintegration. James refers to this chapter of Hodgson in his article in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy,[1] but there is nothing to indicate that Bowne was familiar with it. But even had he been familiar with it, it would not provide a common source of the elements which we have found in common in James and Bowne for the same reasons which we have specified in the case of the work of Thomas Brown. Likewise Wilhelm Windelband, in his essay "Über Denken und Nachdenken," published in 1878 in the Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, stresses the determinative character of feelings and interests in the life of the mind.[2] It is possible, of course, that Bowne had read this article in the Vierteljahresschrift, although he gives no indication of it. But in any case the article could not have been a common source for James and Bowne, for it was published after the appearance of James' article;[3] furthermore it makes no use of the criteria of workability and coerciveness and hence could not explain the presence of these elements in Bowne's Studies in Theism. Again, had Bowne read the article it is likely that he would have referred to

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1. Collected Essays and Reviews, op.cit., p. 57.
2. This essay by Windelband was called to my attention by Mr. Arthur A. Schoolcraft.
3. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 2 (1878), pp. 265-297; reprinted in Präludien, (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr, 1921), pp. 24-58.

it in the same way in which he referred to the article by James. Finally, it must be indicated that James gave the credit for his pragmatism to early personal contacts with Charles Sanders Peirce. In his essay "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" (1898) he gave specific credit to Peirce. Speaking of the pragmatic approach to the problem of truth, James states: "Years ago this direction was given to me by an American philosopher --- Mr. Charles S. Peirce, --- the principle of practicalism - or pragmatism, as he called it, when I first heard him enunciate it at Cambridge in the early '70's."[1] Now there is no indication whatever that Bowne had any contacts with, or that he was acquainted with the works of, Peirce.

With these facts before us, it seems very likely that Bowne was actually influenced directly by the article of James in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, in spite of any reported statement that he was not conscious of any such indebtedness. Such an attitude on Bowne's part is probably to be explained on the ground that he regarded the elements found in James' article simply as a restatement of Kant's doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, so that he thought of his indebtedness in relation to Kant rather than in relation to James. But that such would not be a correct interpretation of Kant we have already seen as a result of our previous investigations. It seems clear, therefore, that James was almost certainly responsible for opening up the pragmatic interest in the work of Bowne. Bowne was no doubt ready for the emphasis. His understanding of Kant, the utilitarian emphasis upon consequences as an ethical criterion, the growing interest in the doc-

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1. James, Collected Essays and Reviews, op.cit., p. 410.

trine of evolution, and the development of empirical psychology - all of these may well have had their part in preparing Bowne for laying hold on pragmatic methods in his own philosophy, but the reading of the articles by James would seem to have been the final, direct and decisive influence. With this point we have also made clear that Bowne's pragmatism did not have priority in time over that of James as Professors Coe and Flewelling and Bishop McConnell have all stated in their writings on Bowne.[1]

A final word remains to be said concerning the relation of Bowne to Kant. We have seen that he thought of his methodology in religious belief as simply a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, but we have also seen that such would involve an erroneous interpretation of Kant. Nevertheless it seems clear that Bowne's statement of method as he first made it in the article "The Logic of Religious Belief," in 1884 was directly influenced by Kant. Bowne's statement, as we have seen, is this: "Whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof."[2] In the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, Kant was defending the independent validity of the moral law as an a priori principle of pure practical reason. As such an a priori principle, any propositions inseparably connected with it, as Kant believed the postulates of freedom, God, and immortality to be, though not capable of being established by theoretical reason, may be regarded as sufficiently authenticated, provided they do not contradict theoretical reason ("indessen dass sie

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1. See references to the work of these investigators in the Introduction of the present study.
2. Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884), p. 652.

ihr auch eben nicht widersprechen"[1]). Accepting the demands of the practical reason, or,as Bowne taught, the demands of our subjective interests, seemed pefectly permissible "in default of positive disproof," that is,"provided they do not contradict theoretical reason." The similarity of the two formulations is evident. It is possible, further, that Bowne was impressed by Kant's use of the term 'interests,' although he ignored completely the rationalistic qualifications which Kant made and taught the doctrine as James had begun to teach it. At no point, however, did Bowne distinguish in detail pragmatic suggestions to be found in Kant; his references were always to the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason. It is not likely, therefore, that Bowne was directly influenced by any of the various elements which we distinguished in Kant as being susceptible of pragmatic interpretation[2] beyond the statement of method which we have already indicated. But it would seem clear that we may accept Bowne's statement of indebtedness to Kant for at least the suggestiveness of the doctrine of the practical reason, although we must recognize that what was strictly rationalistic with Kant became characteristically pragmatic with Bowne. This, then, completes our study of the sources of the pragmatic elements in Bowne's epistemology.

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1. Kant, op.cit., Vol.II, K.d.p.V., p. 155 (Akademie-Ausgabe, p. 121).

2. See Chapter One for study of Kant.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of our investigation may be summarized as follows:

I. Bowne was a rationalist in his acceptance of the trustworthiness of reason and of the rationality of the real, in his conception of the mind as creative in its cognitive activity, in his definition of logic and mathematics as strictly rational truths which are valid independently of experience, in his use of the deductive method in the critical examination of concepts in metaphysics, and in the acceptance of the criteria of consistency, harmony with the rest of knowledge, and adequacy to explain the facts.

II. Bowne was a pragmatist in his use of the following characteristically pragmatic elements: (1) the description of the mind as an organic whole of vital interests and feelings which outline and control mental development and determine our fundamental beliefs; (2) the validation of the general cognitive postulates in terms of the satisfaction of our subjective interests; (3) the use of the 'will to believe' method in the field of moral and religious belief with the criterion of interest-satisfaction extended to apply, in the case of fundamental beliefs, even where facts stand opposed; (4) the use of the criteria of interest-satisfaction, workability, survival, and vital energy, together with the general criterion of the "living mind"; (5) the conception of the function of the theoretical reason with respect to the interests of the mind as merely instrumental; (6) the conception of truth as beneficial and fruitful, although indeed also rational and independent.

III. The occurrence of these pragmatic elements is not incidental or casual, but general and characteristic, in Bowne's treatment of moral and religious belief, beginning in 1879 in Studies in Theism and in 1884 in the article "The Logic of Religious Belief," and continuing uniformly through the whole of Bowne's work. It is not true that Bowne's pragmatism was chiefly a development of the later years of his work, nor is it true that it was an early development that tended later to be outworn; rather it is a constant and characteristic part of his epistemology from 1879 to the end of his work in 1910.

IV. Although Bowne intended to identify his doctrine of the determinative character of the interests and feelings of the mind with the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, he failed to establish that identity, for : (1) Kant viewed the practical reason as autonomous, not as determined by interests and feelings; and (2) Kant made the validity of the principles of practical reason lie in their a priori character as universal and necessary, not in their empirically discoverable generality in human experience.

V. Not only did Bowne fail to establish the identity of the interests and feelings, as he defined them, with the Kantian practical reason, but he failed to establish their rationality on any other ground. He frequently adduced in support of their rationality that they are to be regarded as the natural product of the universe of mind, but this is a petitio principii and establishes nothing.

VI. Bowne's use of two distinct types of methodology was a consequence of his distinguishing between the grounds of belief in science and phil-

osophy as objective and those of moral and religious belief as subjective, and of his setting the interests and feelings of the mind as subjective and determining over against the intellect as objective and free. He resolved the conflict between the two only by giving supremacy to the practical interests, the fundamental beliefs of which must be allowed to stand even in the face of opposing facts.

VII. Bowne did not identify himself with pragmatism as a movement, for, although agreeing with the characteristic emphases of pragmatism in the field of moral and religious belief, he rejected the pragmatic denial of the rationalistic method in the fields of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics. He was further critical of the movement in so far as it presumed to be anything new in the world of philosophy, for he regarded the doctrine as simply a restatement of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason. Nevertheless, he wrote approvingly of the general work of the movement, but he always judged as an outsider, never as one within the ranks.

VIII. Bowne showed interest in religious writing from the first, but he made no use of pragmatic methodology until 1879 in the Studies in Theism. Although Bowne was prepared for the pragmatic emphasis by his understanding of Kant, by his acceptance of the utilitarian criterion of consequences (which he received from J. S. Mill) as synthesized with the intuitionist view of an a priori moral faculty in his ethical theory, by his contact with the doctrine of evolution in the writings of Herbert Spencer, which seems clearly to have been the source of his idea of belief as a natural product, and by his possible familiarity with the attention of empirical

psychology to the controlling character of interests and feelings in the life of the mind, it seems probable that the immediate, direct, and decisive influence toward a pragmatic methodology was the reading of James' article in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy for January, 1878, to which Bowne specifically refers and with which his own treatment of interests and beliefs in Studies in Theism is strikingly parallel. Among his teachers, Professor Martin seems to have had no influence upon his thought that could be regarded as characteristically pragmatic. Ulrici, although influencing Bowne's general epistemology definitively, seems also to have exerted no pragmatic influence. Lotze, influencing Bowne chiefly in the field of metaphysics, did have certain practical emphases in his teaching, and was undoubtedly the source of Bowne's "Life is deeper than speculation"; nevertheless, Lotze's general influence was decidely rationalistic rather than pragmatic. The suggestion for his statement of the 'will to believe' method Bowne quite evidently got from Kant's treatment of the primacy of the practical reason, but Bowne's interpretation of the Kantian doctrine was pragmatic rather than rationalistic as Kant certainly intended it.

SUMMARY

The problem to which the present study has been devoted is one that emerged in the conflict of various interpretations that have been given to the epistemology of Bowne. That Bowne employed both rationalistic and pragmatic methodologies was clear. The problem concerned their relation in his thought. As explicitly formulated at the outset of the study the problem was stated thus: precisely what are the pragmatic elements in the epistemology of Bowne; how are they related to the theoretical function of reason; from what sources are they drawn; what was Bowne's relation to the pragmatic movement in general; and finally, to what extent is the term pragmatism applicable to his epistemology ?

As a preliminary to the direct study of Bowne's works, we reviewed the writings of other investigators in the field of the dissertation. We found that all writers on Bowne have recognized to some extent at least the presence of both the pragmatic and rationalistic tendencies in his philosophy. Among those who have sought to harmonize these two sides of his thought under the Kantian conception of the primacy of the practical reason have been Professor Knudson, Professor Brightman (in his published writings), Professor Hocking and Bishop McConnell. Among those who have stressed the pragmatism of Bowne without attempting to relate it to the rationalism have been Professor Cell, Professor Coe, and Professor Flewelling. In no case had the pragmatic elements in Bowne's epistemology been previously systematically isolated and defined.

In Chapter One we examined the meaning of the term rationalism and its general relevance to the thought of Bowne; and, to show the meaning

of the term pragmatism and its applicability to Bowne's work, we sketched the early development of pragmatism as a movement, exhibiting developmentally its characteristic emphases. We found the antecedents of the movement in Kant, and then traced its more formal development through the work of Peirce and James to that of Dewey.

In Chapter Two, using the historical and critical methods, we turned to a direct study of Bowne's own work. For purposes of convenience the thirty-nine years of his critical writing were divided, somewhat arbitrarily, into four periods, as follows: the first period, from 1872 to 1878, representing the beginnings of his work; the second period, from 1879 to 1883, marked by the publication of Studies in Theism; the third period, from 1884 to 1896, marked by the two articles "Science Must Go" and "The Logic of Religious Belief"; and the fourth period, from 1897 to 1910, dated from the publication of The Theory of Thought and Knowledge. In each of these periods, the writings of Bowne were investigated with reference to the following topics: (1) The Nature of the Mind, (2) The Nature and Scope of Knowledge, (3) Philosophical Method and Criteria, and (4) The Nature of Truth.

In the first period our analysis revealed no characteristically pragmatic elements. Bowne conceived the mind activistically and regarded the cognitive relation as dualistic. The reality of the knowing subject is known both directly in self-experience and logically as a presupposition of experience. From the beginning we found that Bowne accepted the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, but he insisted that all theories be tested not alone by consistency and harmony but also by adequacy to explain the facts. In moral theory we discovered that Bowne had borrowed

from utilitarianism the concept of consequences as a criterion of moral judgment, but he kept it from being pragmatic by synthesizing it with an a priori intuitionism. Concerning the nature of truth, he regarded it as rational and independent, but at the same time as essentially purposive and useful. The elements which were thus found in Bowne's thought in the first period were discovered subsequently to be constant throughout the rest of his work. Each successive period brought further development but no rejection of the fundamental positions of the preceding periods.

In the second period, we found Bowne for the first time describing the mind in pragmatic terms as an organic whole of vital interests, and designating the function of the theoretical reason with respect to these interests as regulative. For the first time, further, in this period, Bowne divided the cognitive field between strict knowledge and rational belief, with logic and mathematics belonging to strict knowledge, and science, metaphysics, and moral and religious belief belonging to rational belief. He distinguished between the grounds of belief as objective, that is, the facts of perceptual experience, upon which science and metaphysics rest, and as subjective, that is, feelings, interests and needs of the mind, upon which moral and religious beliefs rest. It was this distinction between the grounds of belief and the setting of the interests and needs of the mind over against the theoretical function of reason that led to the use of pragmatic methods and criteria in the field of moral and religious belief. In the third and fourth periods, we found Bowne developing further the methods and criteria used in the first two periods, but without adding any essentially new element.

As a consequence of the historical and critical analysis of Bowne's writings in Chapter Two, it was possible in Chapter Three systematically to isolate and define the pragmatic elements in his epistemology. We showed that although Bowne intended an identification of his doctrine of interests with the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, he did not establish that identification, nor did he establish their rationality on any other ground. We showed that the pragmatic elements appearing in Bowne's work were not casual and incidental, but that they were characteristic and constant throughout the whole of his treatment of moral and religious belief after their first appearance in 1879. We indicated that Bowne's relation to pragmatism as a movement was one of sympathy in so far as pragmatic methods were applicable to the field of moral and religious belief, but that he rejected the pragmatic denial of rationalistic method in the fields of logic, mathematics and metaphysics.

In Chapter Four we examined the sources of the pragmatic elements in Bowne's epistemology in so far as these sources are now evident. We described the general thought-background of the period in which Bowne began his work, in so far as that background was related to his pragmatism. We found no evidence of pragmatic influence upon Bowne in the case of Martin and Ulrici, and we measured the extent of the influence in the cases of Mill, Spencer and Lotze, respectively. The relation of Bowne to James we examined in detail and found the evidence for a direct relation of indebtedness clear. We closed the chapter with an estimate of the extent to which Bowne was indebted to Kant for pragmatic suggestions. Following Chapter Four we have listed in summary form the eight principal conclusions which have emerged from the present investigation.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Edward Thomas Ramsdell was born in Bay City, Michigan, May 27, 1902. His parents are Phebe Voorheis and Dwight Horace Ramsdell. His secondary school preparation was done in Adrian and Ann Arbor, Michigan; his high school work in Ann Arbor and Detroit. He was graduated from the Detroit Central High School in 1919. Four years of undergraduate college work were completed, with the B.A. degree from the University of Michigan, in 1923. From 1923 to 1926 he was instructor, and then assistant professor, of English and Public Speaking at the University of Colorado. The work for the M.A. degree, done largely in the summers of 1923 and 1924 was completed and the degree granted from the University of Michigan in 1926. Then followed a three years' course in theology at Boston University School of Theology, from which the degree of S.T.B. was received in 1929. The summer semester of 1927 had been spent at Marburg University in Germany, and secondary enrollment in the Divinity School at Harvard during the years 1927-1929 had allowed work in the department of philosophy at Harvard University. In 1929-1930, he studied at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, under a fellowship from Boston University School of Theology. The work for the Ph.D. degree was carried on at Boston University during the two years 1930-1932.

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1. In the preparation of this bibliography of Bowne's writings, I have followed closely the bibliography prepared by Professor Carroll D. W. Hildebrand, of De Pauw University, as printed in Bishop Francis John McConnell's Borden Parker Bowne (N.Y.: Abingdon Press, 1929), pp. 282-286, except that the order here used is chronological rather than alphabetical. The present bibliography omits two articles listed by Professor Hildebrand which are articles about Bowne rather than by him, namely: "Philosophy of Herbert Spencer," Meth. Rev., 56(1874) pp. 510-514; and "Philosophy of Herbert Spencer," Meth. Rev., 57(1875) pp. 97-114. Further, the present bibliography includes the following article by Bowne which was omitted by Professor Hildebrand: "The Logic of Religious Belief," Meth. Quart. Rev., 66(1884) pp. 642-665.

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